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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
In Anglo-American history from the Magna Carta to the Declaration of
Independence, accountability in government stands as a rallying point for
reformers. During the debate over the 1787 Constitution, Alexander Ham ilton
in Federalist #77 prom oted the new constitution based on m any safeguards, one
being Senate approval of executive nominees. Democracy, Ham ilton insisted,
could be further safeguarded by senatorial oversight of Cabinet or sub-Cabinet
removals. The first Congress responded decisively to the question regarding the
executive power to remove a subordinate—it was vested solely in the president
(McDonald, 1994). While the Senate never received the pow er to review
dismissals, presidents have been cognizant of Congress' oversight powers
when handling scandals.1 Concerned about holding a political appointee

1 Conflict b etw een the executive and Congress arose during the post-C ivil War

period and resulted in the Tenure-of-Office Act of 1867, by which the Senate would
control the dismissal of Cabinet officers. However, the pre-1867 status quo was re
established with Congressional action in 1869 (Hinsdale, 1910) and the act was
eventually repealed in 1887 (Morganston, 1929).

1
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accountable, an executive m ust take into consideration m any different factors
including agency leadership, morale, and the nature of the scandal, lest the
foibles of a Cabinet or sub-Cabinet official be brought into the political arena of
the agency or nation.
With the proposition of the president as moral exemplar, perhaps the
most difficult scandal that a president or president-elect m ust deal w ith is that
which involves the private life of his Cabinet or sub-Cabinet officer. Though
founded by the Puritans, our nation has been intrigued and horrified by sexual
scandals since its inception. While closely intertw ined with the political process,
religious values are an im portant part of the mix of values faced by presidents
throughout our history. Accusations or well-founded proof of sexual
indiscretion against a qualified individual m ust cause a president pause.
A sex scandal presents a president w ith a new set of issues including
sexual harassment, blackmail and the protection of the private life of a Cabinet
secretary or under-secretary. Sexual indiscretion during tenure in office is
usually treated as a serious breach of the barrier between "public" and
"private," w h ic h typically results in the loss of a presidential appointee. Of
interest in this research are the factors that influence the developm ent of a sex
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3
scandal as it relates to a United States Cabinet secretary or under-secretary,
accused or guilty of sexual indiscretion.

Significance of Study

Inherent in governmental sex scandals are larger administrative ethical
standards and the imprecise boundary between what is a "private" and a
"public" act. For elected officials, there is at least the hope that voters can
decide on the appropriate boundary. H ow shall high ethical standards be
applied in an imperfect world that requires able administrators to prom ote the
"public good?" By studying past practitioners' decision-making processes,
perhaps insights m ay be gained into historical trends in ethics at the highest
levels of democratic governance.
Since sex scandals will not fade from the democratic arena, a m ultitude
of practical lessons m ay inform future decision-makers. Studying how a
president, or Cabinet secretary or under-secretary manages the ramifications of
an indiscretion provides a num ber of im portant insights into w hat this
researcher identifies as "scandal m anagement." Lessons to be learned from
studying scandal management include administrative techniques for dealing
w ith the fallout of the private behavior of an important actor, scandal as
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leverage in administrative competition, the impact of congressional responses
to sexual indiscretions in the executive branch, and the (potential) im pact of
public opinion on the managem ent of the scandal.
In Thinking in Time, Richard N eustadt and Ernest May (1986) discuss the
practical nature of analyzing historical events in order to inform contemporary
public executives about decision-making. A study of scandal m anagem ent will
inform m anagers about the process of scandal, the types of external pressures
that will impact executive organizations, and the types of pressures from within
the organization. According to Andrew George and Andrew Bennett (2005),
policymakers can use a descriptive model "to make more discriminating
diagnoses of emerging situations" (p. 237).
Phases and factors that describe sex scandals may also inform other
fields of administration. Crisis m anagem ent in the business field m ay profit
from a study of governmental executives embroiled in scandal. Non-profit
organizations m ay benefit from a discussion of the importance of public
opinion in response to scandal.
Joh n S u m m er s (2000)

indicates that there has been no history of

government sex scandals—developing variables related to this topic w ould
contribute to such an enterprise. This research will contribute to a greater
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understanding of sex scandals in government, as well as focus on some of the
impact of attitudes and mores have had on government sex scandals over the
past 200 years.

Statement of Problem

What factors influence the process involving a United States Executive
Cabinet or sub-Cabinet official who is accused of sexual indiscretion? While
historians and political scientists have identified many of the variables that
have impacted scandals of particular secretaries or under-secretaries, they have
not developed nuanced phases and factors that constitute a sex scandal. By
exploring the tenures of Henry Cisneros, John Eaton, Alexander Hamilton and
Sumner Welles, a greater understanding of the variables involved in the process
will be reached. For the purposes of this study, the following definitions shall
be employed:
•

sexual indiscretion shall be defined as "sexual behavior at variance
w ith the m ores of a society" (Woolf et al., 1977); .

•

accused shall be defined as to charge with a fault or offense;

a Cabinet or sub-Cabinet official is an individual who serves at the
pleasure of the president after being nom inated and confirmed by the
Senate; and
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•

scandal is defined as a real, or alleged, non-systemic, non-corruption,
episodic act(s) which results in damage to the reputation of a
secretary or under-secretary and the community. The scandal process
shall be defined by exogenous and endogenous acts during a period
of time, beginning w ith the exposure or allegation of the sexually
indiscrete behavior and ending with the resignation of the executive
due to matters related to the indiscretion or successful cover-up of the
matter.

Research Questions

The aim of this research into the sex scandal process at the Cabinet and
sub-Cabinet levels is to answer the following questions:
W hat is the general sequence of events that makes up a sex scandal at
this level?
What factors impact the development of a scandal?
Answers to these questions will be developed by exploring (a) the related
scandal literature; (b) the historical literature related to the indiscretions of
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of War John Eaton,
and Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles; and (c) original research into the
relatively recent and under-researched indiscretions of Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development H enry Cisneros. In order to familiarize the reader
w ith the group of three aforementioned cases, the following are brief sketches
of these historical cases.
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While holding the office of secretary of the treasury from 1789 until 1795,
Alexander H am ilton was alleged to have benefited from im proper financial
dealings. An informal congressional delegation confronted the secretary of the
treasury. Ham ilton's exculpatory evidence included proofs of his own affair
w ith a m arried wom an and payments for her husband's silence. Convinced of
Ham ilton's innocence and shocked by revelations of his private indiscretions,
the congressmen prom ised to keep Ham ilton's secret.
Allegations of sexual indiscretion were leveled against Senator John
Eaton before he joined Andrew Jackson's Cabinet. With the approval of
Jackson, Senator Eaton had married a highly controversial social figure,
M argaret Timberlake, on January 1,1829. Ostracized by W ashington elites for
her behavior as a barm aid and activities w ith Eaton while her husband was at
sea, Margaret had become a friend of Andrew Jackson who welcomed her into
the White House. Having ignored the advice to exclude Eaton from his
government, Jackson defended John and Margaret against allegations of sexual
indiscretion before his Cabinet. The Eatons were rejected by Cabinet m embers'
wives and a crucial member of Jackson's ow n family, Emily. Mrs. Emily Jackson
Donelson was the wife of Andrew, the president's stepson. Andrew served as
Jackson's personal secretary. Jackson w ould eventually banish Emily to
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Tennessee. Injected into the poisoned environment was presidential succession
politics—Secretary of State M artin Van Buren successfully supplanted Vice
President John C. Calhoun as Jackson's expected successor. Having developed a
close political and personal relationship with the president, Van Buren
engineered the resignation of the whole Cabinet in April of 1831.
After serving President Franklin D. Roosevelt for seven years, career
diplom at Sumner Welles' reputation suffered a severe blow —allegations of
homosexual solicitation. After an F.B.I. investigation ordered by F.D.R., denials
from Welles and a number of attem pts to pressure the president into firing the
under-secretary, Roosevelt successfully resisted the removal of Sumner. Almost
three years later, Secretary of State Cordell Hull delivered an ultim atum to
Roosevelt which resulted in Welles' formal resignation on September 25,1943.
Welles, Eaton, and Ham ilton's cases provide a small, but diverse set of scandal
variables that drive this undertaking.
The content of this research is organized in the following manner:
•

The three case studies summarized above and the relevant scandal
literature will form the basis to develop a scandal model (Chapter II).

•

With the lessons of history and the literature guiding the researcher,
an exploration of the H enry Cisneros affair is conducted (Chapter III).
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•

A comparison of the original phases and factors to the Cisneros case
will determine whether modifications are necessary (Chapter IV).

This author anticipates refined scandal phases and factors to emerge,
describing a previously unexplored area of administration.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Understanding Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level sex scandals requires an
exploration of presidential appointees within the larger societal and
governmental framework. While a scant amount of literature focuses on
indiscretion at the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet levels in the United States, other
areas may contribute to the development of a model focused on sexual
indiscretion. This review begins with other scandal processes, sex scandals,
institutional competition, executive decision-making as it contributes to an
understanding of sex scandals and finally a proposal of larger moral issues
impacting decision-making at the highest level of government.

Political Scandal

Political scientists contribute a wide variety of variables to the
understanding of how scandals develop exogenously and endogenously. The
following authors contribute the basic framework upon which m ore expansive
works will be added. At the personal level, Garment (1991) sums up w hat is
transpiring in m any contemporary cases of scandal by observing that
10
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individuals in W ashington may subconsciously reconstruct the events
(questionable behaviors) that occur, eventually leading to a conscious effort at
cover-up. Moodie (1989) identifies three major requirements for a scandal: a
messenger, channels for the transmission of the message, and an audience or
public that considers the story scandalous. Moodie notes that the messenger(s)
m ay be from different areas of the government, and it m ay take some time
before the parts of the scandal are put together. Williams (1998) discusses how
other controversies such as Travelgate, sales of pork futures, and events
surrounding the suicide of Vincent Foster contributed to the scandal
environment of the Clinton White House. The lessons of other scandals m ay
im pact how actors behave, i.e., learning from Watergate, Attorney General
Edwin Meese's decision to staunch the hemorrhage of Iran-Contra by insisting
on an investigation based on the president's need to be protected from a coverup (Williams, 1998). Jimenez (2004) confirms the importance of the press's
attitude toward the ruling party and the political strength of opposing parties
during the Spanish socialist scandals of the 1990s.
According to Markovits and Silverstein (1988), political scandals have
actors and plot outlines that are virtually interchangeable. Occurring during a
relatively "quiet" period, a scandal flares for a relatively brief period. An

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
individual acting in what may be perceived as the best interests of the country
is characterized as a violator of the public trust. At the outset, the scandal is
limited to the "transgressor" and the immediate "victim" until the efforts of a
third party, possibly the "purifier," expose it. A purifier m ay be a political
party, the media, investigatory committees, etc. Characterizing the next stage is
the publicizing of the behavior and demands for punishm ent and restitution.
Once the transgressor has been punished, reforms are instituted that will ensure
repetition of the scandal and "quiet" is restored, the cycle is complete
(Markovits & Silverstein, 1988).
Theodore Lowi (2004) provides an alternative framework for
understanding the steps that a political scandal follows. According to Lowi, a
scandal is a "commodity" that carries certain value.
It exists as guilty knowledge that has a certain value to its possessor, and
its release is like any traded commodity, a calculated risk. These are
calculated risks shaped by the political environment, just as risky
business decisions are shaped by the estimates of probability of success
conditioned by the general economic environment. And, as w ith the
economic marketplace, the political marketplace fluctuates, even if not in
a regular cyclical pattern, (p. 70)
The m ost likely consum ers of the "guilty know ledge" are the allies and

potential allies of the political players who possess the information (Lowi,
2004). Sharing such scandalous information w ith the public is regarded as a
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means to invigorate one's supporters and rally legislators to a cause, or
suppress the opposition's voters, demoralize their party, or weaken the
leadership of the party of whom the guilty knowledge is concerned (Lowi,
2004).
Lowi identifies three stages through which a scandal passes: exposure,
denial, and investigation. As a valuable political commodity from the outset,
scandal gains in value w hen a not-entirely-truthful denial is offered to the
exposer or the press (Lowi, 2004). "Investigation (Lowi argues) is an end in
itself, because it is sustained, institutionalized or formalized exposure that can
shrink power without assassination" (p. 79). The process is given further
definition by "substantive" and "procedural" dimensions for each phase. The
substantive dimension of "exposure" is the revelation of the moral breach,
while the procedural dimension includes a cover-up that occurs during the
murky, accusatory period when controvertible proof has not been offered. Lowi
makes the apt observation that it is the cover-up characteristic of this dimension
that makes it politically explosive, note the W atergate scandal. "Denial" reaches
its procedural dimension when constitutional procedures are accessed, for
example the grand jury testimony by President Clinton as a part of the Paula
Jones v. William Jefferson Clinton proceedings. The procedures following
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President Clinton's unwillingness to resign exemplify the extreme m easures—
independent counsel investigations, congressional hearings, impeachment
proceedings, and a Senate impeachment trial—to which a party will resort
when it is pessimistic about reaching its public policy goals.
Lowi's analysis "plays out" the scandal as a commodity analogy w ith the
conclusion that the marketplace for scandal is at its strongest when one party is
concerned about its electoral opportunities. Having reached a pessimistic
conclusion, a party may pass the commodity along to the media. Lowi argues
that the media is the messenger, and while it may influence the scandal
message to a degree, rarely does it become more im portant than w hat it is
reporting. While Lowi suggests a scandal process, other political scientists have
developed other exogenous and endogenous factors describing scandal.
In Robert Williams' Political Scandal in the U.S.A. (1998), the author agrees
with Lowi w ith regard to two distinct phases of a scandal—the breach of
accepted norm s and the ensuing effort to cover-up or minimize the breach. The
"dance of scandal," as Williams refers to it, is composed of the following steps:
allegation, denial, exposure, inquiry, cover-up, fresh allegations, further
inquiries and sometimes even a conclusion. During the "dance,"
questions are posed and, if unanswered, they heighten a sense of
scandal. If answered, the answers provide new facts to check and rebut.
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The search goes deeper and backward in time to look at the accused's
record, (p. 12)
With reference to Watergate, Williams makes the following observations about
forces involved in scandals: the idiosyncracies of the key players, ideological
conflict, institutional confrontation, and partisan rivalries. Beginning in one
institutional location and picked up by the press and other institutions, "the
scandal develops momentum, it multiplies and diversifies. In one sense,
institutions compete for the heart of the scandal"—press, courts, prosecutors
(p. 33). Individuals and institutions cannot contain the haphazard unfolding of
the scandal, nor the m ultiple story lines being developed. "Each player pursues
its ow n institutional logic and priorities. Each feeds on the revelations
unearthed by others that, collectively, underm ine the inadequacies and halftruths of official denials" (Williams, 1998, p. 34). Williams identifies the
dynamics of official Congressional committees involved w ith investigating
scandal, as well as public response, and concludes his commentary about
W atergate by stating that it should not be held up as a fram ework for all future
political scandals.
Once a scandal has become public, Sherman (1989) suggests a framework
for understanding the process. Crucial to understanding the development of a
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scandal is the interplay between the indiscreet individual and his or her
opponents. An effort to mobilize the press is aimed at clearly portraying the
behavior as indicative of personal moral corruption thereby stigmatizing the
individual in the m inds of the public. A defense of the individual m ay come in
certain types of "attacks." From studies of police scandals at the local level,
Sherman premises his stages as follows:
Police departm ents are trusted organizationally to control the conduct of
their members. Failures of internal control are betrayals of that trust. If
the organization does not show any interest in controlling its members'
deviance, then the organization itself appears to be corrupt. . . . Scandal
is a public act of labeling an actor's identity, a ceremony of status
degradation, (p. 890)
Sherman's stages consistently occur, but not always in the same sequence and
sometimes repeating themselves. The following are the stages.
Revelation. A shroud of secrecy is tom by new information and is

sometimes characterized as accidental. The breach that usually suggests a larger
phenomenon is typically caused by a conflict within the circle of secrecy. The
revelation m ay have come about because of conflict over organizational goals.
Publication. While the original sources of the information rarely have the

resources to publicize it, they m ay have the contacts to inform the press.
Decision makers within newspapers m ust judge the behavior corrupt, and once
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the threshold for publishing the first article has been reached, subsequent
articles are routine.
Defense. Individuals w ith access and sharing common interest in the

defense of the departm ent m ay choose to attack through the media. The assault
on the revelations m ay be without concern for the veracity of the original
allegations or with regard to the legitimacy of the way in which the charges
were made. Charged w ith general allegations of corruption, departm ental
individuals argue that there are just a few rotten apples in the departm ent and
m ay attem pt to shut dow n the revelations through control of information, i.e.,
intim idation of witnesses.
Dramatization. Facts are used to imply general corruption that should be

a cause for public concern. "This process has two levels: the level of fact and the
level of symbol" (Jimenez, 2004, p. 1115). The first level deals w ith the basic
details of the scandal, whereas the symbolic level provides societal relevance.
Prosecution. Administrative machinery, whether prosecutor, ethics

departm ent, grand jury et al., begin the review process of behavior, so as to
determine issues of legality.
Stigmatization. According to Sherman (1989), "The conditions of an

audience labeling a police departm ent as corrupt are the conditions of a
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successful, punitive scandal" (p. 909). In order for the stigmatization to occur,
the public m ust perceive the agency as lacking oversight ability w ith regard to
its workers, news breakers m ust be credible and representatives of the
community m ust portray the gravity of the offenses.
Sherman's discussion of police scandals provides a useful guide in
understanding how a sex scandal m ight progress and w hat might be necessary
in order to defend a secretary or under-secretary.

Institutional Competition

An area of the literature that may be helpful in understanding the
development of sex scandals is decision-making at the national level,
particularly in the area of bureaucratic politics. In their discussion of the
development of foreign policy, Allison and Halperin (1972) identify
compromise, conflict and bargaining between various officials as mechanism by
which final policy decisions are reached. Clifford (1990) modifies the
bureaucratic politics paradigm of decision-making by noting that a president
m ay manage the process by setting the ground rules and working with his own
key players. While concerned about making good international policy,
organizations and leadership find that "threats to interests from rival
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organizations, or competing political groups, are far more real than threats from
abroad" (Allison & Halperin, 1972, p. 58). Regardless of the president's efforts,
these larger policy administrative conflicts and domestic politics m ay in fact
lead to the darker side of competition, i.e., in order to further an agency's policy
goals, charges of sexual indiscretion m ay be used to underm ine the position of a
competing executive or lead to a secretary or under-secretary's resignation.
Ginsberg and Shefter (1999) argue that parties in the last 30 years, which
are unwilling to engage in full competition at the polls to stop opponents, resort
to using institutions—Congress or the presidency—under their control or
access to the press or courts (through the special prosecutor) to disrupt rivals.
According to Garment, the "new" special prosecutor law may in fact be an
over-reaction to the scandals, and are destroying good servants who are not
threats to the Constitution, i.e., institutional competition has created a
"monster." The Independent Council Act, according to Fisher (1999), is a
necessity because of the conflict of interest inherent in a Justice Departm ent
investigation of other executives. Fisher concludes that the majority of counsels
h a v e " su ccessfu lly " c o m p le te d their r e sp o n sib ilitie s, an d fu tu re

appointees

m ust act professionally, without appearance of conflict of interest, and
expeditiously carry out his or her responsibilities.
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Sex Scandal Literature

Gastor's (1988) analysis of the Profumo Affair2 in Britain identifies
im portant factors in the development of a sex scandal. Included in the analysis
were:
contemporary sexual mores;
•

press behavior;

•

"placement" of the affair as a symbol of British decline;
the significance of breaking the rules when lying to the elected
body—in this case Gaster states that John Profumo was acting outside
the rules of class and political discourse;

•

additional constraints on the party in power through the behavior of
the "loyal" opposition;

•

executive responsibility;

•

administrative competition between members of the ruling party;

•

civil servants' agendas;

2 In 1963, the brief extra-marital relationship between British Secretary of State
for War John Profumo and a showgirl, Christine Keeler, became public. The situation
was further complicated because of Keeler's relationship with Yevgeny Ivanov, the
senior naval attache at the Soviet Embassy in London.
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•

in place of the American use of due process, the British sense of
fairness gives the accused complete deference unless proof of guilt
arises; and
even though Profumo had not broken any laws and w as not subject
to any criminal sanctions, he subm itted to community values
(resigning his position) that he had always supported.

D unn (2000) identified two contrasting strategies for scandal
management that President Clinton employed. In a successful effort to mitigate
the Chinese espionage scandal, the president admitted error, altered policies,
rem oved workers, opened his administration to investigators, and blamed
previous administrations for mistakes. When President Clinton faced the
W hitewater and various sex scandals, he employed a different strategy. Like
President Nixon during the Watergate scandal, Clinton followed a fivefold
strategy of (1) filing lawsuits and appeals in order to avoid cooperation with
investigators, (2) using the gravitas of office, the president denied a sexual
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, (3) attacking the opposition for conspiring
to remove him from office, (4) deflecting criticism by initiating new programs
that serve the public, and (5) diminishing the degree of his m isbehavior when
finally admitting responsibility.
Through an analysis of the President Clinton/Monica Lewinsky affair,
Gordon (2001) further develops Dunn's factors by focusing on the public's
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varying judgm ents of Clinton's behavior, the addition of alleged prepresidential sexual indiscretion, and the addition of the special prosecutor to
the administrative competition.
Smith's (2003) analysis of presidential rhetoric during the President
Clinton/Monica Lewinsky sex scandal provides a helpful process guide as well
as general communications efforts employed by a president. The author's six
rhetorical phases of the scandal included discussion of how accusations and
defenses impacted the main actors' strategic choices, public opinion, and
congressional votes.
Smith's phase one includes allegation, denial and evasion. Included in
the discussion of this phase is the history of sex scandals as part of President
Clinton's reputation—while it had concerned the public, it had also given
candidate Clinton name recognition—the public was aware that they had
elected an individual with marital problems. This author believes that this
could also be extended to the arena of a Cabinet secretary or under-secretary
that is nom inated and confirmed.
In phase two, prosecutors, reporters and pundits set out to refute the
president's denial in what Smith refers to as a feeding frenzy. President
Clinton's opponents needed to keep the public's focus on misdeeds, but the
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dismissal of Paula Jones' case reduced the "frenzy." With the great deal of
emphasis on his sexual indiscretions, the public continued to give him strong
job approval ratings overall, regardless of the m edia's continued focus. The
public's perception that Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr w as an individual
whose mission was to destroy Clinton favored his presidency. Likewise, the
public perception of the investigator and the behavior of the press m ay well be
im portant in determining the post-scandal outcome of a Cabinet secretary or
under-secretary.
Phase three is characterized as the m om ent of truth in which the
president admitted wrongdoing, apologized, requested privacy so that he could
repair the damage done to his family, attacked the politically m otivated
prosecutors who were prying into personal lives, and said that he needed to
return to the business of the nation.
Phase four is characterized by the determ ination of presidential
opponents to proceed w ith an impeachment hearing that the public opposed by
a huge margin.
Phase five is characterized by a m id-term electoral judgm ent (which
usually results in the sitting president losing seats) that resulted in the public
repudiating the pro-impeachment party.
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Phase six focuses on impeachment and trial. With their constituents
supporting removal and general polls showing opposition to the use of
impeachment against the president, House Republicans pressed their
interpretation of the facts and the Constitution by voting for articles of
impeachment. The requisite two-thirds majority was not obtainable because the
senators were m oved by the punishm ent already m eted out to the president
and their belief that he had not committed a political crime against the state.
The people did not feel that they needed protection from the president and
/'

were concerned about the potentially destabilizing effect of impeachment on
the Office of the Presidency, and the alienation of the American people from
their government. However unlikely, the constitutional process outlined by
Smith m ay be used against a secretary or under-secretary, but this does not
preclude congressional or public responses that m ay be similar to w hat
happened to President Clinton.
Smith concludes that there are certain rhetorical problems that
presidents fall into during scandals. Perhaps the m ost im portant aspect of the
p h a s e s p u t fo rth b y S m ith is th e d e g r e e to w h ic h b e h a v io r d o e s

not "square"

w ith the past rhetoric of the president. In this case, Clinton had previously
stated that he had problems in his own marriage, which he believed was p art of
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a privacy zone, and the public had supported him regardless of his relationship
w ith Gennifer Flowers. The president's continuing rhetoric, according to Smith,
did not however square w ith the fact that he did have an intim ate relationship
w ith Monica Lewinsky, but Clinton's stance on it being a part of his personal
life resonated with the public. President Clinton's rhetorical crisis did not
deepen because he did not lose a portion of his core constituency, partly
because Monica Lewinsky reportedly initiated the encounters. Smith concludes
that Clinton's crisis was due to the fact that his fate was in the hands of the
opposition party. Smith's commentary on the rhetorical crisis that President
Clinton faced offers insight into what an appointed executive m ight face when
dealing w ith a sexual indiscretion.

Managing Sex Scandals

Sherman (1989) provides an interesting interpretation of the literature
regarding "revelation" of a scandal. "The revelation stage of scandal is the one
m ost often interpreted as accidental, explained as a 'mistake' in the
organizational strategies for controlling information about deviance" (p. 896).
H ow should organizations respond to this mistake?
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The field of crisis m anagem ent provides insights into the development of
sexual scandals and how executives deal with the topic. In "Public Relations"
(Marconi, 2004), the author identifies three risky strategies in times of crisis
management: putting a positive spin on it, having "no comment," and doing
nothing while hoping it blows over. According to Marconi, ignoring the needs
of the stakeholder should be avoided by a policy of acknowledging the
problem, dealing w ith it, and returning to the mission of the company. The
author identifies three stages of crisis management: before the first indications
of a crisis, at the first indication of crisis and after a crisis. "Building trust and
being honest" is key to developing a rapport with the stakeholders during the
initial stage. Details "at the first indication of crisis" suggest the following:
•

designate one person to be the spokesperson;

•

define and release your side of the story to the public first, so that
those responsible can lead the discussion;

•

present the executive in the larger context in terms of positive
contributions;

•

keep people within the organization informed;

•

be honest and responsive by continuing to communicate the message
of "making it right."
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After the w orst of the crisis has been managed, it is important to remain visible
and accessible, active in community efforts in order to regain any lost stature. A
few comments bring forth the importance of a track record—if the company is
rotten to the core, a complete makeover m ay be necessary. The track record of a
company, like that of an executive, suggests how an executive who goes public
with the indiscretions before entering office m ay lessen the impact of the bad
news, a la the Monica Lewinsky scandal.
Barton (2001) identifies managers who have unsuccessfully m anaged a
crisis as m ore likely to use these experiences in order to approach the next
situation. Using the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Cuban Missile Crisis as
examples, Barton cites Graham Allison's analysis of each crisis as being shaped
by assumptions, evidence and options. An executive who focuses on the central
issue among competing possibilities and uses all of the tools at their disposal
results in the skillful handling of the crisis. Unlike President Kennedy, Barton
believes that as an executive, President Clinton (a) misjudged the seriousness of
the allegations, (b) was overwhelmed w ith other international issues
(unfocused), (c) failed to receive enough options from a variety of people, and
(d) attem pted to bury the affair rather than acknowledge it. "Clinton failed the
litmus test of crisis management: respond quickly, tell the truth, and m ake it
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right" (Barton, 2001, p. 53). During the initial news about Monica Lewinsky and
the president, Clinton, according to Barton, "personified a case study of a
m anager in denial" (p. 79).

Cultural Underpinnings

Key to understanding the development of a sex scandal are the moral
values and issues which act as a backdrop, or anchors, to m any of the actors
and institutions. Markovits and Silverstein (1988) state:
What is considered scandal at one point in history is considered normal
in another . . . political careers in the United States have been severely
impeded, sometimes destroyed by even the suggestion of sexual
adventure on the part of the politicians concerned. The shared
experiences of one generation produce a set of beliefs and norms of
behavior inevitably unique to that generation, (p. 3)
Dunn (2000) asserts, "To be successful, presidents need a firm grasp of moral
questions. How well they lead the country and how history assesses their
performance depend on their handling of moral issues" (Dunn, 2000, p. 1).
Dunn identifies the following factors as influential in determining w hat issues
emerge at a given time and how presidents react:
cultural conflict in an adversarial society—a culture war between
forces of moral relativity and certainty;
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the intersection of moral character and moral issues—varying moral
interpretations and decisions by the president with regard to certain
moral issues, i.e., support or opposition to abortion, etc.;
the press and presidential m orality—choices by the m ainstream press
to report on the m oral behavior of the president;
presidential strategies during moral combat—steps by the chief
executive to handle scandal;
ideology—varying values-based visions of the future lead to
confrontation over the moral character of the opposition plans;
religion's moral lens—citizens of the United States see events through
a moral lens;
public policy's moral cloak—dressing up public policy initiatives as
moral imperatives by a "moral" administration;
popular expectations impacted by personal shortcomings of a
president;
the constitutional cultivation of moral issues—inherent in our system
are opportunities for the press, parties, and various branches of
government to investigate moral issues;
historical revisionism and presidential greatness—the historical
record will impact the moral legacy of the president;
the national debate about moral decline—a discussion of the
historical moral trends and the part that the president plays;
personal versus public policy m orality—the belief that the personal
life of a president is not of significance as compared w ith the morality
of his policies; and
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contrary definitions of m orality—competing systems provide
different definitions of morality.

The factors mentioned above are particularly im portant in understanding the
decision-making of a president w hen dealing with allegations of sexual
indiscretion against a secretary or under-secretary. However, with decision
making spread throughout the executive department, it can be argued that each
of the above factors impact Cabinet and sub-Cabinet administrators. With
decentralized moral decision-making in the upper reaches of the
administration, a sexually indiscrete secretary or under-secretary faces a
num ber of possible processes.

Sexual Scandal Phases Literature

Methodology

While the literature provides m any of the significant factors in the
development of sex scandals at the Cabinet secretary or under-secretary level, a
nuanced set of phases and factors that incorporates these variables and explores
the subtleties is non-existent. Gamson (2004) notes in his work on the influence
of prostitution and the elite that every sex scandal has its ow n idiosyncratic cast
of characters and particular history. Likewise, sexual indiscretion by a Cabinet
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secretary or under-secretary will have its own properties, but the underlying
context and processes will rem ain the same. Following a brief discussion of the
type of experimental approach are various factors that seem to be of
significance in the development of a sex scandal. In order to develop more
sensitive phases and factors describing a sexual scandal, variables from the
literature will be compiled (see Figures 1-4) and then compared to a case study.
The historical case study serves as the methodological foundation for
developing the phases and factors of a sex scandal. In order to develop phases
and factors of this nature, a qualitative rather than quantitative approach is
necessary for two reasons: (1) a large enough sample size of Cabinet or under
secretaries cannot be located, and (2) a qualitative inquiry is likely to be more
nuanced. Driving this research is the need to know "why" a scandal m ay
progress, and a case study, according to Yin (1989), is particularly suited to
providing the richness of data required to explain the phenomenon. George and
Bennett (2005) list the benefits of case studies as identifying variables and
mechanisms at work. An instrumental case study will be used because it
focuses on the insights that reflect on an overall theory or phenomenon, rather
than just focusing on the case (Stake, 1994). For the purposes of this study, a
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collective case study provides a greater, more nuanced understanding through
a larger sample population (Stake, 1994).
Buttressing any study should be a careful sampling of a population, but
in the case of sex scandals at the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level historical
sources do not provide the statistically ideal. Contemporary exposures of the
Kennedy and Clinton scandals may lead readers to expect that a large
population of sexually indiscrete Cabinet or under-secretaries as well as
documentation to prove scandalous behavior exists. Inherent in this expectation
is the assumption that sexual indiscretion is concomitant w ith the charisma and
ambition to become federal executives. However, im peding the documentation
of such peccadilloes are executives' (and others') attem pts to suppress sexual
scandals and impersonal forces that result in the complete loss of some of the
historical data. The historical literature, while filled with mentions of
presidents' extra-marital dalliances, showcases few fully developed Cabinet or
sub-Cabinet level sexual scandals. Contemporary interest has been focused on
President Jefferson in particular. While people whispered about the striking
sim ila r ities in a p p e a r a n c e

of secretary of state Thomas Jefferson and the child of

his slave Sally Hemings, the scandal developed only w hen Jefferson became
chief executive. This author w ould be speculating regarding cultural and
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historical reasons that explain w hy it had not developed during Jefferson's
Cabinet service or why F.B.I. Director J. Edgar H oover's careful record keeping
regarding the sexual behaviors of elites throughout m uch of the 20th Century
led to few fully disclosed and documented Cabinet and sub-Cabinet scandals.
Thorough scholarship and archival efforts have resulted in the emergence of a
convenience sample of three—Alexander Hamilton, John Eaton, and Sumner
Welles—being available for the construction of this sex scandal model. These
cases do not provide a sample that would fully explicate sexual scandals in a
single historical period, nor do they provide an example from each period of
American history. However, the aforementioned scandals provide im portant
components for the development of phases that describe sex scandals.
Determining specific phase components was accomplished by a
thorough review of available original documents as well as secondary sources.
However, when original docum ents were not available, a careful reading of the
secondary literature was conducted in order to determine the scandal process
as well as the "variables" inherent in each scandal. Ideally, an adequate supply
o f h isto r ica l

documents w ould be available to historians in order to make

informed decisions, but in these cases each historiography provides
opportunities and drawbacks for this research. While Alexander H am ilton's life
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has been carefully documented by m any historians, unfortunately the only first
hand account of Alexander Ham ilton's extra-marital dalliance was his own,
post-Treasury, publication that was intended to protect his reputation.
Secondhand accounts come in the form of Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson's
brief notes or accusations in partisan newspapers, but do not provide data that
suggests a different scandal process than that which is laid out by the Treasury
secretary—whether guilty of speculation or not, the Treasury secretary was
forced to defend himself to a congressional delegation by providing
information of his ow n sexually indiscrete behavior. The case of John Eaton is
the anomaly of the three cases—rich in documents that have been carefully
reviewed by many historians, including experts on Jackson's administration.
While a compilation of official Jackson documents related to the Eaton affair
does not exist, historians have consistently provided docum entation and
interpretations that provide essentially the same scandal process and variables
which composed John Eaton and Margaret Timberlake's scandal. As will be
evident during the review of the secondary literature found in Appendix A,
there are num erous authors who have provided short descriptions of the Welles
scandal. However, the basis for this author's scandal process and variables
regarding Sumner Welles are the thorough, recent works—based on personal

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35
and professional docum ents—of Benjamin Welles (1997) and Irwin Gellman
(1995) as well as the work of Gentry (1991), who provided corroboration of the
scandal process and the involvement of F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover.
Gellman was responsible for the collection of governmental docum ents
regarding the interaction of the three main actors—Roosevelt, Hull, and Welles;
the collection of documents can be found at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
Benjamin Welles, the late under-secretary's son, gathered State Departm ent
documents, private correspondences, and interviews with Welles' intimates not
previously compiled. While the above author's works and documents do not
allow the precision of firsthand historical research, the historical literature's
outlines and secondary literature do allow this author to synthesize the phases
of a sexual scandal.
While other qualitative methodologies, such as a grounded m odel theory
approach, m ay be just as useful, the m agnitude of an effort to evaluate
thousands of historical documents should be reserved for a larger, m ore
indepth treatm ent of all of the cases. In this research, three instrum ental case
studies gleaned from the secondary literature form the basis for the phases and
factors that are then compared to research focused on another case study.
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From the aforementioned historical cases and literature, the general
progress of a sex scandal is depicted and described in Figures 1-4 by the
"actors" and operationalizing variables. The following text is the underpinning
of this author's predictive description of sex scandals at the Cabinet and subCabinet level.

Phase 2: The Individual and the Alleged Behavior

According to Pika and Norman (1996), presidents m ay choose
individuals for Cabinet and sub-Cabinet posts for many different reasons
including technical expertise, clientele or ethnic group identification, political
experience, and pre-tenure friendship. While these factors are determinants of
Cabinet choices and m ay impact the overall development of a sexual
indiscretion scandal, the historical literature suggests that there are other
significant pre-scandal variables (see Figure 1, Phase 1). These pre-scandal
variables are familial relationships, the relationship between the president and
the accused, the relationships between the accused and fellow executives, and
the relationships betw een the accused and members of Congress. While each
relationship can be further classified according to three different categories—
political, professional, and personal—as well as the intensity of each, they are

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37
C abinet Secretary or Under-Secretary

Cabinet Secretary ---- i-~> Alleged Sexually Indiscrete Behavior
or Under-Secretary
\
►
\
(Information received
\
by messenger)
,.r
>

Emergence of "Sexual Indiscretion"
History

Operationalizing Variables
Secretarv or Under-Secretarv Traits

Traits of Indiscretion

Familial relationships
Relationship with the President
Personal
Professional
Political
Relationships with fellow executives
Personal
Professional
Political
Relationship with Congressmen/
Women
Personal
Professional
Political

Nature of Alleged Behavior
"Timing" of Alleged Behavior
Marital Status of Individual(s)
Genders of Individuals
Legality of Behavior
Legal Record of Behavior(s)
Third Party Involvement
Number of Alleged Cases
Related Issues
Social Mores
Disposition of Intimates

Significant to the first phase, as well as subsequent phases of scandal
model, are the alternate paths by which actors are impacted by other
actors, events and context. A Cabinet or sub-Cabinet executive behaves in
ways that are subject to allegations of sexual impropriety. Arising from
the past may be allegations of sexual indiscretion. With or without the
knowledge of a third party's discovery of the alleged impropriety, the
secretary or under-secretary proceeds with their responsibilities.

Figure 1. Cabinet Secretary or Under-Secretary Scandal Flow Chart:
Phase 1 - The Alleged Behavior.
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►
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^
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/
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i
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Executive Department(s)

I

Congress
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Press
‘A
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Operationalizing Variables
Messenger
Public/Private Individual
Documentation
Number of Purveyors

Institutional
Representatives
Investigation
Transmission

Press
Investigation
Transmission

Public
Opinion
Elections

After providing information of alleged indiscretion to various
institutional representatives, a messenger(s) may continue to be an actor
in the process. Institutional representatives may choose to investigate the
allegations and/or transmit the allegations to other institutional actors.
Such an investigation may produce a record that may be "used" in the
future. Oversight responsibilities may result in a presentation of the
information to the secretary or under-secretary. Investigatory reporting
by the press may lead to release of the story, thereby leading to
pressures for a "full" investigation.
Figure 2. Cabinet Secretary or Under-Secretary Scandal Flow Chart:
Phase 2 - The Unfolding. .
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Press ........... *'
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After a secretary or under-secretary's explanation of events, an
exoneration, resignation or cover-up may occur with the approval of the
senior executive involved. News of the decision may be transmitted to
any of the other institutional actors, and result in inaction, an
investigation, or transmission to others or the press. Competing actors
may force another investigation and/or plead their case with the
president for the resignation of the offender. Choosing to cover-up or
deny the results, the president may face the release of the story to the
press and public. In the next phase, the president deals with the impact of
the denial or cover-up.
Figure 3. Cabinet Secretary or Under-Secretary Scandal Flow Chart:
Phase 3 - The Explanation and Investigation.
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Secretary or Under-Secretary
*
A

-► Resignation

President
A

*

Executive
*
Department(s)

Press
X
Public
'a . Congress

Operationalizing Variables
Accused Executive
President
Responsibilities
Pro-Active Behavior

Other Executive Actors
Personal Conflict
Political Conflict
Administrative Conflict

President
Tactics
Personal History
Legacy

Press
Relationship
Support/No Support

Congress
Committee Oversight
Political Capital

Public
Elections

Figure 4: With the statutory power to continue a Cabinet executive's
tenure, a president decides to retain an executive. The repercussions may
be reduced morale, pressure from competing elites, expenditures of
political capital, and/or reduced public support, possibly leading to
electoral losses. The length of the secretary or under-secretary's tenure is
usually determined by any number of factors, including a president's
skills, policy and political disputes, etc., but its conclusion is usually
determined by a precipitating event.
Figure 4. Cabinet Secretary or Under-Secretary Scandal Flow Chart:
Phase 4 - Inter-Executive and Congressional Competition.
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not necessarily m utually exclusive. In the historical literature, various analysts
provide antecedents for understanding the development of a sexual
indiscretion scandal.

Secretary or Under-Secretary Traits

Familial relationships. The relationship between spouses, as well as

extended family, before and after the advent of a sexual indiscretion m ay be
pivotal in the development of a scandal. Whether the wom an (or man) is firmly
grounded as a protector of the marriage, or not, m ay have significant
consequences to the scandal sequence. If the marriage has been unstable due to
indiscretion and/or marital discord, a petition for divorce may quickly ensue
thereby breaking the news to the public and quickening the pace of the scandal
process. Parents or mother and father-in-laws of the sexually indiscrete spouse
may choose to speak out about rum ors thereby intensifying the pressure on the
spouse and provide public support for airing of the scandal. In each of the
historical case studies, historians find a stable marriage.
Alexander Ham ilton's account relates the s to r y o f a b o red , b u t h a p p ily
m arried m iddle-aged man who succumbs to the tem ptation that accompanies
celebrity. There is no indication in the historical record that Mrs. H am ilton was
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aware of the infidelity, nor any other m em ber of the extended family (Mitchell,
1976).
John Eaton and Margaret Timberlake were to a great extent responsible
for the scandal that arose around them. While John Eaton w as a friend of John
Timberlake and saw nothing wrong w ith his wife keeping the company of the
senator, Eaton and M argaret ignored the societal prohibitions against a single
m an escorting a m arried woman to social events or an exhibition of socially
suspect behavior such as being seen visiting on the front porch of her family's
inn. With the death of M argaret's husband, they become dedicated husband
and wife with common, Washingtonian enemies. Mr. and Mrs. William
O'Neale (Margaret's parents) were good friends with Senator Eaton for many
years, and they welcomed the marriage of Margaret to John (Marszalek, 1997).
In a time period w hen getting a divorce inflicted a serious w ound on an
executive's reputation, Welles was released from his diplomatic service for the
Coolidge administration because of the m arital schism w ith his wife, Esther. He
w as happily m arried to his second wife, Mathilde, although there were
o c c a sio n a l d is a g r e e m e n ts o v e r W elles'

alcohol consumption and the am ount of

time that the secretary was working (Gellman, 1995; Welles, 1997).
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Relationship with the president. The relationship between W ashington and

Hamilton dated back to the Revolution when H am ilton served as an im portant
aide-de-camp to Washington. Brookheiser (1996) and Flexner (1969) argue that
Hamilton thought of Washington as a father figure. Indeed, it m ay be reasoned
that George and Martha W ashington m ust have looked on with pride as
Hamilton courted and m arried Betsy Shuyler. But the thrill of working for
General W ashington m ust have w aned when the general exhibited fits of rage
and profanity (Flexner, 1969; McDonald, 1979). Besides the young m an's
disdain for some of his commander in chief's behavior, Ham ilton disliked his
sense of dependence on the general (McDonald, 1979). Resigning because of an
argument w ith Washington, Ham ilton was finally assigned (by W ashington) to
a frontline command at the Battle of Yorktown. He had finally gained "fame,"
but the formality in the relationship with W ashington did not "break" until
1788 (Flexner, 1969; McDonald, 1979). McDonald argues that even after
Hamilton's resignation, W ashington showed greater affection tow ard Ham ilton
than was reciprocated by the latter. Washington showed great trust during the
d e v e lo p m e n t

of th e financial system, and according to Flexner (p. 247),

"admired the m an who had proposed them."
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Herbert Sloan (2004) identifies President W ashington's criteria for
choosing his first Cabinet; it included a candidate's support for the new
Constitution, service to the country during the Revolution, and what he
thought were the traits of "best characters." From February 1777 until February
1781, Washington could not have been more aware of his aide-de-camp's
administrative talents. Demanding administrative perfection (Freeman, 2001),
W ashington rapidly m ade the brilliant young aide what we w ould refer to as
his chief of staff (Flexner, 1969), handling some of the general's m ost sensitive
diplomatic missions. Perhaps General W ashington was unaw are of Ham ilton's
authorship of some of the Federalist Papers, but Ham ilton's w ork to shore up
tax collection under the Articles of Confederation and adopt the new
Constitution in New York could not have been missed.
Throughout the Cabinet's early service for the president, Washington
insisted on receiving opinions on all policy matters from all of the secretaries.
According to McDonald (1979), it was W ashington's intent to steer the m iddle
ground between his departm ent heads. But as each of the major public policy
q u e s tio n s w a s c o n sid e r e d , h e s id e d w ith H a m ilto n — e v e n in

the case of the

national bank legislation that the president had initially opposed. Not only did
Ham ilton succeed on the domestic front, but he also advised (in some cases in
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direct opposition to Secretary of State Jefferson) the president regarding
particular foreign policy initiatives. While Washington did not publicly endorse
the Treasury's financial policies as the reason for the rising prosperity, Flexner
(1969) argues that President W ashington thought it an elegant system that
"hacked away at the bonds of the American financial giant" (p. 247).
The policy successes of Hamilton, with the support of Washington, had a
chilling effect on the secretary of the treasury's relationship with the secretary
of state. Repeated successful forays into his policy dom ain by H am ilton m ust
have been disheartening for Jefferson. In conversations w ith President
Washington, Jefferson, who felt the Revolution was being undone (Ellis, 2001),
attacked H am ilton's financial system as a corrupting influence and attem pted
to wrest the m int and the post offices for State Departm ent control. Resorting to
the use of the press beginning in 1791, particularly the National Gazette,
Jefferson and his colleagues accused Hamilton of favoring plutocracy,
aristocracy, monarchy and corruption by a "monied phalanx." W ashington,
according to Flexner (1969), felt little inclination to believe the doomsaying
claims o f S ecretary Jefferson.
While Secretary Hamilton w orked with majorities in the Congress to
successfully pass the new financial machinery of state into law, the
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philosophical and political brother of Jefferson, Senator James Monroe, must
have been every bit as frustrated at the opposition's inability to stop the
corruption of the revolution by the "m onied phalanx."
Relationship with fellow executives. While not mutually exclusive, a

personal, professional or political relationship between a president and
secretary or under-secretary may impact the development of a scandal. Senator
John Eaton and President Andrew Jackson provide an example of the
importance of a combination of all three types of relationships. According to
Marszalek (1997) and Pollack (1931), the relationship between John Eaton and
Andrew Jackson goes back to 1808 when the two men started dow n a path that
included friendship, m ilitary collegiality, and political collaboration that led to
the peak of political success. Burke (2001) states:
Major Eaton was an old friend of General Jackson, w hom he had known
since he was a lad of 18 when he first came to Tennessee.. . . Young
Eaton married first Myra Lewis, whose sister had m arried Major William
B. Lewis. These girls were w ards of General Jackson, which m ade the
bond of friendship all the more closer, (p. 135)
L. Phillips (1974) and other Jackson biographers report the strengthening of the
r e la tio n sh ip b e tw e e n Jack son a n d E aton th r o u g h E aton's c o a u th o r in g o f

Jackson's biography, speaking in the U.S. Senate about the virtues of Rachel
Jackson who was suffering from character assassination, counseling Rachel and
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Andrew during the campaign, and coordinating a non-stop victorious national
election effort from 1925 until 1928. As a freshman U.S. Senator in 1823, Jackson,
who stayed at the Franklin House w ith John Eaton, developed a strong affinity
for the proprietors, Mr. and Mrs. O'Neale, and the Timberlake family,
particularly Mrs. Margaret Timberlake, the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. O'Neale.
After the death of Mr. Timberlake, Eaton sought out Jackson's advice w ith
regard to proposing marriage to Margaret Timberlake. Dismissing the rum ors
of marital infidelity by Eaton and Timberlake and the year-long m ourning
period before remarriage, Jackson advised Eaton to marry her. Assured of
Jackson's endorsem ent of his nuptials, Eaton and Timberlake wed.
The relationship between Secretary Eaton and other Cabinet members
became quickly apparent. Competitions over policy and Cabinet positions
suggested difficulties for Eaton, who some opposed before confirmation.
According to Alexander (1935) and James (1937), Jackson's Cabinet secretaries,
Branch, Berrien, and Ingham, were Calhoun's men who shared m any similar
political values. Latner (1979) argues that it was access to the president and the
tariff p r o m o te d

by E aton a n d Van Buren (Calhoun opposed it) that created

acrimony. Later in the administration, it would be presidential succession
politics that w ould further the development of scandal.
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Eaton's 10 years of service in the U.S. Senate must have brought him a
certain degree of political stature and support, and his close political
relationship with Jackson insured his confirmation. While Senator Eaton failed
to secure Congressional financial aid to Mr. Timberlake, a naval purser who
incurred heavy losses due to military run-ins with the British Navy, this
researcher has not uncovered documents suggestive of a negative or positive
relationship between Congress and Secretary Eaton.
Relationship with Congress. As a child, Sumner Welles was a member of

Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt's w edding party. Later, Welles w ould ask
Roosevelt for support in joining the foreign service. It was not until 1931, when
F.D.R. was a second-term Governor of New York and presum ptive frontrunner
for the Democratic presidential nomination, that Welles offered his expertise on
South and Central America, indicating that he would actually become involved
in the future candidate's efforts (Gellman, 1995; Welles, 1997). Other than these
tw o occasions, secondary sources do not report the development of a
"personal" relationship between the two men.
Im p r e sse d

by W elles' thinking about hemispheric issues, particularly his

contribution to the Good Neighbor Policy, F.D.R. started the career diplom at on
a meteoric rise. A ppointed assistant secretary for Latin America in early April
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of 1933 (Gellman, 1995; Welles, 1997), Welles was quickly reassigned to a crisis
in Cuba w ith non-intervention as a guiding principle. After his Cuban
mediation efforts, Welles received assignments to deal w ith Panama Canal
issues, Mexican relations, and the Chaco Border War between Bolivia and
Paraguay as under-secretary of state for Latin American affairs. As a m em ber of
Secretary of State Hull's delegation to the Buenos Aires Conference in late 1936,
Welles' fluent command of Spanish and experience w ith post World War I
Latin American affairs helped in developing a consultative process betw een the
U.S. and the Latin American nations, by which hemispheric security w ould be
insured in the future. In May of 1937, Welles was prom oted to the position of
under-secretary of state, and F.D.R. put him in charge of reorganizing the State
Department.
By appointing his "own" m en and reassigning those hostile to his
philosophy, Sumner Welles ruffled a few feathers, including those of the
secretary. With H ull's approval, Welles presided over the day-to-day
operations, thereby gaining control over the State Department apparatus
(G ellm an , 1995; W elles, 1997).

Welles' position was not without its challenges,

partly due to the existing environm ent within the agency and administrative
philosophy of F.D.R. Regarded as a conservative institution dom inated by
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wealthy, Catholic elites from the Northeast, F.D.R. felt the State Department
opposed his New Deal. Many in the State Department were opposed to
Roosevelt's efforts to re-establish relations w ith the atheistic Soviet Union, as
well as the non-interventionist Good Neighbor Policy. Welles' reassignment of
diplom ats and restructuring of the various divisions within the departm ent did
not set well with a staid organization that did not respond quickly to
worldw ide events (Gellman, 1995; Welles, 1997).
Perhaps the m ost im portant change was the way in which F.D.R. dealt
with executive agencies and advisors. In the case of the State Department,
Roosevelt wanted to be his own foreign policy chief. Wann (1968) and Gellman
(1995) identify this choice as partially emanating from the need to be the center
of all decision-making. According to Burns (1956) and Dallek (1979), F.D.R.
divided the various departm ents, including the State Department, by creating
rivalries that would require his direct involvement. Herzstein (1989) described
the situation between his foreign policy advisors as one in which F.D.R. needed
the support from the politically powerful Hull, but honed his ideas using his
a d v is o r s in th e W h ite H o u s e , a s w e ll a s th e S tate D ep artm en t. A fter

his first few

heady trips to the Oval Office and presiding over the day-to-day affairs of the
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State Department, Welles may not have anticipated the administrative
nightm are of being Roosevelt's m an in the State Department.
When President Roosevelt decided to awaken the American public to the
international dangers present, he enlisted the aid of Welles, who contributed to
the Charlottesville speech on arms limitations and abolition of trade barriers
(Welles, 1997). W ith the call to "quarantine" aggressors in an October 5,1937
speech in Chicago, F.D.R. felt the w rath of the public and no support from his
Cabinet, including Hull. At F.D.R/s request, Welles developed a two-part peace
proposal that Hull rejected; in the same month, Roosevelt is reported to have
said the White House "would have to take away the ball from Hull" (Gellman,
1995, p. 151). Having developed a close working relationship with F.D.R. dating
back to the Cuban assignment, Welles reached the international stage acting as
his personal fact-finder to Europe in February 1940. The high profile mission,
according to Gellman (1995), contributed to Secretary H ull's feeling that his
under-secretary w as "usurping his authority and was becoming the president's
closest foreign affairs advisor."
C o n g r e ssio n a l rela tio n s a n d

connections m ay impact the development of

a scandal. Welles was confirmed w ith no difficulty, but only after F.D.R.
sm oothed the w ay by appointing a politically connected rival, R. Walton
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Moore, to the office of counselor to the State Department. In an isolationist
country, perhaps the lack of a Congressional political base and his close
identification with the president's pro-internationalist stance m ay be a key to
the development of the scandal (Gellman, 1995).

Trai ts of Indiscretion

W hat are the descriptive variables that provide a better understanding of
the nature of a sexual indiscretion? The following summaries provide clues to
understanding the key elements of sex scandals.
The details of the affair between Alexander Hamilton and Maria
Reynolds were self-reported by the Secretary of the Treasury in an effort to
refute charges of financial impropriety. Ham ilton reports that he began an affair
with Mrs. Reynolds in July of 1791, paid James Reynolds "hush" money
beginning in December of 1791, and broke off the affair in December of 1792.
Boyd et al. (1952-1970) conclude that Ham ilton's proofs of an affair were
forgeries, but many eminent historians including Chernow (2004), McDonald
(1979), Hendrickson (1976), Cresson (1946), Rogow (1998), Cooke (1986),
Ham ilton (1911) et al. formed opinions in favor of Hamilton. The incomplete
nature of the historical record does not preclude an extra-marital affair and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53
financial speculation on Ham ilton's part. Limited by the possible ways in which
an individual m ight hide illegitimate income, the state of Ham ilton's finances
tends to support the secretary's claims of innocence (Fleming, 1999).
A widower, Senator John Eaton began living in the O'Neale
boardinghouse in Washington, D.C. in 1818. While residing at the house, he
befriended the proprietors, the O'Neales, including their daughter M argaret
Timberlake, the wife of naval purser John Timberlake. Mrs. Timberlake
continued to work in the family's boardinghouse (Marszalek, 1997; Pollack,
1931). Margaret Timberlake's past reputation and current behavior w as not in
keeping with contemporary standards of the place of women, primarily that
she should be so bold in the world of men at the boardinghouse (Marszalek,
1997; Pollack, 1931). From 1821 until 1828 (when Mr. Timberlake died at sea),
Senator John Eaton and Margaret Timberlake acted in w hat was regarded as
socially unacceptable behavior—Eaton escorted Margaret Timberlake to social
gatherings and conducted himself inappropriately at the boardinghouse (James,
1937; Marszalek, 1997; L. Phillips, 1974; Pollack, 1931). W ashington's elite, who
in c lu d e d M argaret B ayard

Smith a n d others that wielded significant political

pow er (Allgor, 2000), ostracized and lobbied against the nom ination of Eaton.
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In the early m orning hours of September 18,1940, an intoxicated U nder
secretary of State Sumner Welles retired to his sleeping accommodations on the
presidential train returning to Washington from Alabama. Ringing for coffee,
an exposed Welles offered money for sex from the porter, John Stone (Gentry,
1991). W hen Stone rejected the under-secretary7s advance, a successive num ber
of other porters were indirectly propositioned by Welles. Roosevelt7s Secret
Service Chief Whiteside was sum m oned to the scene, and w hen Welles came
out of his berth to get the coffee, he inquired as to the reason for W hiteside's
presence (Gellman, 1995).
Nature of alleged behavior. While the "run of the mill" sexually indiscrete

behavior is sufficient to precipitate the resignation of a secretary or under
secretary, the nature, i.e., group sex or sodomy, of the alleged indiscrete
behavior m ay hasten the process. Revelations of suggested deviant sexual
practices, even in the case of consenting, married, heterosexual partners may be
enough to impact the development of a sex scandal. Note the recent "flap" over
the sexual interests of the Illinois senatorial candidate Jack Ryan w ho w anted to
tak e h is w if e , Jerri,

to a s e x u a lly explicit club. Until recently, sodom y between

consenting adults was illegal in many states.
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Timing o f the alleged behavior. This variable is significant in that past

sexually alleged or adm itted behaviors impact a secretary or under-secretary.
The accusations against Senator John Eaton, as well as those against Mrs.
Margaret Timberlake who would become his wife, had a similar impact.
Because of a secretary or under-secretary's notoriety, it appears that any sexual
indiscretion, as well as the repercussions of the liaison, will follow the executive
into office.
Time becomes relevant with regard to scandalous behavior w hen it
reflects a lack of judgment. Poor impulse control m ay also be evident w hen
indiscretions occur episodically. Aware of his bisexual proclivities, Welles
should have been careful about choosing the time and place for engaging in
drunken behavior that would lead to inappropriate actions. After spending so
much time socializing and flaunting his relationship with Mrs. Margaret
Timberlake, had John Eaton chosen not to marry her, the whole affair w ould
have been forgotten as a bachelor's behavior w ith a "commoner." In any other
historical period, Alexander Ham ilton's extended, expensive affair with a
m arried wom an w ould have draw n harsh criticism.
Marital status o f individuals. An executive may be judged differently if

during his or her "single" life a sexual indiscretion occurred. In this pool of
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cases studies, the historical record suggests that Alexander Ham ilton and
Sumner Welles were both m arried during the time leading up to and including
their nomination. In the case of Senator Eaton, historians report the societal
elite's mortification at a m an's decision to m arry his consort.
The marital status of the individual involved in the indiscretion may
com pound the problems of the future nominee. Responsibility for such a breach
of another marriage is a violation of a societal institution. Maria Reynolds and
Margaret Timberlake were married. The historical record does not provide the
marital status of the male porters allegedly propositioned by Welles on F.D.R.'s
presidential train.
Gender of individuals. The Puritan traditions of this country still hold great

currency. During colonial times, an individual tried and convicted of sodomy
with a m ember of the same sex was hung. Until recently, state laws provided
penalties, sometimes prison sentences, for homosexual acts, including
solicitation of another of the same gender. The relatively recent case of
President Johnson's aide Walter Jenkins shows the degree to which homosexual
s o lic ita tio n b y s o m e o n e c lo s e to th e o v a l o ffic e w a s

not defended in the press

and immediately rem oved from his position. More recently, President Clinton's
ambassadorial nominee to the Netherlands was rejected for his gender
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preference. While the American Psychiatric Association removed
homosexuality from its list of disorders in the 1970s, homosexual relations
rem ain somewhat of a political taboo. Previously thought to be a security risk
due to the threat of blackmail, an individual such as Representative Barney
Frank m ay openly discuss his sexual preference and still be re-elected.
Allegations of bisexual behavior on the part of Sumner Welles never did
arise during the vetting process, but the blatant violation of taboos against
homosexual behavior did directly impact the development of the scandal.
Legality of behavior. With changes regarding homosexuality, consensual

relations between adults do not violate the law unless they break other statutes
such as solicitation. Sexual relations w ith a minor violates another societal
taboo. A non-consensual act m ay result in allegations of rape. While
prosecution may not follow the behavior, the fact that such allegations exist
m ay directly impact the confirmation hearings as well as future proceedings.
The enforcement of Virginia's homosexual solicitation statute would have
definitely had an impact on the development of the Sumner Welles sex scandal.
Legal record o f behavior. A legally documented criminal offense m ay result

in a paper trail that will surface before, during, or after confirmation hearings.
Press and legal scrutiny m ay follow the assumption of office. Affidavits were
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collected after Sumner Welles' behavior, but no sworn testimony was collected
by the F.B.I.
Third party involvement. Third parties m ay exist in the form of an

individual who has knowledge of the affair, but will not use it until it is
politically advantageous, m uch as Lowi's (2004) commoditizing of scandalous
knowledge. Not to be neglected are nefarious acts by individuals interested in
extorting a secretary or under-secretary. Community-wide condemnation of
indiscretion may cause continued criticism and political fallout well into the
administration. Perhaps no other case study exemplifies this principle than
Senator John Eaton and M argaret Timberlake.
Number of alleged cases. A track record of sexual indiscretion m ay in fact

have a politically immunizing effect. Americans believe in forgiving individuals
who have adm itted their mistakes, as was the case with President Clinton. As a
function of the fair play concept in our culture, the willingness to forgive may
have its limitations, i.e., the unwillingness of the people's representatives to
confirm an openly homosexual ambassador. President Clinton's ambassadorial
nominee to the Netherlands, James Hormell, was openly gay and w as rejected
as a result.
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Related issues. A m ultitude of other factors may influence the

development of a scandal. Because of the multifaceted nature of any scandalous
behavior, not every ramification can be anticipated. The impact of any
indiscrete sexual behavior may result in illegitimate children, emotional
scarring, blackmail, and secret financial deals. In a W ashington society
dom inated by an elite already prejudiced against Mrs. Timberlake, rum ors of
an illegitimate, still-born child fathered by Senator Eaton plagued the
administration (Marszalek, 1997). N ot limited to blackmail, financial dealings
such as support paym ents may have ramifications after the affair has ended.
Social mores. According to W ebster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Woolf et

al., 1977), chastity is defined as abstention from unlawful sexual intercourse,
abstention from all sexual intercourse, or purity in conduct or intention. The
aforementioned definition is, however, subject to varying societal
interpretations. While the expectation of strict chastity is the Judeo-Christian
benchmark for public officials, penalties for a breach have not always occurred.
Garment (1991) accurately frames scandal:
Whether an act makes for scandal does not depend on the deed's
intrinsic nature alone. It depends just as heavily on w hat happens w hen
other people learn about the act and judge it against a set of shared
values. The sin that shocks no one . . . is no scandal. An act that affronts
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the moral sensibilities, or pretensions of its audience m ay cause a scandal
even if it is in reality no sin. (p. 14)
The origins of the interest in personal life, according to Summers (2000),
can be found in two im portant traditions: American republicanism and
evangelical Protestantism.
American republicanism . .. regarded solid moral character as a sin qua
non of good government. Repudiating older, hierarchical notions of
authority and service, Republicans m ade personal virtue a foundation of
representation and insisted that only persons of exemplary rectitude
should occupy positions of power. For without personal integrity,
leaders could hardly w ithstand the tem ptation of corruption and the
pursuit of narrow self-interest, (p. 828)
Evangelical Protestants noted that hum an governance is "plainly recognized in
the Bible as a part of the moral government of God"; therefore, they prom oted
the idea that self-rule w ould become impossible without virtuous leaders
(Summers, 2000, p. 829). The mass participation of the 19th century insisted on
transparency, only secrecy w ould allow usurpers to succeed (Summers, 2000).
When these two traditions are combined with popular participation in a
competitive system, indiscretion is likely to be communicated.
The cultural norms vary depending on the time period in which the
indiscretion occurred. From the ultra-conservative roles expected of m en and
women in the Eaton case to the laissez faire attitude of the congressmen in the
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Alexander Hamilton/Maria Reynolds affair, the slide rule of societal attitudes
has varied significantly. Flexner (1969) completes our understanding of
W ashington's views on extra-marital affairs as discussed by W ashington in a
letter to a particularly flirtatious Mrs. Eliza Powell after retirement: "George
implied that he w ould not have been concerned at being found in adultery, but
only at having 'betrayed the confidence of a lady"' (p. 367). If President
W ashington's values were representative of the m en of the time, which
Rothman (2004) suggests, the congressional investigators' decision to not report
the indiscretion is understandable.
Societal expectations played a significant role in the case of John Eaton.
N ot only was his wife's public behavior at the O'Neale's boardinghouse tavern
questioned, but she allowed herself to be seen with Eaton in public in a socially
inappropriate manner. In addition, the couple broke the customary yearlong
m ourning period before re-marriage and, reportedly, M argaret bore Eaton's
illegitimate child. Eaton's appointment and tenure were only saved by
Jackson's belief in his innocence (Marszalek, 1997; L. Phillips, 1974; Pollack,
1931). A ttitu d e s a b o u t h o m o s e x u a l b e h a v io r varied at the time of Sumner
Welles' sexual indiscretion. In the state of Virginia, laws dem anded fines and/or
prison time for propositioning an individual of the same sex. Individual
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attitudes varied, and in Welles' case, President Roosevelt was reportedly
inclined to forgive the behavior of an individual under the influence of alcohol
(Welles, 1997).
Since polling data are not available to determine public attitudes tow ard
sexual indiscretion among presidential Cabinet officers, the following is a brief
survey of secondary literature with regard to the public's attitudes regarding
sexual indiscretion and public executives—the citizenry's disposition m ight be
gauged by looking to the behaviors of individuals and events in the political,
public policy, elite or populous arenas.
While the public's attitude regarding sexual indiscretion during the age
of Jackson is discussed in-depth later in this research, Collins' (1999) survey of
American gossip and politics provides interesting observations about the state
of citizens' attitudes, and in particular the status of homosexuality in the
political realm. Collins observes that "the national morality relaxes and
stiffens," and the "public is doom ed to be shocked, hardened, and then reborn
into hopeful innocence, over and over" (p. 10). According to Collins, the
b a ch elo r sta tu s o f P resid en t Jam es B u ch a n a n d id n o t spark a d is c u s s io n o f h is

sexual preference by the W ashington elite, and the newspapers or records of
political stum p speeches do not contain accusations of him being a "sodomite,"
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the label of the time. "Buchanan was protected by the fact that society thought
homosexuality was so awful that it could only be committed by the dregs of
society," equated w ith unnatural acts like bestiality (Collins, 1999, p. 53).
In "Sex, Scandal, and Suffrage in the Gilded Age," Klotter (1980) remarks
that "the sexual habits of politicians had long been of interest to Americans"
(p. 243), citing Alexander Hamilton's and Jefferson's affairs. Klotter states that
in an era when openly proclaimed sexual morality was the cornerstone of
public welfare, an increased interest in sensationalism and m ore widespread
communication in the post-Civil War period stimulated publication of scandal.
According to Klotter, trials of individuals like Henry W ard Beecher contributed
to the public's disillusionment with its leaders. The record about the public's
views on sexual indiscretion and eligibility to hold office are not monolithic,
considering the election of Grover Cleveland, who supported an illegitimate
child.
According to Klotter (1980), the case of the estranged lover, Madeline
Pollard, of Congressman William Breckinridge is instructive about the attitude
of the public. Her 1893 suit for breach of contract—a broken promise of
m arriage—was brought against Breckinridge, who publicly prom oted good
morals with statements like the following: "'chastity is the foundation, the
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cornerstone of hum an society.' On such chastity rested the stability of
governments, for 'pure homes make pure governm ent'" (p. 229). After giving
birth to tw o children, a pregnant Pollard received a promise of m arriage from
Breckinridge. Pollard's situation was complicated by the death of the
Congressman's wife and his subsequent secret remarriage to another woman;
these nuptials caused her to sue for breach of contract since no seduction law
existed in the District of Columbia. The public airing of the sex scandal's details
resulted in a jury award of $15,000 to Pollard. In Breckinridge's subsequent
Kentucky re-election campaign, he faced two opponents and lost a close race.
The Pollard/Breckinridge affair, which had begun in 1884, and the
subsequent trial "came at a time of heightened public interest in morality"
(Klotter, 1980, p. 235). Citing David Pivar's (1973) Purity Crusade: Sexual
Morality and Social Control, 1868-1900, Klotter identifies the existence of the

"new (national) abolitionists," promoting equal standards of morality for the
sexes and elevated personal morals. In Breckinridge's district, the new
abolitionists' voice was heard in the same publication that had published the
congressman's articles. "A Lexington paper noted that Breckinridge w as under
attack by everyone from 'preacher to prostitute'" (p. 236). In the press, letters to
the editors by vote-less wom en instructed young m en who supported
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Breckinridge to stay away from the opposition's daughters and threatened to
boycott merchants. "Other women used the opportunity to appeal for a
w om an's ballot to insure defeat of the m an 'w ho has plunged the poisioned
[sic] stilleto into the heart of virtue'" (Klotter, 1980, p. 240).
During the 20th century, public policy decisions (administratively and
legally), elections, and other social phenom enon suggest the m aturation of the
public's attitudes about sexual indiscretion. Public policy efforts indicate
concern with sexual indiscretion. In 1920, Congress passed legislation making
moral turpitude a reason for removal from office (Morganston, 1929). "A
depraved or shameful act" is the definition of "turpitude," according to the
1955 Random House American College Dictionary (p. 1309). Congress' attem pt
to make the Comptroller General and the Assistant Comptroller General
removable by concurrent resolutions of the houses caused a veto by President
Wilson on constitutional grounds (Morganston, 1929, p. 69). While public policy
decisions may have reflected a m aturation of decision-makers, this was not
necessarily the case w ith public attitudes about sexual indiscretion during the
W o r ld W ar

I era until the Vietnam War. During this period, Collins (1999)

suggests that with the aid of press that was disinterested in the personal lives of
the politicians, "voters, if they chose, could easily convince themselves that, the
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people running their government were faithful spouses and tem perate drinkers,
paragons whose public images were in perfect accord with their private
behavior/' and did not w ant to hear about the personal lives of their leaders
(p. 11).
With national security in mind, President Eisenhower prom ulgated
Executive O rder 10450 in 1953. Individuals w ould not be eligible for im portant
posts if they (a) "exhibited behaviors, activities or associations which tend to
show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy"; (b) provide "any
deliberate misrepresentation, falsifications, or omissions of material facts"; or
(c) provide "any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may
be subject to coercion, influence, or pressure that m ay cause the person to act
contrary to the best interests of the national security" (Barrett, 1997, p. 4). While
Eisenhower's executive order w ould have been related to problems with
national security during the Cold War, it may also have been in response to the
efforts of conservative Republicans to equate homosexual behavior w ith
unpatriotic behavior (Collins, 1999). The issuance of Executive O rder 12356 by
R o n a ld R e a g a n in 1982 r e p r e se n te d an oth er e ffo rt at in su r in g h ig h eth ic a l

criteria for executive nominees who would be privy to national security
information (Barrett, 1997, p. 6).
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In the realm of homosexual indiscretion, a shift in the public's attitude
m ay have been impacted by the 1974 decision by the American Psychiatric
Association to remove homosexual behavior from its list of m ental disorders.
Likewise, the decriminalizing of homosexual acts in subsequent Supreme Court
cases, in particular the court's reversal of its 1984 Bower v. Hardwick by Lawrence
v. Texas, showing the degree to which the public policy process has brought the

decriminalizing of sexual acts out of marriage into a politically more acceptable
state. The public's opinion has not jelled if we consider the case of President
Clinton's June 5, 1999 recess appointm ent of an openly gay James Hormel as
U.S. ambassador to Luxembourg because of Senate Republican resistance,
whereas Representative Barney Frank w as returned to office after the
revelations of his behavior with a male staffer.
At the turn of the century, Americans satisfied with President Clinton's
job performance and familiar with the president's sexual indiscretions did not
favor his removal from office as a result of lying about his personal affairs to a
grand jury. At the polls following the impeachment efforts, the Republicans
w h o w e r e r e sp o n sib le for tryin g

the president lost seats in the Congress.

Americans in the 20th century seem to have m ade a decision about their national
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executives' sexual indiscretions, but this does not discount Lowi's (2004)
statement that opponents m ay use scandal as a metaphorical assassin's bullet.
Disposition o f intimates. The motivations of the principal actors are

perhaps the m ost important of all early variables in terms of determining the
disposition of a scandal. The "private" does not become public, or stay private,
without motivation. A porter m entioned in the Welles case study filed a
grievance over the scandal. Perhaps the progression of an indiscrete
relationship from the sharing of the m ost intimate or a pregnancy, and then the
callous disregard of such a "connection" may cause a rupture in the
relationship, thereby providing the motivation for exposure of the indiscretion.
In Figure 1, this author notes the reception of the message by the
messenger. The secrecy surrounding the scandalous behavior has been broken.

Phase 2: The Unfolding

Messenger

In Figure 2, the messenger(s) transmits news of the scandal to an
institutional representative. The institutional representative m ay move forward
with an investigation or transmit this information to another institutional
representative, the press, or the public. A message transmitted by the
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messenger may lead to the revelation of the sexual indiscretion or related
issues. The following are summaries of the Phase 2 portion of the case studies.
While being held on charges of fraud related to Revolutionary war
bonds, James Reynolds produced documents that suggested to an informal
contingent of congressmen that Alexander Hamilton was engaging in im proper
financial transactions. Before proceeding to President W ashington with their
indictment of the treasury secretary, Senator James Monroe and
Representatives Abraham Venable and Frederick Muhlenberg thought it proper
to allow Hamilton to defend himself. On December 15,1792, w hen three
congressmen armed w ith a few pieces of paper called on him to inquire about
his relationship w ith James Reynolds, Ham ilton's professional reputation was
in danger.
In February 1829, Jackson defended the morality of his secretary of w ar
nominee from charges by Colonel N athan Towson, as well as his wife. After
tw o ministers and others made charges of infidelity against the Eatons, Jackson
h ad the charges investigated. Allgor (2000), Burke (2001), Pollack (1931),
M a r sz a le k (1997), a n d P h illip s (1974) c o n te n d

that Jackson's support a n d

defense of Margaret Eaton eminated from the president's intense loyalty to his
friends, the belief in their innocence, and the political smearing of Rachel
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Jackson's reputation during the campaign. Jackson felt that the attacks from
political opponents in Washington caused her fatal heart attack, and the
president felt it was his obligation to defend M argaret just as he had tried to
defend his wife. Jackson did not need an explanation from the m an who
m arried his friend, Margaret.
In the immediate aftermath, Ernest Norris, president of the Southern
Railway, ordered all who were privy to the cases to be quiet, not write anything
dow n and not talk with anyone except for the proper authorities (Hack, 2004).
According to Benjamin Welles, one of the porters, S. C. Mitchell, was
transferred to the White House to keep him quiet. However, the events of that
morning were not to be stonewalled. Gentry (1991) and T. Morgan (1985) report
that one of the porters filed a complaint with the Southern Railway Company
and affidavits in the matter had been filed w ith the company. Welles (1997)
identifies Felix Belair as a Time Magazine correspondent who learned of the
event w ithin 24 hours from a num ber of Pullman employees.
Rumors about Welles' behavior reached the White House, and Hoover's
F.B.I. w a s ta sk e d w ith d e te r m in in g th e v a lid ity o f th e ch a rg es

on January 3,

1941. On January 29,1941, Hoover briefed the president regarding the factual
basis for the charges and informed him of former Ambassador to France
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Christian Bullitt's "spreading" of the accusations about Welles (Friedel, 1990;
Gellman, 1995; Gentry, 1991; Ward, 1995; Welles, 1997).
Public/Private individual. Either directly involved w ith the scandal or a

receptor of secondhand information, the messenger(s) m ay or m ust move
forward with the information. The characteristics of the m essenger—public or
private—are significant because of the discretion that the public actor may
exercise after the indiscrete behavior occurs.
Documentation. An individual who is arrested and charged w ith an

offense will result in a public record that cannot be stifled and the case m ust
move to trial. Likewise, a grievance filed on behalf of a worker, as in the case of
Sumner Welles, may also proceed through an open hearing. In either situation,
the credibility of the scandal is impacted when documentation exists.
Number of purveyors. The num ber of messengers m ay only be significant

w hen the likelihood of keeping the indiscretion "localized" is eliminated. The
num ber of messengers m ay also be significant in that the story will not be lost
with the death of a few individuals.
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Institutional Representatives

Investigation. With an awareness of allegations, an executive m ay choose,

or be obliged by departmental regulation, to investigate.
Transmission. While the age of electronic m edia has greatly sped up the

development of scandal, the m ore traditional "w ord of m outh" scandal m ay be
filed away by a departm ent executive, the Congress or in the hands of the
president. Or, there may not be a file regarding the accusations developed
immediately. Lowi's (2004) theory of the commoditizing of scandal material is
probably im portant with regard to this since an adm inistrator m ay see no value
to developing a case or transmitting it to another actor. In the case of Secretary
Eaton, it was to the advantage of the political and social elite to attem pt to
derail a political opponent as well as remove an unw orthy individual from the
Cabinet. In the case of Sumner Welles, President Roosevelt was satisfied with
the F.B.I. report as well as the necessity of retaining Welles as his m an in the
State Department. The president's executive discretion in both of these cases
trum ped all other competing interests.
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Investigation. Press involvement m ay be crucial in this case as a conduit

to the public w ith the information regarding a scandal or leading to an official
investigation into accusations. On the other hand, the press m ay choose not to
investigate. Public knowledge of accusations m ay lead to pressure on the
government to conduct an investigation or face electoral consequences.
Transmission. Depending on the intensity of the indiscretion and public

receptivity, the press may choose not to report on the topic or continue to cover
the story after it has been released.

Public

Public opinion. Public knowledge of accusations m ay lead to pressure on

the government to conduct an investigation.
Elections. The scandal process m ay be accelerated by upcoming elections

if polling suggests electoral consequences for retaining an indiscrete executive.

Phase 3: Explanation and Investigation

As previously noted, after a secretary or under-secretary's explanation of
events, an acquittal, resignation or cover-up m ay occur w ith the approval of the
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senior executive involved. News of the decision may be transm itted to any of
the other institutional actors, and result in inaction, an investigation, or
transmission to others or the press. Competing actors may force another
investigation and/or plead their case with the president for the resignation of
the offender. Choosing to cover-up or deny the results, the president m ay face a
resulting release of the story to the press and public. Illustrative of this phase
are the following case studies synopses.
Confronted with the destruction of his public reputation and the
integrity of the country's financial system, Hamilton provided proof that all
financial transactions between himself and Mr. James Reynolds had been to
ensure H am ilton's continued sexual liaison with Maria as well as James' silence
regarding the affair. A num ber of the congressmen were shocked. The
congressmen left the secretary w ith the promise that all charges of professional
malfeasance and knowledge of private impropriety w ould not become public
matters. For reasons unrelated to the Reynolds affair, Hamilton resigned his
post on January 31,1795—the treasury secretary had grown tired of the vitriolic
p o litica l a tta ck s

and realized that the political environm ent would not support

additional programs.
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After two ministers and others m ade charges of infidelity against the
Eatons, Jackson had the charges investigated. Conversations betw een the
interested parties finally led to a presidential defense of John and Margaret
Eaton at a September 10,1829 Cabinet meeting. Postmaster General Barry and
Secretary of State Van Buren supported the president and the Eatons, whereas
Calhoun, Berrien, Branch, and Ingham came convinced of their guilt. Under
intense pressure from Jackson, Reverend J. N. Campbell declined to admit
M argaret's innocence or previous misstatements, but cleared Secretary Eaton of
misconduct.
Intent on retaining Welles, Roosevelt defended his decision (Gentry,
1991; Welles, 1997). On April 23,1941, Bullitt, who coveted Welles' job,
confronted the president over Welles' scandalous behavior stating that not only
were there national political liabilities, w ith F.D.R. being "soft" on
homosexuals, but that the under-secretary w as open to criminal prosecution
and blackmail, a rupture or deterioration in Welles' relationship w ith Cordell
Hull, and problems w ith diplomatic morale when Welles handled issues of
transfer and appointm ents (Gellman, 1995). The president acknowledged the
truth of the allegations, argued that not a paper in the country w ould publish
such a story, nor w ould anyone prosecute Welles, and insisted that the
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assignment of a m ature bodyguard to Welles would prevent future
indiscretions (Gellman, 1995; T. Morgan, 1985). Bullitt threatened resignation
over Welles' continued employment, but it only brought about a m ission to the
Middle East where he could not spread rumors, rather than a firing of Welles
(Gellman, 1995; Gentry, 1991).
In the meantime, the tw o principals at the State Departm ent denied any
wrong doing by Welles, at least for the moment. The under-secretary heard the
rum ors and indicated to Attorney General Biddle that there was no truth to the
accusations (Gellman, 1995; Gentry, 1991; Welles, 1997). Gentry speculates that
Hull m ust have learned of the accusations against Welles during the spring of
1941. Gellman stated that Hull still considered them false in April of 1942 after
discussing the issue with the president and Welles, but was making
contingency plans just in case.
An explanation of the accused's behavior m ay result in the subm ission of
a resignation, an acquittal or successful cover-up thereby ending the process.
The case involving Alexander Ham ilton "fits" this exit from the scandal
process.
While the story of Alexander Hamilton's "run-in" w ith the informal
congressional committee is rather quaint, the reader should not discount the
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decision-making powers of a few influential legislators. The pow er to convene
hearings and begin an investigation, particularly by a "friendly" Congress,
w ould have a trem endous impact on the development of a scandal, likewise,
the decision to not follow such a course.
If a resignation, successful cover-up or acquittal does not occur, an
explanation may bring about (a) another investigation; (b) a threat of an
investigation; or (c) a refusal to investigate by a president, secretary or under
secretary. President Jackson was pleased w ith the results of an investigation
and issued a denial of any sexual indiscretion. Secretary H ull was satisfied by
Welles' denial, and did not begin a State Department investigation. While the
case studies show decisions in the proximate period of the first arising of the
scandal, this does not preclude the ability of a president, secretary, or under
secretary to ask for an investigation at a later date.
The circulation of the secretary or under-secretary's explanation, a
decision to investigate or not investigate, and a cover-up or denial m ay result in
an uncontested tenure. An investigation m ay acquit the accused, but if the
secretary or under-secretary's tenure is still contested, then competition may
occur between actors within the executive and legislative branches (see Figure
4).
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Phase 4: Inter-Executive and Congressional Competition

The basis for understanding the final outcome of the scandal process
appears to be the change, or lack thereof, in the relationships between the
actors, as well as any change in the political environment. In an environment
that is characterized by actors who m ay use knowledge of indiscretion to their
benefit, at w hat point does a compromised executive lose their value? Figure 4
illustrates the multifaceted aspects of relationships during the scandal process.
While historians identify various root issues as the cause for the
resignation of John Eaton and Sumner Welles (see Appendix A for the diverse
opinion regarding the Welles cases), the following case studies illustrate the
essential, as well as complex stories of the "end game" in the scandal process:
Some of the elite women of Washington w ould not socialize with
Margaret Eaton or her friends, and according to societal expectations, their
husbands—various representatives, senators and Cabinet officers—were
expected not to tell their wives w ith whom to socialize (James, 1937; Marszalek,
1997; L. Phillips, 1974; Pollack, 1931). Allgor (2000) describes Margaret as fitting
"The Courtesan" role that came in direct conflict with the existing role of
women in the capitol. The shunning of an immoral woman, regardless of her
husband's Cabinet status, was expected.
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In the aftermath of the Cabinet defense of Margaret and John Eaton, the
president's disgust w ith the behavior of some of his Cabinet m embers led to the
end of Cabinet meetings, but not the ostracism of the couple or those who
would socialize with Margaret.
According to Marszalek (1997) and Latner (1979), Jackson's early support
for Eaton was reinforced by his perception that Clay was opposed to Eaton,
thereby intending to discredit his administration. Jackson felt Clay continued to
oppose his administration as he had opposed his election to the presidency in
1824 w ith the "corrupt bargain." But it was not just Clay who stood to benefit
from an embattled Eaton. Jackson concluded that his vice president, John
Calhoun, stood to benefit from a discredited Eaton and his ally, Van Buren.
Other political factors were at work. According to Alexander (1935) and
James (1937), Jackson's Cabinet secretaries, Branch, Berrien and Ingham, were
Calhoun's m en who shared many similar political values, and, Latner (1979)
argues, it was access to the president and the tariff prom oted by Eaton and Van
Buren that created acrimony.
Eaton's continued tenure served the presidential aspirations of Secretary
of State Van Buren, who sought to remove John Calhoun from the supposed
position of presidential succession. Jackson w as expected to serve one term, but
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larger policy issues and presidential ambitions held by Van Buren w ould play a
role in dividing the Cabinet members. Martin Van Buren used the Eatons and
the season of Cabinet parties to drive a wedge between the president and
Calhoun. According to Marszalek (1997), Alexander (1935), Schlesinger (1943),
and Phillips (1974), Van Buren, in an effort to discredit the secretaries and the
absent Calhoun, whose wife had snubbed Margaret, arranged for a series of
parties given by himself and foreign ambassadors. The snubbing of M argaret at
each of the events outraged the president and, not surprisingly, drew him
closer to the attentive Martin Van Buren.
In January of 1830, Jackson, through an emissary, threatened to fire the
three Cabinet m em bers—Ingham, Berrien and Branch—unless they invited
Margaret and John to their parties and paid a formal visit to the Eatons.
Refusing to instruct their wives to do such a thing, the Cabinet officers let it be
known that they w ould rather be fired than intrude upon their wives' social
prerogatives. Jackson backed down, but had a formal meeting during which he
requested that the Cabinet members stop any slanders against M argaret and
John. In F eb ru ary, a p arty

was throw n at which all Cabinet wives were present

and civil to Secretary and Mrs. Eaton. Jackson requested harm ony among the
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Cabinet officers and felt that the three had been put on notice about the degree
to which he w ould defend John and M argaret Eaton.
Marszalek (1997), Pollack (1931), Burke (2001), Allgor (2000), et al.
provide key information about the lengths to which Andrew Jackson supported
Mr. and Mrs. Eaton by the w ay that he dealt w ith his own family. Having lost
his wife Rachel shortly before taking the oath of office, Jackson depended on his
niece and nephew, Mr. and Mrs. Andrew Jackson Donelson, as "family" in the
White House. The degree to which Jackson cared about his stepson can be
noted by Jackson's oversight of the young m an's military and legal education.
Emily served as his hostess, and his stepson worked as the president's personal
secretary. Because of his Revolutionary W ar experiences during which he
became an orphan, losing his mother and brother, Jackson was intensely loyal
to family and close friends, but any signs of disloyalty did not bode well for a
transgressor (Curtis, 1976).
When Margaret Eaton complained that Emily was not treating her
properly, the president distanced himself from his nephew and niece. For
months, the Donelsons had been snubbing M argaret and John. Marszalek
(1997), Burke (2001), Pollack, (1931), and Phillips (1974) et al. conclude that by
June of 1830, Jackson felt that the Donelsons were responsible for the mess in
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Washington since they had not stood w ith him in defending the Eatons.
Marszalek and Phillips conclude that in the fall of 1830, Jackson w anted
Margaret and Emily to stay behind in Tennessee in order to reduce the political
damage in Washington. After the return trip to Washington, Jackson
admonished Donelson to ignore rumors, and the latter considered returning to
Tennessee. In W ashington, Jackson and Donelson continued to spar over the
political nature of snubbing Margaret Eaton, and discussed Rachel's
responsibilities as the president's hostess; Jackson thought Rachel should stay
in Tennessee if she was not going to socialize with Margaret.
Marszalek (1997), Phillips (1974), and Watson (2004) argue that Jackson
conflated the snubbing of the Eatons with other attacks on his reputation and
administration. Floride Calhoun's snubbing of Margaret and John Eaton
became just a part of Vice President Calhoun's duplicity tow ard the president
as exemplified in the Seminole affair. During the sum m er of 1830, Jackson
found out that Calhoun, while a member of the Monroe Administration,
w anted to court-martial General Jackson for his behavior in Florida. Besides the
flap over Florida, Calhoun's waving of the states' rights banner riled Jackson,
and gained Van Buren additional support from Jackson for supporting
Constitutional supremacy. According to Marszalek, the Seminole affair
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continued to politically keep the Eaton affair off the front page. But in a U.S.
House race in Tennessee, M argaret Eaton was portrayed as a "fallen" wom an
supported by the president; Jackson interpreted the use of the Eaton issues as
part of a larger conspiracy formed against him by the vice president.
The president's resolve to support Mr. and Mrs. Eaton did not waver.
Public opinion and the Eaton affair may not have been significant since Jackson
was dedicated to the cause of defending his friends, but he m ust have realized
the importance of keeping the public on his side. In February of 1831, Jackson
went so far as to change his newspaper "mouthpiece" in order to prom ote his
goals—Duff Green's Globe had turned on Jackson and Eaton, and Blair w ould
prom ote the political viewpoint of the administration (Marszalek, 1997; L.
Phillips, 1974, Pollack, 1931).
The Eatons were not passive actors in the conflict over the secretary's
tenure. M argaret built relationships with Mr. and Mrs. Amos Kendall, an
auditor in the Treasury Departm ent and friend of President Jackson. Mrs. Eaton
hoped to develop a relationship with Mr. William B. Lewis, Jackson's aide, so
th a t h is d a u g h te r m ig h t r e p la c e E m ily D o n e ls o n a s P r e sid e n t J a ck so n 's h o s te s s

(L. Phillips, 1974). In the sum m er of 1830, after Jackson had requested that the
dissenting Cabinet members act civilly tow ard Margaret, she appealed directly
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to the president regarding Emily Donelson's rude behavior. The Eatons had
realized that Jackson might fire the Cabinet, but the result was banishing Rachel
to Tennessee (Marszalek, 1997; L. Phillips, 1974; Pollack, 1931).
The president still seemed dedicated to a working arrangem ent betw een
the Eatons, himself, and the Donelsons as late as March of 1831. Burke (2001)
and Marszalek (1997) discuss the efforts by Jackson's confidantes to develop a
rapproachm ent betw een the Donelsons and Jackson so that the political liability
of the Eatons would be reduced. However, the president's m ood was soured by
his nephew's social faux pas vis-a-vis a sick John Eaton. Instead of restoring the
Donelsons to the White House, the president's nephew and niece were
condemned for Donelson's unwillingness to visit an ill secretary—the result
being a self-imposed exile in Tennessee. This continued antagonism tow ard
Donelson may have been related to Jackson's disgust with Calhoun's recent
charges with regard to the Seminole affair. Jackson's thinking that the
Donelsons were a paw n of his enemies m ay have re-ignited his anger over the
Eaton Affair and reinforced his support for the Eatons.
The fatal blow to Eaton's tenure was the tendering of Van Buren's
resignation. Discussions within the administration regarding the loss of Van
Buren led to Secretary Eaton's realization that the defense of his family was to
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blame for the resignation of his esteemed colleague. Eaton's resolve to remain
in office dissolved. Eaton officially left office on April 7,1831; Van Buren
followed on April 11 (Marszalek, 1997; L. Phillips, 1974; Pollack, 1931).
Burke (2001) concludes that President Jackson's w illingness to accept the
resignations m ay have been related to his longing for the retu rn of his fam ily to
the W hite House. The absence of Emily D onelson h ad brought som e peace, but
the presid en t h ad been w ith o u t his hostess for eight m onths an d personal
secretary since early M arch. It w as expected th at they w ould n o t retu rn until
A ndrew Jackson w as w illing to take them back, and it was Jackson, the family
m an, w ho w as eating alone in som e cases. Van Buren had sensed Jackson's
frustration w ith the lack of a family and the ongoing political controversies.
Realizing th at his su p p o rt of the Eatons in his political rivalry w ith C alhoun
w ould be a political liability an d w anting to provide an avenue by w hich the
chief executive could ask for the resignation of the rest of the Cabinet, Van
Buren gingerly resigned w ithout destroying his relationship w ith a very loyal
president. President Jackson finally chose a w ant of harm ony over the battle
o v e r the E a to n s (A lex a n d e r, 1935; Burke, 2001; M arszalek, 1997; L. Phillips,

1974; Pollack, 1931).
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According to Gellman (1995) and Benjamin Welles (1997), a significant
event occurs between the president, Secretary Hull, and Under-Secretary Welles
during the Rio Conference in January 1942. In a fit of anger, Hull chastised
Welles for not following instructions when negotiating the language in the final
conference report regarding hemispheric relations w ith Germany. Welles
disagreed strenuously and asked for a conference call w ith the president, who
sided with the under-secretary. Benjamin Welles argues that Hull would never
forgive the president and Welles for the decision. Gellman argues that Hull
interpreted Welles' behavior to be a sign of disloyalty, and like Raymond Moley
and George Peek, other officials before Welles, the under-secretary m ust be
removed.
Benjamin Welles argues that the origins of Hull's anger toward Welles
and the president dated back to the Cuban negotiations and the secretary's
exclusion from the Atlantic Charter negotiations. However, Gellman adds a
more detailed description of the administrative situation in which the
president, Hull and Welles found themselves. President Roosevelt w anted to be
his own secretary of state, control the apparatus and appointm ents of the State
Departm ent through Welles, and make all of the final decisions—in some cases
without consulting H ull—by necessity, putting himself at odds with Hull. To
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Roosevelt, Hull was the Southern Conservative who had connections with
Congress so that any post w ar treaty similar to the League of Nations w ould be
passed, but as an administrator, the president found him to be too cautious and
unwilling, with the exception of negotiating reciprocal trade agreements, to be
proactive.
In Welles, Roosevelt found a like-minded, energetic, proactive
individual, an administrator who developed plans from general policy
statements. Hull thought Welles, as well as the president, was too quick to act
and unwilling to consult him on premature or impractical plans. Once Hull had
determ ined that Welles m ust be fired, the existing administrative and political
situation m ade it difficult. Having developed tuberculosis, which required
extended periods of time away from his office, Hull was unable to be physically
present w hen events were transpiring. The secretary of state needed Welles as a
connection to a president who excluded him. Charged with running the day-today operations of the State Department, and responsible for Hemispheric
relations and any other task that Roosevelt might ask him to do, a harried,
compromised Sumner Welles attem pted to serve two masters.
Gellman argues that the history between these men, particularly the
president's unwillingness to support the secretary of state in m atters dealing
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w ith Welles, and H ull's physical problems resulted in him lashing out at the
president in the form of attacking a vulnerable under-secretary of state. H ull's
efforts to remove Welles would have to w ait until the form er's physical
condition improved. Shortly after the Rio Conference, Hull and his physician
left for Miami where he spent almost three months (Gellman, 1995).
Hull and Welles' relationship did not improve during the six m onths
after the Rio Conference. According to Gellman (1995), Sumner, with the
consent of the White House, m ade a speech as a trial balloon regarding the post
world war peace. In June of 1942, after Welles' trial balloon, Hull insisted that
any speech had to be cleared through his office after that point in time. The
secretary of state intimated to Breckinridge Long that he could no longer trust
Welles who Hull believed was claiming White House approval for the
speeches. Hull disagreed with the role that Welles was proposing for the United
State after the war.
A series of events acted as markers in the progression of Hull actions
vis-a-vis the accusations against Welles. On September 11,1942, Hull confided
in Breckenridge Long that he had investigated the rum ors against Welles and
believed them to be true (Gellman, 1995; Welles, 1997). On October 24,1942, 25
m onths after Welles' behavior on the Pullm an car, Cordell m et with J. Edgar
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Hoover to see the F.B.I/s report about the scandal (Gellman, 1995; Gentry, 1991;
Welles, 1997). Admitting that an investigation had been conducted and the
existence of a report, Hoover could not produce it without the president's
approval (Gellman, 1995; Gentry, 1991; Welles; 1997). In early January, Hull had
the charges against Welles investigated by a State Department security agent
who provided the secretary w ith information from Luther Norris, vice
president of Southern Railway (Welles, 1997). After expressing his concern to
the president about Welles' scandalous behavior, Hull gained full knowledge of
the investigation in February of 1943, reading the F.B.I. summaries at the White
House (Gellman, 1995; Gentry, 1991). In the spring of 1943, Hull told the
president that a criminal like Welles should not be tolerated in the American
government, to which the president angrily denounced Bullitt's peddling of
gossip (Gellman, 1995; Welles, 1997). On April 27,1943, Senator Owen
Brewster, at the behest of Bullitt and Secretary Hull, approached a tight-lipped
J. Edgar Hoover about the Welles file; Brewster, an anti-New Dealer and
member of the Truman Committee, could bring the problem up during
committee deliberations (Gellman, 1995; Welles, 1997). Gellman reports that
Biddle spoke to Truman and the Republican leadership and received assurance
that they w ould not broach the topic. In June, Hull told the president that
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everyone in the Senate knew about Welles, and it may make it difficult to get
international agreements approved (Welles, 1997). F.D.R. refused to let Welles
go, telling Biddle "w hy"—Welles was the "only one in the State Department
who really knew w hat was going on" (Welles, 1997, p. 345).
Hull term inated Welles' tenure through public and personal avenues.
Using Arthur Krock at the New York Times, the State Departm ent was
described as a battlefield involving an underling who was trying to oust the
secretary of state; the conflict was having deleterious impact on foreign policy.
On Monday, August 15, Secretary Hull issued an ultim atum at the White
H ouse—the president m ust make a choice between the services of Welles or
himself. The under-secretary would be offered a roving ambassadorship to
Latin America or an assignment to the Soviet and then retire. Confronting Hull,
Welles was told that the president w as worried that the homosexual charges
w ould explode in the Congress and damage the State Department. The under
secretary chose to resign immediately, August 16, because of policy differences
vis-a-vis Hull that w ould make Welles' priorities in any position in the State
D e p a r tm e n t d iffic u lt to ach ieve. In h is letter o f r e sig n a tio n , W e lle s

offered to

advise the president on foreign policy matters in the future and stated the
reasons why his resignation was a necessity. Dating back to the post-Rio
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Conference debacle between Welles and Hull, Sumner believed that Hull
wanted him fired. With the press putting him at the center of the disputes
within the diplomatic corps and Hull's political ties in the Congress, he had
become a political liability and the resignation had to be accepted (Gellman,
1995). The president continued to press Welles to accept a Moscow mission, but
Sumner stated that Hull w ould veto any action that he might take. As a result,
Roosevelt finally accepted his resignation on September 25 (Gellman, 1995;
Welles, 1997). In the memoirs of Cordell Hull, the secretary of state specified his
reasons for asking Welles to resign (see Appendix A).

Accused Executive

Does the role of the accused executive have an impact on the inter
executive and congressional competition that leads to the end of the scandal
process?
President. Since the executive serves at the pleasure of the president, the

point at which the secretary or under-secretary becomes too great of a liability
determines the end of the scandal process, regardless of the intensity of the
political, professional, and/or personal relationship shared.
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Responsibilities. Even though Welles m ay have expanded his

responsibilities in the State Department after the scandalous behavior and
successfully implemented policies for Roosevelt, he had not become an
indispensable member of F.D.R/s foreign policy team.
Pro-active behavior. Regardless of Welles' and Eaton's efforts to reduce the

status of their opponents and remain on good terms (friends in the case of
Eaton and Jackson) w ith the chief executive, the political damage caused by
retaining them outweighed the benefits.

Other Executive Actors

What roles do other executive actors play in the competition? Changes in

personal, political, and/or administrative relationships m ay lead to conflicts
that impact the development of a scandal. Separating these relationships in
order to determine where the problem originated may be difficult.
Personal conflict. Illustrative of these relational changes is the shift in the

relationship between Sumner Welles and Cordell Hull. Personality differences
between a quick to act Welles and a deliberate Hull were exacerbated as
political and administrative variables were added to their relationship over
time. In another administrative environment, there may not have resulted in
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such personal animus. While Vice President Calhoun's support of Floride's
social rebuke of Margaret Eaton could be construed to be of a personal nature
rather than a standard shunning of a social outcast, an illustration of a personal
conflict could be found in the heavy handed m anner by which John Eaton
attem pted to force the president's secretary to accept he and M argaret, and the
subsequent personal problems that arose.
Political conflict. As Sumner Welles and Cordell Hull differed over the

political issues surrounding treaty negotiations and the end of World W ar II,
conflict between the two intensified. N ot limited to the relational shifts between
members of the same department, the Eaton controversy was intensified by
other actors with different agendas, namely the political group surrounding
John C. Calhoun.
Administrative conflict. An expression of different personalities and

politics in m any cases, administrative conflicts m ay grow out of the desire by
the Cabinet secretary or under-Secretary to insist on personnel and procedures
that prom ote their agenda. Administrators who did not measure up to Welles'
sta n d a r d s w e r e r e p la c e d

or r e a ss ig n e d e v e n if th e y w e r e supported by H u ll,

causing conflict.
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President

Tactics. In the intensely competitive environment of Washington, the

president's use of various tactics m entioned in the literature and case studies
does not preclude other executive actors from employing similar tactics. Since
the president is ultim ately accountable to the voters, his choice to publicly fight
for a minister or privately cover-up the m atter are of great importance for the
development of a scandal. Likewise, a competing actor, or actors, may choose to
play their "cards," i.e., Hull's decision to initially ignore rum ors, but then offer
his resignation if Welles was not discharged.
Personal history. Andrew Jackson's marital scandal that involved his

nuptials with an already m arried woman, or Franklin Roosevelt's history of
sexual indiscretions suggests the importance of a president's past. Through
personal experience, a president gains an understanding of the foibles of others,
and as a result m ay be quite tolerant of these indiscretions. Reportedly, F.D.R.
believed that the behavior of an individual while intoxicated should not be held
against them —perhaps it was a reflection of his own mistakes.
Legacy. While the Eaton affair was used to prom ote the aspirations of

M artin Van Buren, the scandal process m ay impact the electability of the
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president's chosen successor. A legacy of scandal m ay cause the president to
change his approach to a scandal.

Press

Relationship. While other factors may impact the press release of news or

public receptivity to scandal, an actor must have access to the public through
outlets. In a competitive environment, a relationship is a necessary first step to
using knowledge. Note Jackson's change to a "mouthpiece" more in-line with
his political views.
Support/No support. A public consensus was never reached w ith regard to

Sumner Welles' behavior because of the press' decision to support the President
and his under-secretary thereby impacting the length of the under-secretary's
tenure. The lack of support within the press had a profound impact on the
Eaton situation.

Congress

Committee oversight. The scandal process m ay be hastened by the resolve

of a majority opposition party in the Congress to capitalize on the indiscretion
with oversight hearings. Public awareness is heightened and alerted to the
seriousness of the indiscretion by the fact that Congress is looking into the
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matter. Community response to hearings m ay speed or restrain the scandal
process.
Political capital. In a competitive policy environment in which a president

m ust use political support wisely to move policy through the legislative branch,
the loss of support due to an undisclosed or public scandal m ay handicap J
future policy initiatives.

Public

A popular president battling for the honor of his secretary's wife is
significant, but w hat is the long-term impact of the controversy on the attitude
of the public w ith regard to the scandal? The public's election day decision
when rival candidates with differing views on the scandal informs the
president about the liability of keeping an administrator. Likewise, the threat of
resignation and exposure of scandalous behavior leading up to elections m ay
cause a president to pause, and reconsider the indiscrete executive's tenure.
While the Eaton scandal was put to a vote by two congressional candidates who
chose to openly support or oppose the president's choice of John Eaton, not all
presidents would be willing to allow such a debate. In addition to the other
motives attributed to Jackson's defense of the Eatons, Holt (1999) argues that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97
the controversy was an opportunity to attack the social pretensions of the social
elites, and this assault solidified his support amongst the voters.
In order to test the above model, this author explored the original
documents related to the development of Henry Cisneros' scandal. As the
housing and urban development secretary for President Clinton, Cisneros dealt
with charges related to personal indiscretion. Based on the aforementioned
phases and factors, the following lines of questioning were pursued when
reviewing documents:
•

W hat was the context and nature of the sexual indiscretion? Was the
indiscrete behavior followed by improper, unethical or unlawful
efforts to withhold information?

•

W hat actors were involved in the development of the scandal?

•

W hat relationships existed that m ay have impacted the development
of the scandal? Did these relationships change during the
development of the scandal?
W hat organizational mechanisms were used to hold the individual
accountable?

•

W hat role did the press and, by natural expression of its gatekeeping
function, the public play in the development of the scandal?

A fter a ca refu l r e v ie w o f th e se d o c u m e n ts, sc a n d a l p h a s e s a n d fa cto r s w e r e

revised.
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Lim itations of Study

The limitations of this study are the following:
1. The fact that this sample is limited to Cabinet or sub-Cabinet officials
in the United States of America political system impacts whether it
can be generalized to other nations or U.S. states. The politics
surrounding Parliamentary Cabinets may differ from politics of U.S.
Cabinet appointees.
2. This convenience sample of four cases is not a representative sample
of the larger population of accused Cabinet or sub-Cabinet officials,
i.e., random ly choosing 15 different scandals from a population of 30
scandals w ould be more likely to provide a more accurate
representation of the variables and phases of a sex scandal.
3. Like any exploration of the past, a limited supply of data is to be
found in the existing documents, i.e., Alexander H am ilton's selfreported scandalous behavior is not supported or disputed by
"independent" documentation.
4. Exploration of historical events is limited by the researcher's 21st
century cultural lens, i.e., it is difficult to understand the nuances of
an 18th century culture that w ould im pugn the character of Margaret

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99
• (O'Neale) Eaton for expressing political attitudes and social
commentary in the company of men.
5. Since the four case studies were chosen from different time periods,
the variability of cultural change limits some comparisons, i.e.,
judging the public's response to the scandal outside of the nation's
capitol would be difficult both qualitatively and quantitatively.
6. This aim of this research is to provide a description of the phases and
factors of a sexual scandal and, as a result, does not provide
prescriptions or solutions for individuals faced with such a situation.
7. In each of the case studies, the executive chose to stay in office or the
president chose to retain the individual accused of sexual indiscretion
as long as it was politically possible; w e do not have a case study that
deals with how an executive is quickly removed from office because
this researcher was unable to find such a case.
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CHAPTER III
HENRY CISNEROS SEXUAL SCANDAL
On January 21,1993, the United States Senate confirmed Henry Cisneros
as President William J. Clinton's Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
(H.U.D.). Secretary Cisneros' list of accomplishments included receiving
degrees from H arvard and George W ashington University Henry, serving on
the San Antonio City Council as mayor and councilman, raising three children
w ith his wife Mary Alice and managing large pension plans. Armed with the
knowledge of cities' needs, Cisneros proposed reforms for H.U.D. programs.
Seventeen months into his tenure, Cisneros' previously aired, extra-marital
relationship with Linda Medlar resurfaced. After alleging a breach of contract
regarding Cisneros' prom ised support payments, Medlar claimed that Cisneros
had purposely misstated the levels of financial support to her during his F.B.I.
confirmation background check. Attorney General Reno chose to seek an
independent counsel to investigate the charges. With the support of President
Clinton, Secretary Cisneros remained at his post and waited for final action by
Independent Counsel David Barrett. At the end of President Clinton's first
term, Cisneros resigned.
100
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The following is a recreation of the sex scandal, and m any of the
attendant ramifications, that impacted Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development H enry Cisneros. Linda Medlar and H enry Cisneros' sexual
scandal adheres to the general phases of the author's proposed phases and
factors of a scandal, while providing new dimensions to particular variables. As
mayor of the city of San Antonio, Cisneros' affair w ith Linda Medlar was
adm itted to by the principals and reported by the press—fitting phase one, in
which there is public acknowledgment of indiscretion before taking office as a
secretary or under-secretary. Cisneros' disclosure of support paym ents to Linda
Medlar to the vetting committee and F.B.I. did not deter President William J.
Clinton from naming Henry as his secretary of housing and urban development
(H.U.D.) secretary—a case of a nominee admitting to indiscretion and financial
support for his lover, and yet the president-elect supported the nom inee
regardless. W hen Secretary Cisneros failed to continue his financial support of
Linda Medlar, she filed suit for breach of contract regarding support paym ents
and on September 12,1994, alleged on a national news program with
d o c u m e n ts

and tapes for support that Cisneros had m ade m isstatements to the

F.B.I. regarding her support paym ents—fitting phase two, the messenger
provided information about the multifaceted nature of the scandal to various
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officials. After an explanation by Secretary Cisneros, the president showed
support for his appointee. The law required, however, that Attorney General
Janet Reno determine if the allegations w arranted the appointm ent of an
independent counsel to investigate the case. Attorney General Reno's
declaration that Cisneros had lied to the F.B.I. was followed by the appointm ent
of a counsel on March 13,1995, evoking a statement of innocence by Cisneros
w ith a slight disclaimer that his statements to the F.B.I. m ay not have been
exact, beginning phase three. Voicing support for Cisneros, President Clinton
applauded the secretary's job performance as well as frankness w ith regard to
Medlar. Entering the investigation stage of phase three, Secretary Cisneros had
little protection from the final decision of the OIC, but he did have the support
of the president. After the appointment of Independent Counsel David Barrett
to investigate the charges, Secretary Cisneros served the president for the rest of
the first term/ resigning in November 1996. While not a "part" of this author's
model, Barrett sought an indictment of citizen Cisneros in November of 1997
resulting in a plea bargain to a misdemeanor in 1998. In Cisneros' case in
particu lar,

the cover-up w a s much w o r s e than the indiscretion.

Much like the affairs of the past, the documents of the Cisneros/Medlar
affair are limited in scope. While Linda M edlar m ay have appeared on national
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television and the transcripts of the tapes may have been sent to m any
newspapers allowing reporters to have their ow n copies, the actual transcripts
have not been preserved in institutions that m ade them available to this
researcher. The courts in Lubbock and Washington have sealed the files of the
related cases, a newspaper in San Antonio claimed proprietary information
when this author asked for a copy, and a num ber of reporters have not been
able to find copies that were in their files. While historians are naturally limited
by the artifacts that are available, this research has been limited by
•

Linda Medlar, who did not begin taping her conversations w ith
H enry Cisneros until 1990, almost two years after the affair had
begun, thereby reducing the actual artifacts available to researchers;

•

Medlar, who edited and destroyed conversations; and
the independent counsel's report,3 whose interest is in presenting a
document that supports the decision to bring charges and does not
have the interests of the research community in mind.

3 Unfortunately, this researcher was unable to obtain a copy of the F.B.I.
manuscript or an edited manuscript that was sent to news outlets. As a result the basis
of most of the following reconstruction of the Cisneros scandal process is based on
Office of the Independent Counsel David Barett's report. Had the case progressed to
the courtroom, Linda Medlar and Henry Cisneros would have been able to provide a
better recreation of the scandal as well as the context for many of the recordings.
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Because of the scarcity of documents that pertain to some areas of the scandal,
this author relied on evidence and opinion supplied by the secondary literature.
However, press clippings, journal articles, interviews and the independent
counsel's report provide a fair representation of the phases through which the
scandal proceeded, as well as the im portant variables of the scandal.

Phase 1: The Individual and the Alleged Behavior

What was the nature of the relationships between family members? The

historical record contains a limited num ber of documents to establish the nature
of the relationship between Mary Alice (Perez) Cisneros, H enry Cisneros, and
their extended family. A generally positive portrayal of their family is found in
the newspapers and a biography by Diehl and Jarboe (1985) shows the
influence of political activism, public service, cultural and Catholic traditions
that bound them together, but their marriage, it can be speculated, suffered as a
result of these influences.
The origins of Henry Cisneros' political education can be found in the
operations of the Romulo M unguia print shop that was only a few blocks from
the hom e where George and Elvira brought their newborn, Henry, on June 11,
1947. Cisneros' grandparents, Romulo and Carolina Munguia, and their
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children, Elvira, Guillermo, Rafael, and Ruben, were refugees from 1926
Mexican revolutionary politics. Escaping death during this volatile period,
Romulo m oved his family to San Antonio. In the United States, Romulo
contributed to San Antonio's La Prensa newspaper while Carolina helped
launched a Spanish language radio station. Eventually, Carolina and Romulo
launched an independent press that printed business and political materials.
From the M unguia print shop, Romulo advised striking pecan-shelling workers
and politicians in Texas as well as Mexico, and his children assisted in the
operations and observed the political activities. As World War II was entering
its final few months, Elvira was introduced to George Cisneros, a sergeant
major whose family's history w ent back to the earliest Spanish settlements in
New Mexico. Within six months of their first d ate—following a local SpanishAmerican custom insisted upon by Romulo—George and Elvira wed. After
mass on Sundays, the young couple and their children attended family
gatherings at H enry's grandparents home that included his uncles and cousins
(Diehl & Jarboe, 1985).
T h e e d u c a tio n

of young H enry regarding "family" began during dinner

table discussions, extended to his grandfather's print shop, and perhaps m ost
importantly by the example of his parents. Discussions at the dinner table were
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far ranging and free-wheeling debates that lasted well into the evening,
building a sense of family. After completing the second grade, the Cisneroses
decided that Henry could rise to the challenge of "skipping" a grade—the
interest in stimulating young Cisneros was not just at Catholic school, but
during the summer w hen Elvira Cisneros insisted that her children do work
around the house, read and try creative activities. When H enry and his brother
visited their grandfather's shop not too far from the family home, they grew in
awareness of San Antonio politics and the mechanics of campaigns. While
working as a civil servant, Cisneros continued to contribute to his country and
community by serving in the U.S. Army reserve and working to improve the
delivery of city services. George's dedication to the Air Force seems to have
"rubbed off" on Henry w ho developed an interest in aircraft, participated in
ROTC, and decided to apply to the Air Force Academy (Diehl & Jarboe, 1985).
After failing to gain admission to the academy, Cisneros was adm itted to Texas
A&M.
According to Diehl and Jarboe (1985), Henry's drive to succeed at Texas
A&M w as exem plified by a full daily schedule, only getting four to five hours
of sleep, when he was excelling as a student, an active participant in m any
campus organizations and a member of the ROTC program. Through campus
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opportunities, H enry's horizons grew —he was able to meet elite in the Texas
business community, attend a conference of diverse students at West Point and
visit New York City. During the Texas A&M years, Henry showed a change in
interest from the military to urban affairs (Diehl & Jarboe, 1985).
In retrospect, George Cisneros felt that he taught Henry to lead by
example—family first, the importance of education, clean living, striving for
excellence and hard work (Wu, 1983), and Elvira emphasized the im portance of
education and charitable actions (Obregon, 1982).
Raised in a Catholic household where everyone—nine children in all—
participated in the operations of the family's grocery store, Mary Alice Perez's
first memory of Henry Cisneros was when she was in eighth grade, and
participating as a model in a beauty show at her Catholic school—he w as in the
audience sporting a big-ears-and-very-little-hair look. Fourteen-year-old
Henry's first m emory of 12-year-old Mary Alice was that she struck out
whenever she came up to bat in a baseball game. Mary Alice did not remember
striking out, but rather that H enry wanted to win and she was a team player.
T h e pair sta r te d d a tin g w ith v e r y strict ru les s e t b y their p a r e n ts w h e n M a ry

Alice was 14 and attending an all girls school. Mary Alice remembered that
they went to football games and church events in groups because H enry did
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not have a license to drive. While Henry attended Texas A&M, Mary Alice
completed high school and took courses at San Antonio College (Diehl &
Jarboe, 1985).
On June 1,1969, Mary Alice, age 19, and Henry, age 21, were w ed in a
traditional ceremony at St. Agnes Catholic Church. They had become engaged
during H enry's senior year in college, but had postponed it when he received a
full scholarship from the Texas Municipal League so that he could pursue a
m aster's degree in regional and urban planning at A&M. While pursuing his
graduate degree, Henry had the opportunity to serve as assistant city manager
of Bryan, Texas, but was hired in January of 1969 by the Model Cities
Departm ent in San Antonio as an assistant director. As Henry pu t a lot of time
into his new job, Mary Alice realized that she did not want to be at home alone,
so she interviewed successfully for a job at a bank (Diehl & Jarboe, 1985).
Cisneros' experiences with the Model Cities Department m ade him
realize that federal program s could not rem edy the West Side's employment
and infrastructure problems. Elected officials with backgrounds in
a d m in istr a tio n a n d

finance were necessary to develop public policy that w ould

aid under-developed neighborhoods. With this in mind, Cisneros applied
successfully to George Washington University's urban adm inistration program
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and planned to minor in finance. Taking a chance on only a few job leads in the
nation's capital, Henry and Mary Alice moved to W ashington in January 1970.
After managing to successfully obtain a student internship at the National
League of Cities administration, Cisneros settled into a hectic schedule of
coursework and administrative work. Mary Alice successfully interviewed for a
job translating documents from Spanish to English at a bank. A business trip to
Florida kept Henry from being present when Mary Alice gave birth to Theresa
in the spring of 1971, two weeks before the due d ate—H enry's brother George
who was attending Georgetown University had to navigate the icy roads with
his sister-in-law (Diehl & Jarboe, 1985).
After completing his doctoral coursework, H enry Cisneros successfully
competed for a White House Fellows program where he was placed as an
assistant to Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary, Elliott Richardson. The
Richardsons included Mary Alice and Henry in a num ber of social activities
including performances at the theater. From Richardson's example Cisneros
learned the basics of clothing styles as well as the value of a developed intellect
a n d c o m p e te n c e — th e n e x t job or e le c te d o ffice s h o u ld n o t b e o n a p r o fe s s io n a l's

mind, rather developing skills and understanding which will speak for
themselves w hen people are looking for a candidate or employee. Richardson
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emphasized the need for an electoral base of support outside of Washington
rather than trying to climbing the ladder in Washington. Before returning to
San Antonio, Cisneros applied for a $10,000 grant to attend H arvard
University's John F. Kennedy School of Government where he obtained a
second master's degree in public adm inistration—the bona fides of a Harvard
degree. As for Mary Alice, she managed to find a babysitter and take a job until
the couple happily returned to San Antonio in 1974 (Diehl & Jarboe, 1985).
Upon returning to San Antonio, Henry Cisneros successfully
interviewed for a teaching position at the University of Texas at San Antonio
and worked to gain a slot on the ballot for the city council, beginning an
energetic campaign—sometimes working 16-hour days (Diehl & Jarboe, 1985).
The relentless effort to achieve and spend all the time necessary in order to
successfully complete a task in college now began to express itself in his
political life. Sworn in on M ay 1,1975 after an impressive electoral tally,4 Henry
set about a six-year campaign to become the mayor of San Antonio (Diehl &
Jarboe, 1985). Mercedes Cisneros came into the world during the sam e year that

4 According to Watkins (1975), Cisneros out polled his closest competitor,
Aleman, 45,622 to 19,724 votes. In a field of six candidates, none of the remaining
candidates' tallies broke 10,000 votes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ill
her father became a member of the city council. In an October 1977 interview,
with a child in her lap, Mary Alice describes her life w ith an ambitious
politician beginning with the unknow n quantity that her husband w as w hen
they first got m arried—she thought he was going to be a manager, not a
politician (V. Davidson, 1977). Her self-described mission was supporting
Henry, whom she believed had the "talents and assets to help the community"
(V. Davidson, 1977, p. 15-A). Included in her responsibilities were m anaging the
family budget, house, cars and two children—she received support from her
parents and in-laws with her duties (V. Davidson, 1977). Mary Alice's handling
of all of the family responsibilities was not the way they had planned it, but
"that's the way it turned out" (V. Davidson, 1977, p. 15-A). In the political
realm, Mary Alice tried to help H enry's constituents w ho called their home,
represented H enry at meetings, talked to the press, cut ribbons or appeared at
political events, and clipped new spaper articles for Henry; she hoped to be the
First Lady of San Antonio (V. Davidson, 1977). From the available evidence,
Mary Alice seemed to be the wife of a driven politician and she had to m eet the
challenges w h en he was not there to help her.

While H enry was busy w ith long days of work at city hall, teaching and
traveling on the lecture circuit or attracting business to San Antonio, M ary Alice

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112
attem pted to maintain a sense of accomplishment in her life, as well as a sense
of family life. Rather than worry about w hen H enry would be coming home,
Mary Alice found a part-tim e secretarial job and fit college coursework into her
schedule w ith the hope of becoming an elementary educator (V. Davidson,
1977).
By 1978, Mary Alice (in an interview) described Henry's frenetic
schedule as having a "horrendous" impact on their young family, but Henry
responded, "I think Mary Alice understands .. . the sense of mission I have . ..
and I am grateful for the free rein she has given me to do w hat I m ust so long as
I rem ain moral, ethical, faithful and honest about the mission" (Jones, 1998,
p. 5). The article did not develop the topic any further, and Cisneros' statement
suggests that Mary Alice w anted Cisneros to be a politician w ith high
standards.
W hen Henry joined the 1981 mayoral race, Mary Alice w as an integral
part of the campaign staff (Diehl & Jarboe, 1985). Polling well, Cisneros won,
and then again in 1983, by receiving 9 out of 10 votes. Priding himself on
attention to detail in the development of a more robust San Antonio, Mayor
Cisneros' schedule of meetings led to missed meetings with constituents, et al.,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113
and 14- and 16-hour days that kept him away from his family, as well as a
reduction in the time necessary to teach (Diehl & Jarboe, 1985).
The press put emphasis on the low pay of the councilmen and the
sacrifice of the Cisneros family income, which was decreased by $340 per
m onth because of a state law that did not allow an individual to draw a
paycheck from two different Texas institutions. By 1984, H enry's busy schedule
courting businesses for San Antonio, forced him to reduce his teaching load by
40% at University of Texas at San Antonio which m ost likely reduced his salary
of $25,080 to approximately $15,000 (McCrory, 1983). Henry prom ised M ary
Alice that he w ould bring home $1,500 a month in speaking honoraria (Wood,
September 2,1984). Mary Alice likely felt more fulfilled w hen she was able to
work outside of their home and a great deal of pride w hen her salary, as a
public relations counselor, boosted their income w ith an additional $16,080,
composing anywhere from one-quarter to one-third of the family earnings
(McCrory, 1983). The family income was augmented by tw o events. Switching
to Trinity College allowed him to collect a $4,040 salary from the city in 1984
(Diehl & Jarboe, 1985). By mid 1984, Cisneros' honoraria had brought in
$10,050—this was a result of rejecting nine out of 10 invitations to speak; the
range being from $500 to $2,000 (Wood, June 24,1984). H enry Cisneros'

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114
reputation was worth 20% of their family income in the m id 1980s, and it would
m ost likely climb after being considered by Democrat Walter M ondale for the
vice presidential slot.
During Mayor Cisneros' second term, he, with the help of his
administrative assistant Ms! Hernandez, attem pted to wrest time from his
schedule in order to keep a semblance of a family life. Henry and M ary Alice
jogged together whenever possible. He attem pted to spend time w ith his
parents by stopping at their home when out jogging. In order to m aintain a
healthy family dynamic, they ate at family friendly restaurants, jogged together
w hen possible, took short vacations to the Gulf of Mexico for some beach time,
attended mass on a regular basis, and visited grandparents on holidays or
whenever possible—attem pting to keep a routine (Diehl & Jarboe, 1985).
In the period around his fourth election as mayor in 1987, Cisneros
attem pted to set a moral standard for city employees as well as publicly affirm
the importance of Mary Alice. When an Express-News article revealed that city
m anager Fox took a trip to Puerto Vallarta w ith the ex-wife of a city manager
a n d s u g g e s te d th at it w a s c a u sin g a d m in istr a tiv e p ro b lem s, C isn e r o s c r iticized

the city manager publicly ("Is There a Dark, Moody Side to Cisneros?" 1987):
"A m an is entitled to his private life, but if that's the particular private life he
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w ants, he m ight be m aking a choice of that private life over his job" (O 'C onnell
& Silverman, 1988, p. 1). The m ayor alm ost asked for the city m anager's
resignation, even th ough the public felt (according to the new s report) that
w hat tw o consenting adults do in their spare tim e is their ow n business ("Is
There a Dark, M oody Side" 1987). Tw o m onths after Cisneros h ad beg u n his
relationship w ith Linda M edlar (Jones, 1998), he w as able to affirm (in the M ay
edition of Esquire) his special relationship w ith his wife an d how , "There are
other w om en w ho are m ore statuesque and have other qualities, b u t I've
alw ays been particularly susceptible to that kind of excitem ent she generates"
(Gonzalez, 1987, p. 1-B).
D uring the final tw o m onths of M ary Alice's pregnancy, H en ry —still at
w ork at 7 p .m .—received a call from his wife. She w as experiencing bleeding,
an d by the tim e he cam e hom e, an am bulance h ad already arrived. The
prognosis for the baby w as good, b u t M ary Alice's doctor recom m ended b ed
rest until the baby w as bom . H enry shifted his priorities from city d u ty to
dom estic duty, m aking Theresa an d M ercedes breakfast and then delivering
th e m to s c h o o l (Jarboe, 1987).

The actual state of their m arriage m ay be deduced b y the am ount of tim e
req u ired by the m ayor's job as w ell as differences in personalities (O 'C onnell &
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Silverman, 1988) and later described as "the fundam ental problem is dramatic
personality problem s—two good people on different roads" (Wood, October 15,
1988, p. 12-A). Before the breaking of the sex scandal story, M ary Alice sought
advice several times from Attorney Pat Maloney regarding divorce (Thompson,
October 14,1988). Later, Henry Cisneros stated that the problems within their
m arriage "are long standing and one could make the case, perhaps, that they
should have been dealt w ith a long time ago . . . a fatal error" (Martinez &
Tackett, 1988, p. 10-A). Mayor Cisneros and his wife had fought for years and
their alienation increased w hen she turned to fundamentalist Christianity
(Maraniss, 1988; Jones, 1998); "he had earlier adm itted that coming home nights
to hear his wife's religious friends praying up a storm on the ground floor was
not that sweet and easy on his ears" (Thompson, October 16,1988, p. 3-A). The
resentm ent m ay have grow n when John Paul—the son that Henry always
wanted, but Mary Alice w anted nothing to do w ith because of the hassle of
diapers and rearing another child—came along (Maraniss, 1988). The June 10
birth of his son and the infant's heart defect caused him to put any statewide
p o litic a l p la n s o n h o ld a n d alter h is sc h e d u le , e x c e p t

for paid speeches, in order

to help out with the care of John Paul. Noting that he could not of necessity
w ithdraw completely, Cisneros felt that he had to deal with San Antonio
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Symphony labor issues, Hemisfair plaza redevelopment, acquifer issues and his
Alamodome presentation to the city council (Martinez, 1987). Without his
attention, he felt that these projects could become political liabilities" (Canty &
Martin, 1987). It can be surmised that while Cisneros' decision to not begin a
campaign statewide away from his family was im portant to the survival of his
marriage, perhaps the most im portant aspect of it was the shutting dow n of his
political action committee, the Committee for Texas Progress, located in Austin
(Canty, 1987). Established in May of 1987 with the goal of involving Cisneros in
state politics, its executive director w as Linda Medlar (Canty, 1987). According
to Gugliotta (1994), Medlar's employment was terminated because Mary Alice
had gained knowledge of their affair.
In retrospect, Cisneros saw his situation, when he had grown enamored
of Linda, as a clash between everything he had been taught by his parents and
Catholicism as duty in conflict w ith the freedom he w ould experience w ith the
inspiration and joy of his muse (Maraniss, 1988). In a January 1989 interview
w ith Marie Brenner of Vanity Fair, Cisneros said that his "spirit was broken"
(p. 47), b u t th is r e la tio n sh ip (w ith M e d la r )—h e h a d o th er extra-m arital

relationships—was "different" (p. 48).
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H e (Cisneros) had become baffled by a marriage that had seemed
preordained to him as a c hild.. . . "Mary Alice and I have nothing in
common anymore . . . I begged her to go back to school and she
w ouldn't. Instead she became a born-again Christian." (Brenner, 1989,
p. 48)
"Look at m y life. I m arried young. It was not a good match or a happy
one. The Catholic strictures are binding. They are part of having to live
in m y grandfather's house. You don't leave the West Side. You don't
betray the family. . .. Mary Alice thinks I have turned away from God,
and this at the root of m y problems. She has become a born-again
Christian, and in the m orning I wake up to Jesus tapes and at night that's
w hat I go to sleep w ith !. . . (Mary Alice told him t h a t) because I have
been living the sinner's life I have, I was only offered 12 and a half
m inutes on the platform (at the Democratic National Convention)."
(Brenner, 1989, pp. 50-51).
"W hen I was in graduate school, I fell deeply in love with a Canadian
girl who was studying city planning. Mary Alice and I were already
m arried and I decided I had had enough of being burdened by my
background. That night I went to bed and I had a dream that m y baby
daughter, Theresa, was hit by a car on my way to church. Can you
believe that? But there it was. And I decided after that dream that I
w ould have to live m y life like a priest. I w ould have to devote myself to
a cause and a city." (Brenner, 1989, p. 51)
Unlike the closed-lip, pithy public figures of the past, Henry Cisneros
had invited the public into the conflicts of his upbringing and his marriage. The
press had treated him well as m any of these articles suggest, but it is not hard to
im a g in e h o w d ifficu lt it m u s t h a v e b e e n k e e p in g

a fa m ily and career together.

What was the nature o f the relationship between President Clinton and Henry
Cisneros? According to Pika and Norman (1996), Henry Cisneros, the Mayor of
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San Antonio, was chosen by President-elect Clinton for his Hispanic
background and political experience. Implied in Pika and N orm an's analysis is
Romero's (1997) reference to Cisneros' doctorate in urban planning, as well as
practical experience in helping to rebuild San Antonio as selling points to the
president-elect. President Clinton confirms Pika and N orm an's analysis and
adds that he and Cisneros were friends before Henry's nom ination (Clinton,
2004). In a recent interview (Boswell, 2003), Henry Cisneros discussed his preH.U.D. secretarial relationship with then Governor Bill Clinton as consisting of
getting to know the Arkansan when introducing him to conventions in San
Antonio in 1983 and 1985. Clinton's appreciation of Cisneros' work in San
Antonio resulted in subsequent invitations to Arkansas that included a speech
in Hot Springs, interactions with Hillary Rodham Clinton, and visits to the
governor's mansion. The political relationship between Clinton and Cisneros
m ust have been strengthened by w hat Jones (1998) and Gugliotta (1994)
characterized as Cisneros' hard work for Clinton's election. Cisneros' service on
the president-elect's transition team m ay have increased the likelihood of him
b e in g o ffe r e d a p o s itio n in th e C ab inet.

The nature of the working and personal relationship between President
Clinton and Secretary Cisneros is not mentioned by Clinton in his
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autobiography. Even after Linda Medlar filed suit and appeared on "Inside
Edition," we m ay be able to gauge President Clinton's attitude about Secretary
Cisneros' "value" by the fact that Henry was invited to serve on a group of 12
to 15 political advisors and Cabinet officers that Clinton put together after the
1994 Republican takeover of the Congress to discuss its political ramifications
(Boswell, 2003). During these meetings, Cisneros felt that he developed a close
relationship w ith Clinton; H enry noted that, "Pm sure he has a close
relationship w ith about 10,000 people and I was fortunate be one of them"
(Boswell, 2003). We do, however, get a peak into the private assessment of
President Clinton by Cisneros in the transcripts of the taped conversations with
Linda Medlar. DeParle (1994) reports from the transcripts of Medlar and
Cisneros' conversations that the secretary felt Clinton was a difficult m an to
work for—very indecisive, and Davidson (1994) reports that Cisneros makes
the general statement about Clinton, "There are a lot of personal qualities about
Clinton that are troublesome for those who w ould work with him" (Express
News, p. 5A). Like any professional executive, Cisneros w anted clear guidance
from the chief executive; this, however, does not shed a great deal of light on
their relationship other than a need for patience.
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What type of relationship did Henry Cisneros have with members of Congress
before and after his move to Washington as H.U.D.? The relationship with members

of Congress m ost likely began in 1977 w hen Councilman Cisneros was elected
to the board of directors of the National League of Cities and increased as he
worked to protect funding for cities. The board of directors and the advisory
council were expected to comment—some of the members w ould testify before
Congress—on the national urban policy that was being developed at the time,
specifically how federal funds were to be apportioned betw een northern and
southern cities ("2 from S. A. Decide Where Fed Funds Go," 1977). Efforts to
modify early proposals by the Reagan Administration regarding block grants
and other domestic program s (Weser, April 18,1981; June 6,1981) no doubt
raised Cisneros' profile w ith the Democratically controlled Congress. When
Cisneros was elected as president of the National League of Cities on December
11,1985, he pledged to lobby Congress in a continued defense of federal grants
to cities (S. Phillips, 1985).
It is likely that the closest relationship that Cisneros m ay have had in
C o n g r e ss w a s

w ith H e n r y G o n z a le z , who represented San Antonio in

Congress—the need for communication between the tw o m ust have resulted in
a working relationship at the least. The level of political support by Gonzalez
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dates back to Cisneros' first run for mayor, w hen Gonzalez repudiated his son's
decision to support a candidate other than Cisneros (Diehl & Jarboe, 1985).
During the 1984 election period, when he was one of Walter M ondale's
potential vice presidential running mates and spoke at the Democratic National
Convention, Cisneros reported an unwillingness to run for office beyond his
position—he expressed an interest in serving for perhaps another three terms,
acknowledging the fact that he would not have a political base or experience in
Congress (Diehl & Jarboe, 1985). But he was willing to work with members of
his own party within Texas who held congressional seats, co-chairing Senator
Lloyd Bentsen's 1987 re-election campaign.5 In 1987, Bentsen is quoted as
saying, "(Henry is) one of the real stars in our party—not just in Texas, but
nationally;" and a candidate for a democratic W hite House's Cabinet (Cantu,
1987, p. 60).
Democrats and Republicans did not grill Cisneros during the
confirmation process. This m ay have been out of a sense of decorum since
Cisneros had already suffered embarrassment over the scandal, as well as the

5 Whether it was Henry's influence with Senator Bentsen and/or Linda Medlar's
talent as a fundraiser that got her a job with Bentsen's re-election campaign (Canty,
1987) is open for conjecture.
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fact that many of the senators had suffered embarrassing scandals (see
Cisneros' comments later in this manuscript).
The 1994 takeover of Congress by the Republicans changed the dynamic
of governing. No longer were the peoples' representatives friendly to a
vigorous government. Instead, Republicans were interested in eliminating
H.U.D. (Martin, April 16,1995), thereby setting up a natural antagonism
between the secretary and members of the Congress.
What type o f relationship did Cisneros have with other executives before and
after entering the service o f Clinton? The secondary literature is silent on the

relationship between Cisneros and other executives, and the relationship
between Andrew Cuomo and himself, as well as other administrators. Did he
work w ith other Cabinet chiefs to further his goals for H.U.D.? What type of
relationship did he have w ith Attorney General Janet Reno?
Unlike the case of Sumner Welles or Alexander Hamilton, Henry
Cisneros' case of sexual indiscretion arises and is docum ented before he
assum ed the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development post, and it is the
a tte n d a n t factors, n a m e ly su p p o r t p a y m e n ts to h is lo v e r d u r in g

the interim of

service in San Antonio and the Cabinet that are the focus of this case study.
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What were the traits of the alleged indiscretion? The traits of the indiscretion

appear to be rather concrete and rather typical of a m an and w om an who
violate their m arriage vows in an indiscrete, consenting, heterosexual
relationship that turned out to be damaging to children, parents, family, and
friends. In March of 1987, H enry Cisneros and Mrs. Linda Jones M edlar during
a fundraising trip to New York broke their m arital vows. Hired in 1986, Mrs.
Medlar was the executive director of Cisneros' PAC, Committee for Texas
Progress (Canty, 1987). After the affair had begun, according to Medlar, she and
Cisneros saw each other w hen they could (Gugliotta, 1994).
Three m onths into their affair, Cisneros' son, John Paul, was b om with
heart defects, including the lack of an atrium (Maraniss, 1988). According to
Medlar,
H enry was devastated, not only because of his s o n . . . but also because
we had to figure out how to encompass John Paul into our future p la n s..
.. H e thought there w as a w ay to do i t . . . being a private person for a
while, spending as m uch time as he could with John Paul, and he and
Mary Alice coming to some sort of agreement. (Gugliotta, 1994, p. 4)
Cisneros needed to make a calculation that w ould take into
c o n s id e r a tio n h is p o litic a l fu tu r e ,,h is lo v e for L in d a M edlar, h is m a rr ia g e a n d

John Paul's problems, which H enry thought could be a message from God to
m end his ways (Gugliotta, 1994).
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Gugliotta (1994) states that Cisneros, without M edlar's knowledge,
began talking w ith new spaper reporters and others almost immediately about
the wom an whom he loved, each reporter sworn to secrecy. While bringing the
pair a year and a half of protection from the public's eye, Cisneros' confessions
came to the attention of Mary Alice. According to Medlar, M ary Alice insisted
that she be fired w hen Henry, citing John Paul's needs, rem oved himself from a
1990 gubernatorial or senatorial run in A ugust 1987. Maraniss (1988), on the
other hand, does not mention this early effort, but states:
From the m om ent he announced in August, 1987 that he (Cisneros) was
taking himself out of the 1990 races for senator or governor, Cisneros
began a calculated effort to explain his situation to the San Antonio news
establishment in off-the-record meetings. Many of Cisneros' friends said
his purpose was clear, "he was trying to co-opt the entire press corps,"
said a city hall associate. (Casey, 1988; Maraniss, 1988, p. 1-C)
Cisneros discussed his problems w ith the publisher of the San Antonio
Express-News, the editorial board of the San Antonio Light, and many of the
reporters, hoping to immunize himself through the media stricture,
emphasizing that as long as it was not impacting his performance, then his
private life was off limits (Maraniss, 1988).
A t city hall, Cisneros was criticized by coworkers for sharing his story of
indiscretion with "2,500 of your closest friends," thinking that the press would
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continue to cover up the problem, divorcing M ary Alice for an A nglo—it would
not be accepted in the Hispanic community; the motive ascribed to Linda was
her interest in being the wife of the first Hispanic U.S. President (Maraniss,
1988).
On September 12,1988, Henry Cisneros announced that he w ould not
seek a fifth term as mayor of San Antonio. Citing his son's medical problems, as
well as John Paul's medical bills that are estimated at $200,000 (Corchado,
1988), Cisneros denied that marital problems had anything to do w ith his
decision to not seek re-election (McLemore, 1988).
In a San Antonio Light column written by Rick Casey during the week of
October 3,1988, the columnist posed three ethical questions, one resembling the
case of Henry Cisneros' sexual indiscretion. On Thursday, October 13, Casey
stated w hat the press knew: (a) Mayor Cisneros and his wife had an unhappy
marriage; (b) the mayor held "off-the-record" conversations w ith reporters and
other staff members, stating that he is in a serious relationship w ith a w om an
other than his wife; and (c) he discussed his personal problems w ith other
members of the community who had been free w ith the information. Casey's
conclusion—the m ayor's behavior had to be exposed or it would appear that
the 4th Estate was covering it up.
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In a current article that appeared on October 13,1988, O'Connell and
Silverman's interview of Cisneros shed a great deal of light on rumors that
swirled around Mayor Cisneros' personal life. Henry rejected the idea that the
public had the right to know about the intricacies of his marital problems,
especially since M ary Alice contributed so m uch to the community and
deserved privacy. Cisneros stated that there were difficulties due to personality
differences, but divorce was not a possibility because of the support that John
Paul needed. Cisneros did, however, describe his friend:
There is a friend .. .who is a friend . . .whose name I will not m ention
because that person is not a public person, who is very smart and very
insightful—capable in m y field—and who is one of the best friends I
have ever had, just in terms of the hum an feedback that a person needs
over the course of a lifetime. But for that to assume the proportions that
it has is simply incorrect. It is not factual and it is not correct. (O'Connell
& Silverman, 1988, p. 4)
With regard to rumors, which he felt wounded by after all of his years of
public service, Cisneros stated:
"There is no pregnancy, there is no child, there is no paternity suit, there
are no physical assaults, no divorce filings, nothing of that nature.
Nothing at all. Nobody has left town, nobody went to another place to
have an abortion. Nothing of that is true—absolutely rock solid zero.
Period ." (O 'C o n n ell & S ilverm an , 1988, p. 4)

"In an attem pt to explain his behavior vis-a-vis the press, the public, and
his problems,—I tried to ask for privacy to deal w ith them. What people
don't understand is that the reason I w as asking for privacy was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

128
threefold—I have tried to ascribe—ascribe some dignity to the office
itself. Secondly, I have taken the role dimension of my assignment, my
mission, my personality, m y job, seriously. I have felt it was best to
handle private problems in private, and not through the klieg lights and
the environment that is attendant. The consideration for saying that I
would not run was that I wanted to spare Mary Alice, the girls (his two
teenage daughters) and John Paul all the difficulties, and sort this out in
private." (O'Connell & Silverman, 1988, p. 5)
While M ayor Cisneros could not determine the reason for the exposure of his
indiscretion at that precise time, O'Connell and Silverman concluded that
Henry had used his family and personal life to his political advantage, without
setting strict limits for reporters, and it had backfired.
When asked about the Current article that was about to be released, the
m ayor's wife had no comment since she had not read it, but she did say that the
family had a lot of needs and she did not own a gun—a reference to the rumor
about her attem pt to shoot H enry (Martinez, October 13,1988).
The final blow to any pretense came with the publication of Paul
Thompson's column entitled, "Cisneros Confesses Deep Love for Medlar," on
Friday, October 14,1988. Based on notes from previous conversations,
Thompson identified Linda Medlar, a political fundraiser and wife of Stan
Medlar, a local jeweler, as the wom an who Mayor Cisneros characterized as his
"best friend in all of the world" (Thompson, October 14,1988, p. 1-A).
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Thompson reported that his conversations w ith Medlar indicated that she was
equally in love (on m any different levels) with Cisneros. Thompson reported
that Cisneros had originally planned to finish out his fourth term, divorce Mary
Alice when the public spotlight had been turned off, and live happily with
Linda. According to Thompson, Cisneros seemed to have changed his attitude
about divorcing Mary Alice during the m onth just before the scandal broke
stating that "a public figure like himself m ay have to 'pay some dues' in terms
of propping up a sagging marriage and maintaining the right kind of family
image, 'whatever the cost'" (Thompson, October 14,1988, p. 14-A). As the story
was about to break, Medlar indicated to Thompson that she was unsure of the
future (Thompson, October 14,1988).
On the day the Thompson piece was to be published, a newspaper
reporter knocked on the Cisneros' door before dawn (Martinez & Tackett, 1988).
Showing the headlines to Mrs. Cisneros who was carrying John Paul, she
refused comment (although she prom ised to comment later in the day—she
never did) and retreated, saying that she needed to take care of her children .
(Martinez & Tackett, 1988). In r e sp o n se to the revelations, M ary Alice and
Mayor Cisneros appeared on the front porch of their home for a short tim e—the
m ayor m et w ith the press and his wife retreated inside to family and friends,
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m any of whom had brought covered dishes, as if someone had died in the
family. The list of family and supporters included Mary Alice's pastor,
Reverend David Walker of the Alamo City Baptist Church, her sister Annie
DeLeon and brother Roger Perez, and the m ayor's uncles, Ruben and Romulo
Munguia, and his close friend Rene Gonzalez, the family's accountant
(Martinez & Tackett, 1988; Wood, October 15,1988).
Mayor Cisneros led off the press conference in his front yard by stating
that his wife came to the front porch in order to show that "she's intact, (a)
capable, strong woman" (Martinez & Tackett, 1988, p. 10-A). He jokingly noted
that she w anted to show that she had not been shot, as the rum ors said she had
done to him; but on a somber note, he did say that he had explained the
situation to his teenage daughters who would have to deal w ith personal and
peer issues (Martinez & Tackett, 1988).
While denying that he planned to get divorced, Cisneros declined to go
into detail about his marriage, saying only that Linda Medlar was not the cause
of his marital problems, rather long-standing issues that should have been
worked out (Martinez & Tackett, 1988). Reported in the W ood article, but not in
the Martinez and Tackett account, was Cisneros' comment that he needed a
"soulmate."
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But when asked if he was sorry about his relationship w ith Medlar . . . he
replied, "people in the course of a lifetime find friendships and ways to
cope, support, in m any different ways, in m any different forms. I cannot
be sorry for life the way that it is; I cannot be sorry for that." (Martinez &
Tackett, 1988, p.l-A).
The mayor described Medlar as a "very intelligent, bright, attractive person,
very close. . . who understands the difficulty of m y present situation" (Wood,
October 15,1988, p. 1-A). Cisneros asked that the press respect Mary Alice's
privacy (Martinez & Tackett, 1988; Wood, October 15,1988). Cisneros asked for
"some time and understanding in order to work things out" (Martinez &
Tacket, 1988, p. 1-A ; Wood, October 15,1988, p.l-A).
"I am sorry that as leader of the community, San Antonio and m y name
go together on these problems," he said, "but I guess hum an beings aren't m ade
of plastic and wiring and metal, they are m ade of flesh and blood and feelings
and a lot such things" (Martinez & Tackett, 1988, p. 10-A). H e added that Linda
Medlar was okay w hen he had spoken with her earlier that morning. The
m ayor promised to continue working for the dty, while acknowledging the
possibility that he m ay be unable to speak on the national speaking circuit,
which provided a large portion of his fam ily's income, or work for other
candidates for office (Martinez & Tackett, 1988).
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Cisneros did not attack the press during the interview or in subsequent
conversations (Maraniss, 1988), but his Uncle Ruben M unguia stated, "The
media has m ade a personal (public) issue of something that should have been
kept private among themselves. It's their family, and their problems should be
theirs, as w ould be yours, as w ould be mine" (Martinez & Tackett, 1988,
p.

10-A).
According to Phillips (October 15,1988), members of the city

government were generally supportive of Henry Cisneros. Council m embers
Hasselocher and Wing voiced their support for the mayor on the record, but
other members w ho thought the indiscretion was a private m atter did not want
their sentiments reported. City manager Fox assured the citizens of San Antonio
that services w ould continue to be offered regardless of Cisneros' affairs.
Press coverage of Linda M edlar included a personal telephone interview
and comments from previous coworkers and an employer. Balik (1988)
reported that associates thought she was a very private person, conscientious,
hardworking, a dutiful wife, and a slender blond. Her supervisor at the San
A n to n io C h a m b er o f C o m m erce th o u g h t sh e w a s a q u ick learner, w e ll

organized and got along well w ith people, but knew little about her personal
life (Balik, 1988). A woman who served with Linda and Stan M edlar on a
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charity committee thought that she was "pretty," "gracious," and "supportive
of St a n . . . they were a unit" (Balik, 1988, p. 3-A). Interviewed for a San Antonio
Light article published on October 16, Linda Medlar said that she would
support whatever decision Cisneros m ade concerning his private life, asked
that the public not allow the personal problem s to detract from the m ayor's
accomplishments, and stated that Cisneros was trying "to work out some
personal problems that w ould hurt people the least; he was not given the
opportunity to do that" (Martinez, October 16,1988a, p. 1-B). W hen asked if she
w anted to marry the mayor, Mrs. Medlar stated that it was a private m atter and
hoped that the attention on the relationship w ould not cause anyone concerned
to rush im portant decisions (Martinez, October 16, 1988a). Having received
encouraging calls from supporters, she "w ould try to go on w ith her life,
hoping that the sudden public attention on her would not im pact her
professional career" (Martinez, October 1 6 ,1988a, p. 4-B).
Members of the Cisneros family responded in different ways to the
revelations. On Sunday, Mary Alice, Mercedes, Theresa, and John Paul w ent to
church. T h e r e v e r e n d and the family stood before the congregation and prayed
for the Cisneros family and Linda M edlar (Cook, 1988), and shortly thereafter
Mary Alice left on a retreat w ith members of the church (Maraniss, 1988). Alone

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

134
at home, Cisneros cried (Maraniss, 1988). On the M onday following the
scandal's exposure, Mayor Cisneros returned to work, facing the press and
opinion about his indiscretion. His secretary Delzie Madkins told him that
"responsibility was more im portant than happiness" (Maraniss, 1988, p. 1-C).
When questioned by the press, Cisneros insisted that he had nothing m ore to
say about the topic, rem inded them that he could not accomplish the city's
business if he were pursued about the topic, and stated that he would notify
them when he had m ade a decision (S. Phillips, October 18,1988). Ten days
after the Thompson article, Cisneros stepped into the late night national
spotlight w ith an in-depth interview by Charlie Rose, the anchor of "CBS News
Nightwatch" (Jakle, 1988). While he had told the San Antonio press that he
would not go into detail, Jakle reported that Cisneros appeared to have
changed his m ind, explaining how he was weighing the various options in his
situation in light of the fact that his marriage could no longer work. Perhaps the
calculation for Cisneros was that he wanted to "immunize" himself on a
national platform against further embarrassment, foreshadowing how
candidate Clinton would use the press to his advantage.
While Linda Medlar received calls of support, she also experienced
anonymous death threats, the loss of "two big fundraising jobs," and
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depression resulting in her seeing a psychiatrist: "(she) was adm itted to a
psychiatric ward" and "attem pted suicide w ith an overdose of pills and booze"
(Jones, 1998, p. 7). In late November, Stan Medlar filed for divorce, stating that
he had stopped living w ith his wife on October 14 (the date of the Thompson
article) and that the m arriage had become unsupportable ("Linda Medlar's
H usband Files," 1988). While Barrett (1997) maintained that Cisneros m oved in
with M edlar at the end of October, Jones (1998) reports that tw o months after
the story broke, Mayor Cisneros rented an apartm ent and "only his closest
aides, he later acknowledged, knew to dial Linda's number, not his own, to
reach him" (p. 7). When Stan filed for divorce, according to Linda,
Henry urged her to walk away from the marriage em pty-handed to
avoid an ugly court battle that could damage his own golden name and
political future. Linda claims she left behind assets w orth well over $1
million, believing that Henry w ould m arry her, that H enry would
always take care of her and her daughter. (Jones, 1998, p. 7)
Cisneros disputed the assertion that he put any pressure on M edlar to avoid a
court fight (Barrett, 1997).
According to Medlar, Cisneros proposed marriage and the date was to
b e "in th e fa ll o f 1989 after h is in v e stm e n t c o m p a n y g o t o ff th e grou n d " (Jones,

1998, p. 8). Over the next two years, Cisneros would start four companies,
Cisneros Communications, Cisneros Asset Management Company, Cisneros
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Benefits Group, and Cisneros Metro Air. The latter charter company was
instrum ental in allowing him continued visits to Linda M edlar when she had
moved to Lubbock. "By mid 1989, Cisneros testified, saying he was harboring
doubts about a long-term relationship with Linda because of his moral
misgivings and the health of his son" (Jones, 1998, p. 8). In November 1989,
Cisneros w ent to the hospital for gallbladder surgery, and rather than returning
to M edlar's home, was brought back to his family home, leaving his clothes at
Linda's residence (Jones, 1998).
M edlar w ent to Lubbock (Barrett, 1997), and w hen she returned to San
Antonio refused to respond to Cisneros' calls, inquiries through friends, or
Christmas gifts left at her door (Jones, 1998). In January 1990, Linda agreed to
speak with H enry (Barrett, 1997). Over the next few months, she explained her
financial difficulties resulting from their relationship and they finally came to
an agreement in which Henry Cisneros agreed to pay her $4,000 a m onth in
support. According to Medlar, Cisneros said the paym ents w ould last
"forever," whereas Henry recalled agreeing to paym ents until Kristan
graduated fr o m c o lle g e (Barrett, 1997; Jones, 1998). With C isn ero s' r e fu sa l to p u t
the agreement in writing, Medlar began tape recording her conversations with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137
him in March 1990 (Barrett, 1997; Jones, 1998) and visited Attorney Pat Maloney
to find out her rights as a result of a verbal contract (Barrett, 1997).
In a San Antonio Express-News article appearing on April 22,1990,
Linda told her side of the events surrounding their affair. While acknowledging
that her career and m arriage have been ruined, her ex-husband had been a
"strong and supportive friend" (Wood, April 22,1990, p. 1-A). She and Cisneros
still communicated, but she believed that he had not been completely honest
about their bond:
"There is a bond that will never be broken. I wish it could have been
different. The bond is still there even though the problem s exist. We
truly, truly cared deeply for each other. We loved each other. We wanted
to spend the rest of our lives together. We wanted to do it in a way that
was least painful for everyone. But it didn't work out that way. We
talked about having a place in the country. Those were all real things.
They are a part of Henry that the public and you in the press never saw.
H e's not an institution. H e's not a robot. We went through months and
m onths of pain, trying to think of what was best. It w as not something
we took lightly. There was John Paul to consider, along w ith everyone
else" (Wood, April 22,1990, pp. 1-A, 15-A)
Stating that she was not a "public" person or interested in being the first lady,
Linda said she was a political person who worked hard on campaigns,
in c lu d in g th e effort to d e fe a t th e s p e n d in g c a p s in San A n to n io , a n d it w a s in

this capacity that she had m et Mayor Cisneros and was asked to join his PAC
(Wood, April 22,1990). While serving as a liaison to the business community
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and successfully raising $168,000 to retire the committee's deficit, she and
Henry fell in love. She related:
"I not in awe of him. I could see his strong and weak points. It (the
relationship) was not something we worked at. It just happened. I don't
offer any excuses. If I had been a man, we would have been best friends.
He called me for advice on every issue that came up. It was during that
time that Henry and I became very close" (Wood, April 22,1990,
p. 15-A).
Public interest in Linda and H enry had not subsided when Henry left
office in June of 1989, as they had hoped. "The press is still very interested in
Henry. He doesn't discourage it. I know that. H e's a public person. But I did ask
him, 'Henry, just be honest with them. Tell them what the real story is. D on't
play word games with them'" (Wood, April 22,1990, p. 15-A).
Besides wanting everyone to know that they (she and Henry) were
trying to make everyone happy, she stated:
"I am doing this story for one reason only, and that is because I have
become a paragraph of the extra-marital affair. 'There is just so m uch
more to it than that. I am a person just like anyone else, who has m ade
some mistakes in her life" (Wood, April 22,1990, p. 15-A)
Elvira frowned on the financial support for Medlar and verbally
c h a stise d h er so n , s u g g e s tin g th a t h e b u y her (L inda) "a m o p a n d pail" (Jones,

1998, p. 9). In some cases, Henry delivered cash support payments in person,
while on other occasions, Alfred Ramirez and Sylvia Arce-Garcia w ould make

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

139
deposits directly into M edlar's bank account (Barrett, 1997). Table 1 contains an
analysis of Cisneros' paym ent data compiled by the Office of the Independent
Counsel David Barrett (see Appendix B for the raw data). A num ber of Henry's
supporters offered her jobs that she rejected; "loans," sometimes amounting to
$11,000, were accepted (Jones, 1998). The total of the payments ending on
November 3,1992 was $160,654 and the average payment over 35 months was
$4,590 (Barrett, 1997). According to M edlar's San Antonio Attorney Pat
Maloney, there had been an attem pted settlement in 1991 for an undisclosed
am ount when the couple was splitting up; and again, according to Medlar'
Attorney Floyd Holder, for $100,000 in December, 1992 (Hendricks, 1995; Wood
& Martin, 1994).
What was the marital status of the individuals involved? At the time of the

public revelations of the affair, both Medlar and Cisneros were m arried to Stan
Medlar and Mary Alice Cisneros, respectively. The Medlar m arriage, that began
in 1974, was marked by Linda's leaving in 1980 (a five-day m arriage to another
m an resulting in an annulment) and a reunification with Stan. Cisneros was in
the 18th y e a r of his m arriage. After Stan filed for divorce in November 1988, the
final divorce decree was approved by a district judge in April, 1989 ("District
Judge Oks Divorce," 1989).
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Table 1
Cisneros Payment Data
Year

1990

1991

1992

$44,500

$73,024

$63,150

13

20

28

Highest Monthly Payment
total

$9,100

$17,000

$16,000

Lowest Monthly Payment
total

$2,500

$2,017

$2,200

Average Monthly Payment
total

$3,423

$3,651

$2,258

4

1

1

Total of Payments

Number of Payments

Number of Monthly
Payment totals
< or = $2,500

Were there related issues that may have been of political significance? During

the media frenzy following the reporting of the affair, Mayor Cisneros adm itted
to having an affair with Linda Medlar. Because of this disclosure, Stan M edlar
filed for divorce. Linda lost some of her clients, received a demotion in one case
and eventually suffered the destruction of her political fundraising company.
Henry asked Linda that she not drag their affair into court because his
reputation w ould suffer, thereby resulting in the loss of any child support from

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

141
Stan. Because of this financial damage to Linda, Henry agreed to make
paym ents amounting to $4,000 a m onth in support to Linda Medlar.
What were the genders of the individuals involved? Besides a heterosexual

relationship between Cisneros and Medlar, no evidence suggests that Cisneros
and M edlar were engaged in homosexual activities together or apart.
Do legal records exist which document the alleged behavior? N ew spaper

articles, interviews with Cisneros, and the divorce of Stan and Linda Medlar
document the events surrounding the public affair, and legal docum ents that
are sealed exist. A jury trial was never conducted in order to determine the
legal standing of the verbal agreement between Cisneros and Medlar.
Were the alleged behaviors legal? No data suggest that adultery was

unlawful in the state of Texas. While this author surmises that a Texas hush
money statute exists, an indictment and conviction of Cisneros w ould be
difficult based on the initial intent of the payments.
Was there a third party involved in the scandal? Interestingly, the single

event that may have set-off the scandal m ay be found in the comments of Elvira
C isn e r o s (Jones, 1998). E lvira, it m a y b e in ferred , to o k her fa ith a n d its

commandments very seriously when in 1982 she began a Bible study group
(Obregon, 1982). According to Rick Casey,
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[W]hen a local TV reporter asked Elvira Cisneros on-camera about
rumors that Henry was unfaithful, she said, "he tells me he isn't," and
then the reporter asked, "do you believe him?" and there was this long
pause. Then Elvira said, "no" and began to cry. (Jones, 1998, p. 6)
Elvira was not just displeased w ith her son at the time for his indiscretion, she
did not like the fact that he was blaming John Paul in order to cover-up his
misdeeds (Corchado, 1988).
It may also be argued that w hen Cisneros attem pted to immunize
himself with off-the-record discussions with the press, the third party w as in
fact the press community.
Did evidence of past sexual indiscretion exist? "When he was in public,

people—especially wom en—sought to touch him, reaching out to brush his
sleeve or grasp his hand as if he were some holy man" (Jones, 1988, p. 1).
Medlar chided him for having affairs w ith other women, including two
reporters (Jones, 1998). The independent prosecutor David Barrett (1997) as well
as the existing literature, alleges unfaithfulness by Cisneros with other women.
Brenner (1989) and Jones (1998) support "unfaithful" sexual relations w ith other
women, but there are no names or details of these extra-marital affairs. M ary
Alice acknowledged indiscretions by her husband, but she did not divorce him.
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What were the existing social mores? Alison Cook (1988) attem pted to put

the Cisneros indiscretion into context w ith the following description of San
Antonio and its mayor:
You have to understand San Antonio to understand the city's
preoccupation with H enry Cisneros, to understand w hy San Antonians
took their private affair so personally. An excitable city by nature, it is
also an extra-ordinarily verbal and gossipy one, endow ed w ith two great
caldrons of talk: the heavily Hispanic West Side, where el chisme ("the
gossip") is a favored pastime; and the clubby, inbred w orld of Alamo
Heights, home to m any of the city's Anglo business establishmentarians.
Henry, as the ultim ate celebrity in a celebrity-starved town, is a natural
focus of talk. And compared w ith other major burgs, San Antonio
identifies with its m ayor to a positively startling degree: as a ticket to the
big time (no small m atter in a city w ith a lingering inferiority complex),
as a (sic) tangible symbol of Hispanic aspirations and the Anglo business
community's dream of consensus. N ow this eminently gossip-worthy
figure had provided San Antonians w ith everything they like to chew on
best—sex, politics, religion—and an opportunity to bash the press.
H enry himself, w ith his compulsion to comment, played the
consummate San Antonian in stirring the rum or pot. (p. 86)
During the post-affair exposure period, H enry Cisneros' statewide
popularity had changed, but some results fell within the m argin of error. The
sample of 1,008 Texans polled during the period October 19 until November 2
gave the following results:
H isp a n ic s' o p in io n o f C isn ero s in a s p r in g p o ll w a s 67% p o s itiv e a n d
h a d d r o p p e d to 61%,

•

negative ratings had increased from 4% in the spring to 5%,
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•

Catholics' positive ratings of Cisneros dropped from 57% in the
spring to 53%, and

•

Catholics' negative attitude tow ard Cisneros increased from 4% in
the spring to 5%.

According to the pollster, many of these results feel w ithin the m argin of error,
but Jan Jarboe, a Texas Monthly reporter and Cisneros biographer, interpreted
the positive results in terms of Cisneros' "charmed political life," as well as his
honesty while explaining the extra-marital affair (Reed, 1988).
The political response to Cisneros' bowing out of public life was
indicative of residual support for him. The result of a local radio jockey
conducting an eight-day (outside of Cisneros' home) petition m arathon to
encourage H enry to run for office again was the collection of 50,000 signatures.
Even Mary Alice encouraged him to stay in politics. This continued popularity
of Cisneros is because of his performance and how it benefited the Hispanic
community, the personal nature of the affair and a request by Cisneros for
understanding of his hum anity ("San Antonio Forgives, Tells Mayor: Scandal
Aside, Stick with Politics," December 5,1988).
W hat was the disposition o f the principal intimates? A fte r the payments had

been worked out, Cisneros reported that the romance had left his and M edlar's
relationship, but they continued to see each other occasionally (Jones, 1998).
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Evidently, the relationship needed further definition. According to Barrett
(1997), in April 1991 Linda w ent to the Cisneros home to confront H enry over a
misstatement that he m ade to her regarding having moved out of the West Side
home completely. After Mary Alice told H enry to make a choice betw een her or
Linda, H enry chose Mary Alice, but told Linda that he still loved her (Barrett,
1997). Because of her destroyed social and working life in San Antonio and
contempt for the Cisneroses, Medlar asked H enry for $8,000 so that she could
relocate to Lubbock, which she did the following m onth (Barrett, 1997).
The relationship betw een Cisneros and M edlar did not end—he opened
Cisneros Air in July 1991 (Poling, 1991) and used one of the planes to make trips
to Lubbock (Barrett, 1997). The historical record does not contain proof of Mary
Alice's awareness of these trips, but citing M edlar's constant threat to go on the
M aury Povich show as a reason, she filed for divorce on October 22, 1991
(Wood, 1991). Mary Alice requested full custody of the children, child support
and a majority of the assets. She asked the court for a temporary restraining
order that barred Henry from contacting her, but she also requested that the
cou rt a p p o in t a m a rria g e

counselor at the advice of counsel, a sign that Mary

Alice felt that there w as a possibility of reconciliation (Wood, 1991). Anderson
(1994) reported that Linda M edlar was nam ed as a co-respondent in the divorce

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

146
case, which resulted in the loss of her job in the public relations departm ent of
the University Medical Center, Lubbock. The documents filed stated that the
Cisneroses had been living together up until October 18,1991 (Wood, 1991). On
November 18,1991, Mary Alice ended her efforts to divorce Henry (Barrett,
1997). According to Gugliotta (1994), once Henry stopped seeing Linda, the
divorce process ended, but this has not been corroborated by other sources.
During depositions for the suit filed by Medlar in 1995, Cisneros said that
another contributory factor that m ade Mary Alice file for divorce was the
am ount of money that he was paying Medlar (Hendricks, April 2,1995). There
is no evidence to suggest that Henry Cisneros' publicity regarding his
reentering politics as a candidate for statewide office later in the 1990s w as in
any way contributory to the marital problems (B. Davidson, 1991).
With the nom ination of William Jefferson Clinton as the Democratic
Party's standard bearer in July of 1992, Henry Cisneros resigned from the board
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in August in order to join the Clinton
campaign; Linda M edlar viewed this move as interest on Cisneros' part to
rejoin politics, thereby threatening her financial well being (Barrett, 1997). In
fact, Cisneros did experience a reduction in his speaking circuit income because
of his time commitment to the cam paign's transition board, but he did not fail
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to keep his support payments flowing into M edlar's account (see Table 1)
(Barrett, 1997).
W hen Clinton was elected, Henry Cisneros served on the president's
transition team6 and then w as considered as a candidate for a Cabinet post. A
transition team 's responsibilities are to make policy recommendations to the
president-elect and review perspective nominees for Cabinet posts.
M ary Alice Cisneros and Linda Medlar faced different challenges
because of the election of William Jefferson Clinton on November 3, 1992. Each
would focus on preservation of the family in different ways. Mary Alice and

6 The vetting and confirmation process requires the actions of four different
entities: a transition team which deals with policy as well as Cabinet prospects; a team
for each nominee (four-six individuals in this case), which analyzes the capacity of the
perspective nominee to serve and communicates with the president-elect through a
chain of command; the F.B.I., which serves the incumbent president and the F.B.I.
director, and does a full field background check of perspective Cabinet officers; the
Department of Justice Personnel Security Office (D.O.J.-P.S.O.), which does a review of
the nominee's F.B.I. file in order to determine if they receive a security clearance; and
the U.S. Senate (one committee is responsible for checking the qualifications of a
nominee and any one senator can put a hold on a nominee) confirms. Any senator may
request a copy of the F.B.I. report, but it is customary that just the chairperson of the
committee reviews the report.
To begin the process of filling a Cabinet post, the president-elect must in
writing request an F.B.I. background check and include Standard Form 86 (SF-86) a
questionnaire for sensitive data, and an Authority for Release Form. Each perspective
nominee has to fill out a Personal Data Questionnaire developed by the Transition
Team, a financial disclosure form, a senate questionnaire, and a Memorandum for
Perspective Employees that allows the F.B.I. to conduct a background check. (Barrett,
1997, pp. IV-25-IV26)
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her daughters w ould sacrifice their lives in San Antonio in order to preserve the
family. Linda saw danger for her family's only source of income in the
Cisneros' move to Washington. When Cisneros was working in the private
sector, Linda knew he was making approximately $350,000, but a fixed income
government job w ith no outside income from the speaking circuit threatened
her standard of living (Gugliotta, 1994). In an attem pt to dissuade the ex-mayor
from taking a Cabinet post, Linda, in an entrapping fashion, spoke with Henry
about $10,000 cash payments from Morris Jaffe, a Texas developer, that
Cisneros used to pay off private creditors and other extra-marital flings—all of
which the future H.U.D. Secretary denied (Gugliotta, 1994). Cisneros saw it
from a different perspective, if he did not accept the job and try to work out the
financial situation, he "would die on the vine" (Gugliotta, 1994, p. 7).
As advisor and dependent of Henry Cisneros, Linda M edlar's recordings
prove invaluable in understanding the progression of the scandal process. In
the immediate post-election period, Cisneros was put on the short list for a
Cabinet position and he made paym ents to Medlar on November 9 and 13—
tw o $1,000 paym ents on the form er an d one $2,000 on the latter (Barrett, 1997).

On November 22, Cisneros agreed, by signing an "Authorization for Release"
form, to allow the Transition Team and F.B.I. access to information about his
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academic, criminal, etc. records, thereby allowing the vetting process to move
forward (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-26). Later in November, Henry Cisneros m et with
President-elect William J. Clinton, and they talked about m any issues, including
John Paul and the payments m ade by Cisneros to Medlar. In the following
excerpt7 from the Medlar tapes (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-29), Cisneros discusses w hat
Clinton said about the topic:
HC:

. . . We talked a b o u t . . . what considerations there were that
would prevent m e f r o m . . . serving.

LM:

I'm sure he did, since he's . . . just been through something like
that...

LM:

And w hat'd you tell him?

HC:

I told him, John Paul [Cisneros's son, who had health problems]
first. And, u h . . . the business issues, and u h . . . and - and - and
then the concerns about the impact it would have for everyone
with respect to the personal things.

LM:

What personal things?

HC:

Well, all t h e . . . issues that w o u l d . . . could conceivably. . . be
raised.

7 Technicians who worked with Linda Medlar's tapes of her conversations with
Henry Cisneros were in some cases unable determine what the pair were saying due to
the volume of their voices or because the tape recorders truncated the discussion.
These passages are marked by "US" or "UI."
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LM:

And w hat'd he say?

HC:

Well he had . . . thoughts on it, on all.

HC:

Exactly.

LM:

A nd so what was his thought?

HC:

Well, that, that the, he couldn't, he really couldn't really speak to
the issue of John Paul. A nd as far as the business, it kind of
depends on what you're appointed to, whether you have to divest
or just put it in a blind trust. And as for the personal, he said
he . . . didn't think it w ould be there because . . . they had treated
him that way as an elected person running for the highest office,
but he didn't think they w ould do that to people in, in, you know,
in an appointed position . ..

LM: Hmm.
It appears that the president-elect w as not quite as concerned about m any of
the issues, particularly as a result of his own campaign experience.
In the conversation that followed (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-30), Cisneros and
M edlar discuss political scenarios and their feelings about the impact that a
Cabinet nomination might have:
HC: .An opponent might in a race. But, anyway.
LM: And so what implications are there here?
HC: Uh, for you?
LM: Uhm-hmm.
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HC:

I think probably none.

LM:

I don't want to think probably, I have to know, Henry.

HC:

But there's no way to know.

LM:

What, w hat are the scenarios here?

HC:

One scenario is there's, uh, no implication at all. They just refer to
my situation in generic terms. A nd another. . . is . . . that they
actually mention your name in ss-some story somewhere.

LM:

So, you've already decided to take something, haven't you?

HC:

No, I said I had not. You asked m e to play out scenarios; scenarios
means hypotheticals.

Cisneros w ent on to tell Medlar the importance to him of returning to politics:
HC:

Uhm, I . . . concluded, as you know, over these weeks, or rather
months and years, that I needed to be there for John Paul. And . ..
that's what I'm doing, and that's w hat I've done. And, if . . . it is
possible to, you know, serve and be attentive to that obligation, as
well as my obligations financially and to you, and so forth, then
I'd like the opportunity to do that. But if it's not possible, then it's
not possible.

LM:

And, Henry, w hat about all those times you, you just absolutely
couldn't do anything like that w ith Mary Alice?

HC:

Well, it's a problem. B u t . . . my alternative is to die on the vine.

D u r in g th e sa m e c o n v e r sa tio n , M ed la r

discusses some of the reasons

why Cisneros may not qualify for a Cabinet post:
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LM:

. . . And I quite frankly d o n 't see why Clinton thinks that an
appointed, someone w ho's appointed, is gonna be any less . ..
scrutinized, since they have been in the past.

HC:

Well, let me just tell y o u . . . on that, if I m ay speak to you frankly
w ithout your getting upset, I don't think it's, I don't t h i nk. . . it's
gonna be an issue just because it7s something I addressed earlier,
and so did you, a n d . . . and, uh. They will refer to the incident,
but they're not gonna get into it unless, you know, unless . . . one
of us feels compelled to talk about it, a n d . . . so, it's really in our
ow n hands.

Medlar discusses another possible problem for Cisneros if there is an
investigation into his background:
LM:

I mean, there is a disaster, and i f s not me, sitting there waiting to
happen. And if you d o n 't know t h a t . . .

HC:

(Sigh) Uhm-hmm.

LM:

. . . you know. I can't believe that you don't know that, that the
scrutiny that you will come under, and you go ahead and do it,
the scrutiny that you will come under will be about you, will be
about your past, will be about your financial dealings, your
dealings as a politician, say i.e., Morris Jaffe . . .

HC:

First, there's no problem there.

LM:

There no problem there?

HC:

Uhm-hmm.

LM:

Henry, you took cash from him.

HC:

Uhm-hmm.

LM:

You did, too!

HC:

Uhm-hmm.
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LM:

I'm sorry, Henry, but you did.

HC:

I'm sorry.

LM:

(Sighs) Henry, you gave me the cash.

HC:

I don't believe from my campaigns . . .

LM:

You would . . .

HC:

. . . it may have been for some cause or something . . .

LM:

. . . no, for your campaigns.

HC:

. . . bonds or something, I don't know.

LM:

You would go over there. You w ould have to, you w ould have to
sit in his office, and you w ould bring an envelope back with
$10,000 in it.

HC:

Mhm, hmm.

LM:

(Sigh) Now, you can try to . . . tell m e that that7s not true, but I'm
sorry. Henry, I was there. Now, I don't know that anybody else
knows about that except Shipley . .. and whoever Shipley's told.
'Cause I never told anybody. Shipley told me w hen I w as first
working for y o u . . . that you accepted cash to pay off your . . . uh,
credit card bills.

HC: Absolutely not.
LM: That's what Shipley said.
HC: Wel l . . .
LM: How m a n y . . .
HC: . . . it doesn't make it true.
LM: H o w m any p eople has Shipley told?
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HC:

I don't have any idea, but there's no truth to that. I never ever,
ever, ever, have used pr-, public money for private purposes.

M edlar's needs are also discussed (Barrett, 1997, pp. 33-34), including Cisneros'
help for purchasing a home, as well as privacy from further press exposure:
HC:

All right. On the h o u s e . . . w hat do we need to talk about?

LM:

Well, basically, (laughs) you know, I'm supposed to close within
thirty days of when I sign the contract.

HC:

. .. I'll go to work on it.

LM:

You know (sigh), you say that you're gonna take out a loan, right?

HC:

Correct. That's the only thing, only thing I can do.

Later in the conversation, Medlar discusses past treatment by the press and her
willingness to even attack Cisneros if warranted:
LM:

But I - 1 don't Un- unless it gets, unless they come and start, an d —
and this could happen too, Henry, if they start pulling me through
the m ud again.

HC:

Yeah, I know.

LM:

. . . then I'll come out fighting.

HC:

I understand.

LM:

You know , and I'll fight M ary Alice, and I'll fight you, and I'll
fight everybody w ho's concerned . . .

HC:

(Clears throat)
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LM:

. . . because they're not gonna drag m e through the m ud again.

HC:

Right.

LM:

A nd th at's the other cQ nsideration. . .

The Office of the Independent Counsel in these series of quotes is attem pting to
show the nature of the relationship between Cisneros and Medlar: threatened
and insecure, Medlar appears to be pushing against a politically ambitious,
almost desperate Cisneros who is taking care of the business at hand, a support
paym ent in the form of a house loan to his lover and the denial of any
inappropriate behavior. In a subsequent deposition, Medlar m aintained that
she agreed to not have the home put in her nam e because it might have political
repercussion (Barrett, 1997). The reader m ust be rem inded at this point that at
trial this portion of the manuscript was not contested.
On December 2, Cisneros and Medlar discussed the expectation that
Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX) w ould be the nominee and future treasury
secretary, and Governor Ann Richards was considering perspective appointees
to the position—Cisneros was one of the individuals that Richards was
c o n sid er in g .

Cisneros expressed Richard's sentim ent that large support

payments w ould be perceived as a form of corruption on his part and that
someone w ould find the information which w ould make Cisneros' stand for
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election difficult (Barrett, 1997). Later that same day, Cisneros discussed the
dynamics of a Democratic Congress and his chances of confirmation:
HC:

(Laughing) But the difference there is the Democrats control
Congress

HC:

. . . the point is you'd be, you'd be confirmed anyway. I mean, I,
people have told me that. They can do what they want; you're
gonna (be) confirmed. The Democrats control the Congress,
they're not gonna turn back a president's nominee. And I, and and - and . . . and (clears throat), and Clinton's not gonna put up
with that crap. I mean, he's not gonna let that blow somebody
away.

HC: W hat I gotta do . . . is decide . . . and my life in this stuff is over,
because this is as close as I'm ever gonna come . . . and, it can't be
done.
LM: W hat do you mean, this is as close? You m ean . . .
HC: This brush with the Senate and the Cabinet.
LM: Well, did, uh, u h . . .
HC:

. . . and if I can't do it, then I can't do it. I just need to get it out of
my dam n system and j u s t . . . go on and do something else.
(Barrett, 1997, pp. IV 37 - IV 38).

On December 3, $4,000 was deposited by Henry Cisneros into Linda
M edlar's bank account (Barrett, 1997), and later that day, M edlar and Cisneros's
conversation (Barrett, 1997) provides an insight into the status of their
relationship and her financial future:
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LM:

I said, I, I'm, you, that you, you know, you're mulling over your
opportunities right now, and that's fine. You know, I, there's
nothing I can do about any of the things that have happened or
will happen in the future. And I don't intend to be, you know, any
kind of a problem to you, uhm And you know that, don't you?

HC:

. . . I'm not, I'm not concerned about it, am I?

Cisneros discussed how he w ould still be able to pay Medlar if he w ent to
Washington, D.C.:
HC:

Okay. Bottom line is, I am going to make sure that you're financ-,
it's a very, very, very, very, very tough problem for me. But I
work on it all the time.

LM:

Is that what you wanna do, come up with a lump sum?

HC:

I cannot do that. It doesn't exist; it will not be that way.

LM:

Well, if that's tr-, true, then when you divest yourself, and you're
only on a salary, how on earth do you think anything could work?

HC:

Well, the, when I divest, the company's worth whatever it's
worth. They will give me ss-, a- a - a - a, like a stream of
payments, 'cause they don't have the cash. And I'll just have to
direct that part of that stream of payments goes to you.

LM:

And if you're in Washington for eight years?

HC:

Well, I don't know, I mean, I don't know how long you, uh,
(UI). . . I mean, u h , . . . I mean, we've never talked about long this
is s u p p o s e d to run, e x c e p t that y o u 'v e to ld m e t h a t . . . y o u

wanted to get through Kristan, and have some m oney for her
college, and then you were prepared to wo-, you know, look at
your career options . . . . We can talk about that at some point
about just, you know . . .
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LM:

About what?

HC:

About, about the length of time that you think you need this
particular stream of revenues in this, this level.

LM:

Well, all I know is that you'll be going to . . . Washington, one way
or the other...

HC:

. . . no, that's not necessarily correct, but go ahead.

LM:

(Sigh)

HC:

It's not, nothing is decided.

LM:

It is decided, Henry.

HC:

No, it isn't.

LM:

One - one way or the other, it will be decided. I personally think
probably the Senate and I think that that's probably wise. I'm not
telling you not to do it.

HC:

Now, Linda, if I can't work this out, I can't go!

LM:

If you can't work w hat out?

HC:

The money! And that's the truth.

M edlar told the OIC that she had excerpted a portion of the tape at this point,
because it concerned threats she m ade to Cisneros. Medlar represented to the
OIC that the following conversation, in substance, had been erased:
HC talks about me threatening to go to the press & how it would ruin
him and do me no good because if he is not able to m ake money, that
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w ould hurt me. HC had not been able to talk to me because I got so
angry.8
During the same conversation, Medlar also told Cisneros that she had decided
to remain out of the public eye while he was in Washington, D.C.:
LM:

I mean, whatever I feel has, is gonna have to come second . .. you
know. And that's, uh, when I m ade the decision that whatever
you decided to do, I would support completely. And by support, I
mean, I'm as underground as I can get, Henry.

HC:

I know, I know, I know, I know.

During the same conversation, Cisneros acknowledged to Medlar that she had
the ability to destroy him anytime she chose to do so, if he became a Cabinet
officer:
LM:

I'm trying not to hold you down, Henry, at all.

HC:

Well, if you do, you do, I mean, you know . . .

LM:

. . . I'm not trying to.

HC:

. . . I mean, if you do, just do it! Just tell me, "Henry, I'm not
gonna let you do this, I have the p oten tial. . . to destroy you
anytime I want."

LM:

But I'm not going to.

8 Throughout the passages to follow there maybe non-verbatim passages from a
log which the OIC asked Medlar to develop, and she would testify to at trial.
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HC:

But if you, if you, if you (UI)

LM:

. . . but I never have, so why w ould I do it now, Henry?

HC:

Because the - the - the - the destructive potential grows. Uh, w hen
I'm a private citizen, nobody cares. If I'm a Cabinet officer, you
got something.

LM: Henry, I love you, I d o n ' t . . .
HC:

. . . I know, but what I'm saying . . .

LM: . . . I d o n ' t . . . honestly. . .
HC: I'm not saying you would, Darling; I'm not saying you would, I'm
just saying, I'm just saying . . . you do have the power! (Barrett,
pp. IV-40 - IV-42)
Realists about the situation, Henry and Linda discuss the potential pow er that
each holds, and the conversation could be easily interpreted to show an
unstable relationship.
On December 4,1992, Linda M edlar's sister, Patsy, and her husband,
Allen, applied for a home loan. As part of the application process, they were
asked if the home w ould be their primary domicile, to which they replied in the
affirmative. In subsequent testimony, the Wootens adm itted that they were
buying the h o m e for Medlar with funds provided by Henry Cisneros. By

making false statements on the application, they had committed bank fraud
(Barrett, 1997).
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The administrative/paperwork process by which H enry Cisneros became
H.U.D. Secretary had already begun on November 22 when he filled out the
Authorization for Release of Information form and on December 7, Cisneros
executed a Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions.9 The S.F.-86 was completed in
order to begin the process for Cisneros' eligibility for a security clearance to
perform "sensitive duties" (Barrett, 1997). The F.B.I. uses the S.F.-86 as the basis
for its background investigation, deriving interview questions for Cisneros and
identifying individuals to be interviewed (Barrett, 1997).
The result of the background investigation were to be used to (a)
determine the suitability for Federal government employment or
retention in such employment in accordance with Executive O rder 10450;
and (b) determine the honest, reliability, trustworthiness, and good
character for clearance for access to information classified under the
provisions of Executive Order 12356. (Barrett, 1997, p. 4)
Executive Order 10450 (an Eisenhower Administration creation) resulted in the
vetting process, which includes the F.B.I. background checks, transition team

9 The "Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions," a.k.a. Standard Form-86 or
S.F.-86. Perspective employees who knowingly falsify or conceal material facts are
guilty of a felony—a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001—which m a y "result in fines of up
to $10,000 or five years imprisonment, or both," and an employee who has knowingly
falsified or concealed material will "have their clearance suspended and/or be
dismissed." likewise, false statements and representations to the F.B.I. are a violation
of 18 U.S.C. Section 1001.
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questioning and the Department of Justice Personnel Security Office approval.
The F.B.I. was given the responsibility for developing information regarding the
"suitability"10 of a perspective nominee (Barrett, 1997). As a result of Executive
Order 12356 (a Reagan Adm inistration creation), the Departm ent of Justice
Personnel Security Office (D.O.J.P.S.O.) developed the following criteria for
making its security clearance determinations: "(1) whether the individual is
unreliable, untrustw orthy or open to blackmail; (2) whether the individual is
financially responsible; and (3) whether the individual is honest" (Barrett, 1997,
p. 7). According to Barrett, Executive O rder 12356 applied to H enry Cisneros
because he would have access to classified documents and conceivably could
become the president of the United States.
On December 9, 1992, Arky, Calamaro, Veve and others members of the
vetting team interviewed Henry Cisneros. Cisneros brought up the paym ents to
Linda Medlar, estimating that he had paid $2,500 per m onth over a period of

10 "Suitability criteria included (1) behaviors, activities or associations that tend
to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy, (2) any deliberate
misrepresentations, falsifications or omissions of material facts, (3) any criminal,. . .
im m oral. . . sexual perversion or financial irresponsibilities, ( 4). .. serious mental or
neurological disorder with satisfactory evidence of cure and (5) any facts which furnish
reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion. . . contrary to the
best interests of the national security" (Barrett, 1997, p. 6).
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several years. The perspective nom inee informed the vetting team that Linda
Medlar was unstable. His hope w as to pay her a "lump sum " paym ent before
entering the Cabinet. The num ber of extra-marital affairs during Cisneros' 20year m arriage to Mary Alice m ay have num bered as m any as 10. H e disclosed
to the vetting group that Mary Alice was not aware of the m agnitude of his
payments to M edlar or the extent of his infidelities. While James Ham ilton
moved ahead w ith a request to the F.B.I. for a Level 1 full field background
investigation on December 10, the vetting team expressed concerns regarding
the non-public nature of the paym ents which could be regarded as "hush
money," tax issues, M edlar's knowledge of the nominees' history, the stability
of the relationship, and maintaining M edlar's silence vis-a-vis the media.
Henry Cisneros was communicating with Linda M edlar in the
meantime:
HC:

. . . and uh, I want, I need to . . .

LM:

(Sneeze)

HC:

. . . visit with you, you know, just to kinda check signals. I'm on
the car phone right now, and it's probably not the best idea for
this kind of, you know . . .some of the other, som e of the sensitive
stuff that w e're talking about. Uhm, whoa, hang on just a second.

Q sneros then told Medlar that his payments to her were dam pening his
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prospects for a Cabinet appointment:
LM:

A nd so . . . did you make the decision on the Cabinet?

HC:

(Sigh) U hhh (laugh), I don't think so (UI) Truthfully?

LM:

Yeah.

HC:

I think we m ay be talking about nothing.

LM:

Ohhhh, you are not.

HC:

No, I am. I swear I am.

LM:

Why?

HC:

Uh, that, that's w hat I need to share with you. The . . . finances of
the past, doesn't go down. And (US) they j u s t .. . well, I don't
want to talk about it on this phone, ya know?

LM:

Yeah W hy did they have to know about that?

HC:

Because they would. It's pretty obvious when you, when you,
when you, w hen you, you know, probe (US). . . visible means of
support and that kind of thing, ya know?

LM:

(US) And w hat about the Senate?

HC:

Well, if it's gonna be a problem in the Cong-, ya know, if it'd be a
problem in one, it's be a problem in the other, so

Cisneros then told M edlar that they needed to resume the conversation on a
secure phone:
HC:

All right. I'm rushing to Corpus. Uh, I do need to talk to you. Uh,
it's nothing to worry about, it's just, I need to . . .
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LM:

Are they going to call me?

HC:

No. No, no, no, nothing like that, nothing like that; I'll call you
(US) from a secure phone.

Before ending the call, Cisneros raised the possibility that the press might
contact Medlar:
LM: Is it bad?
HC: No, it's not bad. I t ' s . . . j u s t . . . I kinda need to know where you
really stand in order to . . . know (US) w hat to do, and I truly need
your best judgment. I truly need your best, non-em otional. . .
w hat you can truly think you c a n . . . stand (US) by me to do. And
that really is what it comes down to, w hat you really think you
could . . . take, and, uh . . .
LM: (US) What do you m ean take?
HC: Well, I mean, you know, what - what - what you really (UI). We'll,
we'll, we'll talk (UI), w hat you really . .. I'll lay out, you know,
sorta worst case, and you tell me . . . (Barrett, 1997, pp. IV-50-IV52).
Webster Hubbell conveyed the concerns of the vetting team to Clinton
and the ensuing conversation included a discussion of the possibility of more
affairs than Cisneros was reporting, and the lack of information about Cisneros,
M ed lar a n d th e p a y m e n ts. A c c o r d in g to H u b b ell, C lin to n w a s c o n c e r n e d a b o u t

the stability of Linda. The status of Cisneros' nom ination was still in question
(Barrett, 1997).
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On December 11,1992, Cisneros informed Medlar that he was going to
be questioned further about the payments:
HC:

Uhm-hmm, but I wanted to call and just see I - 1 w ould like to call
you a little later and just, you know, maybe have about a . . . 20
minute, half-hour (US) conversation or s o . . . uh . . . before five
because, uh, they're sending a couple of lawyers from - from . . .
from out of t o w n . . .

LM:

Yeah.

HC:

. . . to sit dow n with . . . with me, you know, and kind of look
a t . . . uhm . . . at - at (US) both w hat has occurred and what needs
to occur. You see what I'm saying?

LM:

Uh-huh.

Cisneros again told Medlar that he w anted to "check signals" before the
questioning occurred:
HC:

And uh uh, I'd like to, you know, just kinda check signals with ya,
so (US) I have some confidence in talking to them. You see what
I'm saying?

LM:

Yeah, I - 1 don't know w hat w hat you mean by w hat needs to
happen. W hat do you mean?

HC:

Well, I mean, ya know, w hat w e've talked about for the future
and so forth.

LM:

You told them about that?

HC:

We have to.

LM:

Why?
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HC:

Because, u h . . . It's - it's the ki- (US), well, I didn't actually tell
them about that per se, but, I mean, I got to t hi nk. . . anything that
has or will occur . . . is likely to be addressed. You just can't, ya
k n o w , . . . there's just no way not to.

Cisneros then told Medlar that he needed to be sure that she w ould stick to an
agreed-upon story about the payments because, according to the vetters, the
paym ent issue was a potential reason not to proceed with his appointment:
HC:

There's . .. a h . . . okay. Uh - uh - uh . . . let's talk, ya see, because
then I ca-, I know kinda what I'm dealing with, ya know w hat I'm
saying? Because, uh, like the conversation w e had the other day
was, ya know, was sufficiently angry and so forth that I can't
speak with any confidence about w ould or w ouldn't happen. Ya
see w hat I'm saying?

LM: (US) And what are they saying?
HC: Well, this a potential. . . reason not to go forward.
LM: That's what they're telling you?
HC: Yeah.
LM: Wha-, are they gonna talk to me?
HC: No. I don't think so. I - 1, ya know, that we, I have . .. the guy
they're sending is a, is a real good guy, and, uh, the guy they had
me w ith in W ashington is also a good guy and, u h , . . . I trust 'em
a n d I th in k th e y 'r e d e c e n t folks an d th e y d e a l w ith a lot of hum an
situations, and so forth, and so, it's not like they're judgm ental
people or anything like that. So, I w ould have no problem if you
were willing to do that, but I don't know that they wo-, would
w ant to do that, you know.
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LM:

(Laughing) 'Cause I'm the pariah right?

HC:

No, that's not it, it's not it. It's that, it's that - that, u h , . . . they
might have problems then later if it's under oath or something
like that, you know.

During the same conversation, Medlar told Cisneros that the house she was
buying with Cisneros's money was in her sister's name, not her own:
LM:

But, Henry, ya know, basically I'm doing everything so that noth-,
I mean, even the . . .

HC:

Yeah.

LM:

. . . the house . . .

HC:

Yeah.

LM:

. . . is not in m y name.

HC:

Yeah.

LM:

Do ya understand?

HC:

Yeah.

LM:

It's in my sister.

HC:

Okay. Okay. (Barrett, 1997, pp. IV-53 - IV-55)

On December 11, Hubbell was sent to San Antonio by President-elect
Clinton w ith the specific topic of conversation to be Medlar, so that the
transition team had a complete picture. The substance of Cisneros' statement to
Hubbell was as follows:
•

he was paying Linda Medlar out of a sense of "moral obligation,"
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• the payments were not "hush money,"
• his wife knew about the payments to Medlar,
•

approximately $2,500 a m onth had been m ade to Linda M edlar for
three and one half years,

• the maximum paym ent w as as much as $15,000,
• he gave her $20,000 to move to Lubbock,
• Medlar was unstable, and
• he thought a "lump sum " paym ent would prevent her from going to
the press. Before Hubbell left, he told Cisneros that there m ight be a
gift tax due, and that he should not bring up Linda Medlar w ith the
press. (Barrett, 1997)
In the ensuing conversation between Medlar and Cisneros regarding the
Hubbell interview, Henry misled Linda about what he had said to Webster
about her m ental stability. In regard to future financial support, Medlar w anted
him to tell the vetting team that there w ould be a lump sum paym ent and no
future payments (Barrett, 1997). According to Medlar, Cisneros expressed his
love for her even though she threatened to destroy him and promised that the
payments w ould be continued (Barrett, 1997). Cisneros expressed concern over
the discovery of any future or past support, whether the payments w ould look
like hush m oney if disclosed in the Senate confirmation hearing, and the
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possibility that the I.R.S. might discover the dispersal of large sum s of money to
her w hen he divested. Cisneros ended the conversation w ith the statement, "If
this phone's tapped, w e're sunk anyway" (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-70).
In a December 11,1992 meeting, Webster Hubbell briefed President-elect
Q inton on the Cisneros interview and Clinton w as willing to go ahead with the
nom ination provided H enry Cisneros consult a "good lawyer" about a final
paym ent to Medlar, as well as any tax issues resulting from pervious support
payment. James Hamilton, counsel on the vetting team, testified about the
thinking of the group regarding the lump sum payment to Medlar:
in weighing the risks associated with M edlar's volatility and the
likelihood that she would talk to the press, the fact that Cisneros had
worked out a lump sum payment arrangem ent with Medlar "clearly was
a relevant factor." (Subsequently stating) "before you suggest that there's
something evil about that—it is a different matter to make arrangem ents
so the press and the public don't know something and to make
arrangements so that the F.B.I. or the Senate doesn't know something."
(Barrett, 1997, p. IV-74)
Of course this depended upon whether H enry Cisneros was lying about
whether in fact there w ould be just a lum p sum payment and helping Linda
once in awhile.
On December 13,1992, Cisneros and his attorney, Seagal Wheatley,
visited Little Rock, Arkansas for a legal consultation about m aking the final
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paym ent to Medlar. During the same visit, Hubbell was informed about Mary
Alice's divorce suit and the arrangements that had been m ade to have an
accountant work out the payment to Medlar. On the 13th, Linda Medlar
attem pted a dialogue with Cisneros that would have resulted in him adm itting
to accepting im proper cash payments from associates in San Antonio—he
accused Medlar of having the line bugged (Barrett, 1997).
A successful lawsuit against a sitting Cabinet secretary or under
secretary requires irrefutable proof of lying and on December 14, Henry
Cisneros filed a Supplement to the SF-86, in which he stated that there was
nothing in his "personal life that could be used by someone to coerce or
blackmail" him (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-77). Clearly stated on the supplem ent was a
rem inder regarding false statements and the resulting penalty. On the same
day, Cisneros consented—in w riting—to an F.B.I. background check;
subsequently, James Hamilton asked that the F.B.I. work be sent directly to him
(Barrett, 1997).
During the time period surrounding the nom ination of Henry Cisneros,
D e c e m b e r 15, 1992 u n til D ecem b er 18, 1992, w h e n H e n r y 's ta x a c tiv itie s b e c a m e

known to the vetting committee, he engaged in financial dealings to support
Medlar which showed a conscious effort to avoid discovery, and according to
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Medlar, they agreed to tell a different story to the F.B.I. than that which he had
told the transition team. From the analysis of Cisneros' tax returns by tax
lawyers, the vetting team learned that Cisneros had filed "sloppy" returns, and
with regard to Medlar's payments, he should have filed a gift tax return at the
federal level and possibly at the state level (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-79). On
December 16 and 18, H enry Cisneros, aware that banks w ould have to file
federal paperwork indicating a $10,000 deposit of money, arranged for the
deposit of $8,000 support paym ents into M edlar's account (the total was
confirmed by Linda and H enry in a subsequent taped conversation (Barrett,
1997). The sums were subsequently passed on by Medlar to her sister Patsy
who used the money in the purchase of M edlar's home. The version of the truth
that Medlar and Cisneros agreed to tell the F.B.I. regarding support paym ents
during background check was that she received payments no larger than $2,500
at any one time, the sum total was never larger than $10,000 to $15,000 a year
and that the final paym ent was going to be $30,000 (Barrett, 1997).
On December 22, H enry Cisneros was prepping for his confirmation
h e a r in g a s w e ll as h is

final p a y m e n t to M ed lar. How ard Pastor, who was

prepping Cisneros for the confirmation hearings, said that he did not think that
the payments would be brought up since the affair was public and H enry had
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reconciled w ith his wife. Pastor felt that sharing pertinent information w ith the
appropriate senator w ould avoid any calls for disqualification of the nominee.
In a financial disclosure statement, Cisneros said that he expected to receive
another $30,000 in outside lecture incom e—this was same as the sum of m oney
that he had just borrow ed in an unsecured loan from the First Interstate Bank—
which was not accounted for by information stating the "when" and "where" of
the speeches (Barrett, 1997).
Having received the endorsem ent of Republican senators Phil Graham of
Texas and Pete Domenici and HUD Secretary Jack Kemp, which indicated the
level of bipartisan support for his nomination, Henry Cisneros m et w ith
Senator Donald Reigle (D-MI), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs—who was responsible for Cisneros' confirmation
hearings, on December 23,1992. Reigle, who had some problems w ith sexual
indiscretions in his ow n personal life, listened while Cisneros gave the
impression that the Senate committee should not be concerned about the issues
surrounding Linda M edlar—paym ents were m ade out of a sense of moral
obligation and other issues were being resolved (Barrett, 1997).
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In a taped conversation between Henry and Linda on December 24,1992,
the reality of Medlar's pow er over Cisneros is articulated and insecurities over
support have m ade the relationship difficult:
HC:

All right. I didn't call to argue w ith you. Look, I . . . intend . . . to
get that money there for you. Now, if you're telling m e . . . that
you don't w ant me to, and you w ant to throw in the towel, and
you want to pursue some other option,. . . then I guess you need
to tell me.

LM:

What other option?

HC:

I don't know . . .

LM: • • • what are you talking about?
HC:

. . . what you're talking about. I don't know what you're talking
about, didn't know yesterday w hether you're . . . I don't, I - 1 don't
know w hat you're saying. If you're saying to me, you w ant me to
make this work, I promise you I will.

LM:

Henry, you are gonna be going through confirmation where
they're gonna be asking you questions.

HC:

The subject probably is not even gonna come up.

LM:

And w hat if it does?

HC:

If it does, I'll tell them what we a gr e e d. . . and the only person in
the w o r l d . . . who can sink me at that point, and I m ean serious,
I'm talking con - con contempt of Congress, jail, is y o u .... But it
dudn't (sic) even - 1 mean, you know, what, I mean, I know what
p u r p o s e th at w o u ld serve. B eca-, I in te n d to d o righ t.

LM:

Henry, I seriously d o n ' t . . .

HC:

Okay. Linda, you have a . . . there is a flaw in your thinking . . .
and it has to do with the value of money. I have busted m y ass, I
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would, I mean, I cannot tell you how m uch m oney But damn, give
m e a little credit for doing it all these years A nd give me a little
credit, 'cause I have a plan in m y mind.
(US in background)
LM:

Well, maybe your plan isn't w h a t . . . I mean, it, just because it's
your plan, maybe it's not what I need.

Medlar told the OIC that she had excerpted a portion of the tape shortly past
this point because it concerned threats she m ade to Cisneros. Medlar
represented that the following conversation, in substance, had been erased:
Argum ent about HC divesting and his waffling as to how to make the
paym ents to me. (Some threats from me)
The recorded conversation continued acrimoniously:
LM:

Things have changed dramatically from where we were three or
four weeks ago . . . from your attitude. You think I don't know
that; you think I don't feel that.

HC:

No, that's not true.

LM:

D on't give me that, Henry!

HC:

All right. Look, don't get upset, and, uh, please, I mean, I, it - it's
so hard to call you when I know that every conversation is gonna
end this way.

LM:

Well, I'm sorry Henry, but you're the one w h o ' s . . .

HC:

. . . rvo, y o u d o n 't h a v e to b e th is w a y .

LM:

. . . you are the one w ho's changed, not me.

HC:

You d on't have to be this way.
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LM:

You're the one w ho's changed, not me.

HC:

I haven't changed a bit.

LM:

Yes, you have. You've changed in - i n . . . just about every way.

HC:

Linda, if you, if you don't, I haven't changed a bit. D on't make me
change by runnin' me through the . . . ringer every time I pick up
the phone to call you.

LM:

I don't...

HC:

. . . don't make m e dread calling you because I know it's gonna be
an emotional harangue.

LM:

Well, nobody's making you call me (Barrett, pp. IV-84-IV-87).

The relationship between Cisneros m ust have been difficult during the period
following the Christmas Eve discussion, because Medlar spoke w ith John
Rosales, an aid to Cisneros, December 29, and said that she w ould have to "take
action" if Cisneros did not call her (Barrett, 1997). During the ensuing 48-hour
period, Cisneros spoke w ith her twice.
On December 29,1992, the director of the F.B.I. ordered agents to (a) use
standard m ethods to interview Cisneros; and (b) develop a dossier of the
wom en w hom he had slept with, when the affair began and ended, and why it
ended.
During a December 30, 1992 interview, F.B.I. agents informed Cisneros
that the interview was intended to collect accurate information about him and
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they gave him a copy of the SF-86 Supplemental, asking if he wanted to make
any changes, Cisneros replied that to the best of his knowledge the disclosures
were accurate and correct. In hindsight, the F.B.I. and Office of the Independent
Counsel were able to determine that at the time that Cisneros
•

was not telling the truth about his payments to Medlar in the past or
planned future support payments;

•

m ade no admission regarding the possibility of threats by Medlar in
the future which would compromise his position;

•

falsely stated that Linda Medlar was a stable individual; and

•

falsely stated that he had had only one extra-marital affair aside from
his adulterous relationship w ith Linda Medlar (Barrett, 1997, p. IV89), and that these were in direct contradiction to his statements to
the transition team.

A December 30,1992 interview of Henry Cisneros' accountant, Luis
Hernandez, who asked to remain anonymous, revealed that money from
Cisneros' lecture circuit work was not deposited into business accounts, nor
personal accounts. Hernandez estim ated that the sum of these withholdings
was approximately $60,000, and speculated that the funds m ight be going to
Medlar (Barrett, 1997). Hernandez had heard office gossip that the paym ents
h a d b e e n r e m itte d d u r in g 1992 (Barrett, 1997).

Cisneros called Medlar after his FBI interview, telling her that the agents
had not brought up payments. He had told them that she was at her m other's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

178
home recovering from surgery, and "when it (the interview) comes, d o n 't—
don't panic" (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-90). The rest of the conversation, which
Medlar taped, shows Cisneros' level of understanding of the vetting and
confirmation process:
LM:

Don't panic? They didn't say anything about the money?

HC:

No, but I - 1 - 1 talked to Sylvia, and she said that, uh, they talked
to Louis Hernandez, who is an accountant, and. asked him today
whether, uh, he knew of any paym ents and, uh, he said no, he
didn't because he doesn't He, I, doesn't get involved in that. He
accounts with, he accounts for the money that we put into the . . .
system, and the money that I help you with comes before that,
comes out of that before it gets to him.

LM:

Uh-huh.

HC:

U h . . . frankly, the line that I have b e e n . . . holding to, you
k now...

LM:

Uh-huh.

HC:

. . . is - is - is - is, I think, the, the right answer. Uhm, I've m ade
sure that they know that you were a private person, and wanted
your privacy, and so forth. Uh, and - and let me just say that that, how this works, just so you have a feel for it. The FBI was
brought into this for executive level persons, for security reasons,
uhm, that's primarily what they're interested in. Their report is
not made available generally to the Committee, to the Senate, or
anyone else. (UI)

LM:

Then why are they doing it?

HC:

It is made available to, I think, the chairman of the Committee,
and that's it. Uhm, and the chairman of the Committee can, uh,
then determine whether, you know, there is something
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problematic. Now, our good fortune is the chairman of the
Committee is a Democrat, it is Senator Riegle, who has had some
very severe personal problems that w e r e . . . abused by the press.
He, uh, had a relationship, and, uh, a tape recording was m ade of
a . . . a, literally a private conversation, intimacy, you know,
lovemaking.
LM:

What did they ask you about us?

HC:

Well, they wanted to know, uh, uhm, roughly when, uhm, we
were t ogether. . . questions about dates, uhm , questions about
your status.

LM:

What did you say there?

HC:

Well, that you were a private person living in Lubbock. Uh, but I
think they just want us, uh, what they're after is, u h . . . uh,
evidence of stability. . . and and blackmailability, those are two
issues, words he used . .. you know, is this a, a stable person and
also is there here the potential for blackmail which is w hat the
money issue will come up. Uh, and, uh, I don't think it's gonna be
a problem. But, you know, some people when you hear "F-B-I,"
you know, all of a sudden panic, and I just think, you just need to
know, stay as steady as you can. And but I felt I had to tell you
about it just in case it happens as early as tomorrow. They're,
they're at it now, and they're gonna try to finish i t . . . by . . .
w hat'd they say? I forget, the seventh or something like that,
so . . .

LM:

A nd w hat if they find out about the money? I mean, I'm j u s t . . .
asking.

HC:

Well, I . . . u h h h . . . they asked me whether I had told Clinton, and
I told them that I had . . . in transition (UI). I mean, you know, this
is not a discovery w e're now making, uh, w e're not making some
kind of a discovery here of any kind . .. Uhm, you know, about
our, about the relationship, and, of course, it w as public. U h . . .
w hat if they find out? . . . I don't think there's a problem, and I
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think I'm gonna, I will continue to . . . say w hat I've . . . said all
along about this.
LM:

W hat'd you tell Clinton? . . . And you assured them that the
relation-, did they ask you if you were still in contact w ith me?

HC:

I forget the words exactly, it w asn't "in contact," never m entioned
"in contact" or anything like that, but it was something like . . . uh
. . . you know, "Are you, are you still seeing each other," or
something like that. I mean, it was, it was easy to say no, because
it was the truth.

LM:

Okay.

HC:

Don't worry, please.

LM:

(Sighs)

HC:

Don't worry, don't worry. It's uh I mean, num ber one, nothing's
gonna happen to you. Number two, if it happens to me, it's my
own doing, and I w on't let you get hurt, so . . . okay?

LM:

All right.

HC:

Thank you.

LM:

Thank me for what?

HC:

Just for being a . . . steady girl when, u h . . . like w hen w e get into
the clinches. (Barrett, 1997, IV-88-IV-92)

Subsequent F.B.I. interviews of Sylvia Arce-Garcia, John Rosales, Maria
Delgado, and Frank Wing on December 31 resulted in no information regarding
Cisneros' payments to Medlar. Rosales did mention that Medlar had insisted on
the phone that Cisneros should call her or she w ould have to take action, but
subsequently recanted. Grand jury testimony during the preparation of the OIC
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case later revealed that Cisneros had spoken with all three of his staff members
and told them not to mention the paym ents to the F.B.I. Testimony offered by
Delgado included that the unw ritten office policy was to transfer calls from
M edlar to Rosales or Garcia regardless of Cisneros' presence in the office, and
that she had over heard Rosales and Garcia discussing that Medlar had m ade
threats that she w ould destroy him (Cisneros). Arce-Garcia, on December 31,
and Rosales, approximately two weeks later, applied for positions as special
assistants to the H.U.D. secretary. Frank Wing was interviewed on December
31,1992 and reported favorably about Cisneros' financial situation, not noting
anything about payments to Medlar, he was subsequently hired as a senior
advisor at H.U.D. (Barrett, 1997). Determining a causal link between
conservative statements during the F.B.I. interviews to employment with
Cisneros in W ashington would be quite difficult, but the appearance of
impropriety could be inferred.
When the F.B.I. contacted M edlar's mother on January 1,1993, she told
the agent that Linda, who had undergone a significant surgical procedure in
December, was under six weeks of bed rest ordered by doctors, and was in poor
mental and physical condition. M edlar's mother requested that Linda not be
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contacted until January 8 or until the six weeks was up, approximately the end
of January or the first week of February.
On January 5,1993 the Cisneroses' m arriage counselor, Dr. Robert
Jimenez, was interviewed. H e had begun treating the couple w hen the affair
had become public and related that the couple had been separated several times
since the m arriage had suffered "four to six 'one night stands' by Cisneros"
(Barrett, 1997, p. IV-95). The couple had rededicated themselves to the
marriage, and no information about payments to Linda had been mentioned.
Other than Luis H ernandez's speculations in tw o different interviews about
possible paym ents to Medlar and the fact that the money had already been
taxed, no other payments are m entioned in the F.B.I. background checks.
On January 4,1993 Cisneros deposited $4,000 in M edlar's bank account
and had the following discussion with her:
HC:

Yeah, okay. Uhm . . . oh b o y , . . . it's gonna be dicey.

LM: Why is it gonna be dicey?
HC: The FBI's crawling all over everything.
LM: The what?
HC: The FBI.
LM:

What are they crawling all over?
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HC:

Well, the business about whether or n o t . . . money was paid, and
so forth.

LM:

Who are they talking to?

HC:

Well, talking to just about everybody I've ever known in my life.

LM:

Well, then how do you know that, they haven't talked to me, so
how do you know they're . ..

HC:

They haven't talked to you?

LM:

No.

Medlar told Cisneros that the FBI h a d tried to contact her but that her mother
h ad told the FBI that she could not be interviewed:
LM:

Uh, but they haven't talked to me. They called and Mother told
(UI) . . .

HC:

That w as when?

LM:

Uhh.

HC:

Over the weekend?

LM:

It was, the - the first. It w as the . . .

HC:

The first?

LM:

Yeah, it was on Friday, the first, and, I was asleep and she . ..

HC:

They will. They'll talk to you.

LM:

. . . she told them in, in no uncertain terms that I had just had
surgery, and she didn't feel it was appropriate that they call. I
mean, that's exactly w hat she told them.

HC:

(Chuckles)
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LM:

And she w as really upset about it.

HC:

Yeah.

Medlar and Cisneros also discussed how the FBI had learned about the
payments:
LM:

. . . So, I mean, they haven't talked to me, so where w ould they be
getting the thing about the money?

HC:

I don't know. I truly don't know.

LM:

Well, w hat had, w hat has been said?

HC:

Well (sigh), they had a meeting, for example, with one of the
lawyers today from the transition. And they said, "Well, w hat w hat can you tell us about, you know, the payments. Uh, you
know, amount or frequency or whatever," you know, and . . . and
uh, it was as if they knew, and they were just trying to confirm,
you know, w ith other people.

LM:

Umm. No, they haven't even talked to me.

HC:

Yeah. (UI)

LM:

And probably they won't.

HC:

I don't know whether the FBI can look at your bank records
without you even knowing that they are? I just don't know.

LM:

I don't think so.

HC:

Yeah.

LM:

I th in k th a t's a n in v a s io n o f p rivacy. N o w , th e y c a n p r o b a b ly lo o k

at yours.
HC:

Yeah.

LM:

But I don't think they can look at mine.
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HC:

Okay.

LM:

Because that's an invasion of privacy, I mean, I c a n . . .

HC:

I put the money in there personally today for the month.

LM:

I could go . . .

HC:

And I'm working on the other. But the, but your money for the
m onth is there, so, if you have to pay bills the next few days or
whatever.

The conversation then turned to how Medlar should deal w ith the FBI:
LM:

You know . . . but, uh, I - 1 really, unless the FBI just makes me
talk to them, I'm not gonna talk to them. I really and truly don't
understand why it would have anything to do, you know, unless,
unless, they were trying to get me to say something about you, I
mean...

HC:

You know, I think you m ight be, you can get away with that.

LM:

I'm going to.

Cisneros then expressed concern that the contents of the FBI Background
Investigation Report w ould have an adverse impact on his upcoming Senate
confirmation hearing:
LM:

The hearing, are you nervous about this hearing?

HC:

Yep. (Laughs)

LM:

Why? I - 1 didn't, I - 1 had heard, maybe on TV, I said, I guess
CNN, that they, you're not one of the ones they're goin' after . . .

HC:

Well, w hen they get the FBI r epor t . . .

LM:

. . . goin' after Ron Brown.
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HC:

. . . when they get the FBI report, it's all gonna change.

LM:

They're goin' after Ron Brown.

HC:

When they get the FBI report on Thursday . . .

LM:

Uh-huh.

HC:

. . . it will all change.

LM:

I thought only the chairman got it.

HC:

Yep, that's true b u t . . . uh, I 'spect, I 'spect if there's something
questionable (clears throat), that he has to bring in the minority
. . . ranking member, and . . . you know, it's just a question how
they wanna interpret it.

LM:

You know, I also don't understand that. How on earth can they
ask you questions if they haven't seen the FBI report?

HC:

Well, they're asking policy questions for the most p a r t . . . I think,
well, we'll see, m y life's gonna become a little bit more
complicated . . . by about Friday of this week.

LM:

Why?

HC:

Because that's w hen the chairman will have reviewed the report
and feel compelled t o . . . you know, maybe put a hold on this or
something.

LM:

And if he doesn't, then do you feel comfortable with it?

HC:

No, no, 'cause, you know, I mean, it can leak at any time, you
know.

LM:

Leak what?

HC:

To the press.

LM:

Ab-, about the paym ents you mean? Is, is this all you're talk-, is
that what you're talking about?
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HC:

Yeah. Mm-hmm. Yeah.

LM:

And you think because the FBI has asked som ething about it Well,
they asked your own staffer about it, didn't they?

HC:

Right.

LM:

So, it's n o t . . . so, this is, I mean, this isn't something that just
came up?

HC:

No, they shouldn't be acting surprised about it, b u t . . . we'll see.

LM:

Who shouldn't be acting surprised?

HC: The FBI.
LM:

Well you said that the guy, and I've forgotten his name Who's the
chairman of the Committee?

HC: Riegle?
LM: . .. yeah, had had personal problems.
HC: Big time.
LM: And so, you don't feel like he'll bring up any of that.
HC: Well, I don't think he will, he's a Democrat.
LM: Well, then who else could, if nobody else gets the FBI report?
HC: Uh, the - the, that's a good point. But, but, I guess, if there's
something truly questionable, he's honor-bound, probably, to
share it w ith like the ranking minority member, you know.
LM:

(Laughs) Henry, I have a little bit of a problem w ith that, "he's
honor-bound?"

HC: Hmm.
LM: You really believe that?
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HC:

I don't know, I just truly don't know how - how, I - I'll, I have to
find out more about, how, what, w hat exactly he w ould do, if he
had, if there was something in there that, you know, he felt he had
(UI).

LM:

H ow do you know nobody else sees that report?

HC:

Well, it's the way it's supposed to work. But that's not the way it
worked with - w ith Tower, (A previous Secretary of Defense
nominee) they kept leaking pieces, you know?

LM:

You know, I absolutely cannot believe that the other members
don't see that report.

HC:

They don't.

Cisneros then reviewed with M edlar what he was going to tell the FBI about
the paym ents if he was asked:
LM:

So, when is the FBI gonna come back to you, first of all?

HC:

Probably Wednesday.

LM:

Wednesday?

HC:

I w ould think so.

LM:

A nd do you think they'll ask you anything on that?

HC:

Mhm-hmm

LM:

All right. You're going to tell them the same thing?

HC:

What we, w hat - w hat we spoke before.

LM:

All right, well, I need to know w hat is said.

HC:

Okay. You can reach me at the Jefferson [Hotel in Washington,
D C.] if you need me, okay?
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LM:

Yeah, okay.

HC:

And if that gets, if it's, if it's in the middle of the day, and I'm not
here from morning to n i g h t . . . then the tran sitio n . . . and I don't
have the number, but Sylvia [Arce-Garcia] or John [Rosales] will
have it.

Cisneros then emphasized to Medlar the trust he was placing in her:
HC:

I'll call you tomorrow.

LM:

All right.

HC:

Okay.

LM:

But w e're straight on everything, right?

HC:

I think so.

LM:

Until after this hearing or what?

HC:

No, no, no, no, no.

LM:

And if I don't talk to the FBI, there's no downside to that, is there?

HC:

Uh, no.

LM:

You'd really prefer that I didn't.

HC:

I - 1 want you, uh, I'm gonna tell you something you're not gonna
believe here. I trust you, I trust your judgment, I trust you. After
all we've been through and everything that7s been said, I think
you're an intelligent. . . person. I trust you with my life.

LM:

No, I w ouldn't go that far.

HC:

Well, this is m y life. It's on the line. If they knock me out, m an I
am wiped. All that board stuff I was gonna d o , . . . the company, I
probably need to divest a n y w a y . . . become a liability there, I
mean, I am wiped. I might as well cash in everything I've got, pay
off all m y bills, and j u s t . . . get outta town.
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Finally, M edlar and Cisneros again discussed the upcoming Senate
confirmation hearing, and his anxiety about the proceedings:
LM:

. . . and then the only reason that they w ould w anna get in touch
w ith me is to see if I would confirm it. Is the only thing I can
figure out. Right?

HC: Yeah.
LM: But if they, if it comes up in hearing, and you fade it, then it's all
right. Or if it comes up, if it doesn't come up at all, then you feel
comfortable, right?
HC:

That's right.

LM:

Then the Senate . .. cannot go back and ask anymore questions,
right?

HC:

Oh, yeah. That's w hy I say I'm not asking anybody to m ake any
moves .. until the Senate actually votes.

LM: Well, when will you go up there?
HC: Well, I'll be in and outta there. And then I'm suppose to go to
work the morning of the 21st as Acting, even if I'm not confirmed
by the Senate yet.
HC:

Yeah. Okay. I'm gonna let you go, and I'll talk to you tomorrow.

LM:

All right.

HC:

Get some rest, you need the rest.

LM:

(Laughs) I need all of this to be over with.

HC:

Uhm-hmm. Me, too. Believe me nobody is wrestling w ith this
m ore than, my stomach's upset, I feel like I got a knot, and I feel
like quitting about every f e w . . . few hours.

LM:

But you won' t . . . . (Barrett, 1997, pp. IV-100-IV-109)
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On January 7,1993, F.B.I. agents re-interviewed nom inee Cisneros
because of the inconsistencies in the information it had received from Cisneros,
his staff, and Hernandez. F.B.I. agents were instructed to probe Cisneros about
other sexual indiscretions, payments to any other individuals, his relationship
with Linda Medlar including payments, and his relationship w ith his wife.
After the agents rem inded the nominee to be candid, Cisneros "acknowledged"
to the FBI that he had
•

financially "assisted" Medlar;

•

that he had never paid her m ore than $10,000 in a single year or more
than $2,500 at any one time;

•

claimed that he had paid taxes on all of his salary from his
speechmaking;

•

stated that he understood that the gift tax laws w ould apply to any
payments to Medlar that exceeded $10,000 annually;

•

denied making payments on a regular basis;

•

denied that he was making paym ents at the present time;

•

"asserted that Medlar had never threatened, coerced, or otherwise
tried to obtain money from him and that the paym ents were not
'hush m oney"' (Barrett, 1997, p. 112);

•

stated that Linda Medlar was stable;

•

denied having any substantive conversations w ith M edlar since early
1991;
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•

stated that Medlar and one other sexual indiscretion had been the
extent of his extra-marital affairs; and

•

informed the agents that support paym ents were known about by the
Clinton transition team higher-ups. (Barrett, 1997)

Cisneros had understated his total yearly paym ents by more than $30,000 in
1990, $60,000 in 1991 and $55,000 in 1992 (see Appendix B for specific num bers
as well as Table 1 for more descriptive data).
On January 8, Linda M edlar was contacted by an F.B.I. agent. She
resisted an interview stating that she was emotionally and physically incapable,
as well as confused as to why they would want to talk w ith her (Barrett, 1997).
Meldar asked that they not contact her again (Barrett, 1997).
On January 8, the F.B.I. interviewed Mary Alice, who was aware of
Cisneros's payments to Linda Medlar, including $8,000 to cover the cost of
moving to Lubbock. Mrs. Cisneros said that her husband was supporting Linda
Medlar out of a sense of obligation because she could not get a job. M ary Alice
withdrew her divorce petition because Henry had decided to live u p to his
familial obligation and moral traditions of family. She also said that H enry had
more than two extra-marital affairs. On January 15 Medlar and Cisneros had a
discussion about the importance of Mary Alice's interview:
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LM:

And w hat did she say to them?

HC:

She . . . played along like she knew. And, a h . . . because she knew
that if she didn't, it would be blackmail.

LM:

What do you m ean it'd be blackmail?

HC:

Their m ain concern about the m o n e y . . . was that there was
illegality involved. That - that you w e r e . . . w ould be threatening
me w ith something, and that's why I was giving you the money.

LM: Uhm-hmm.
HC:

So that, and the main thing w ould be disclosure to spouse and so
forth. And, also I guess, you know, just generally. So, uhm, you
know, she understood that and had to acknowledge that she
knew . . . so that it w ouldn't have been cast as an illegal thing.
(Barrett, 1997, p. 113)

James Hamilton received Cisneros' F.B.I. background report on January
11. Copies of all interview summaries were enclosed with the F.B.I. report
including the Cisneros and Hernandez interviews, but are not actually part of
the text. "The F.B.I. report itself does not contain Cisneros's false statements; the
enclosed and incorporated interview reports do" (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-115). The
report contained H ernandez's speculation about $60,000 in paym ents to
Medlar. The following information regarding the transition team 's response to
Cisneros' inconsistencies is the product of the OIC grand jury testimony.
During Ham ilton's subsequent grand jury testimony regarding the allegations
of Cisneros' lies, he acknowledged reading the report and "could not recall
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whether he had noticed any inconsistencies" (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-115) between
the information that the vetting team had received and w hat was reflected in
the F.B.I. information. Subsequently, Hamilton stated that he might have been
concerned if the payments had am ounted to $60,000 per year. After discussing
the report w ith Hamilton, Ham ilton's deputy Gary Ginsberg, who felt the
paym ents stood out, and Elizabeth Arky, another m ember of the vetting team
who initially interviewed H enry Cisneros, spoke w ith Cisneros (Barrett, 1997).
Arky and Ginsberg m et w ith Cisneros to review the F.B.I/s report.
Ginsberg sum m arized and or read the F.B.I. report verbatim to Cisneros,
particularly about Medlar, and payments estimated to be as much as $60,000.
Cisneros, Ginsberg testified, was "visibly agitated and nervous." Ginsberg's
account of the meeting with Cisneros was not corroborated completely by Arky
(who w ould later serve with Cisneros at HUD). Elizabeth Arky m aintained that
she was not present for part of the interview when the inconsistencies were
presented to Cisneros—stating that Ginsberg thought it w ould be a violation of
Cisneros' privacy. The OIC did not include evidence from this m eeting into its
final report. E v e n after th e in c o n siste n c ie s, Jam es H a m ilto n a u th o r iz e d th e
release of the information (F.B.I. report) to the D.O.J.-P.S.O. for the necessary
security clearance.
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The F.B.I. report was released to D.O.J.-P.S.O. on January 14,1993.
Included in the file were the interview reports and the information that
Cisneros had provided to the transition team. The F.B.I. was not aware of what
was in the transition team material (Barrett, 1997).
At the DOJ-PSO, Dominic Rubino who was ultimately responsible for
the decision regarding the granting of a security clearance, and Carol Snyder
reviewed Cisneros' file. In retrospect, Rubino thought Cisneros' lies about when
he last spoke to Medlar and the amount of the payments w ould have
compromised the chances of a security clearance, unless the m atter could have
been investigated further—had the security clearance been granted and the
inconsistencies discovered, the clearance w ould have been suspended.11 Snyder
maintained that lying to the F.B.I. was the most important aspect of the
situation because the D.O.J.-P.S.O. determination regarding a security clearance
was based on F.B.I. information alone, and Cisneros would have been denied

11 When President Clinton entered office on January 20,1993 the Department of
Justice office ceded the authority (to H.U.D.) to investigate the matter or suspend
Cisneros' security clearance regarding Cisneros' "fitness for office or eligibility to
receive his security clearance" (Barrett, p. IV-120).
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his clearance because of the substance of the lie regarding the amounts of the
payments. D.O.J.-P.S.O. expressed its concerns to the transition team.
The transition team responded that it was aware of the payments and
since the affair was public and M ary Alice was aware of the monetary support,
they were not concerned.12 The transition team provided the F.B.I. report to the
chairman of the Senate Banking Committee. The F.B.I. report included
Hernandez' observations regarding possible $60,000 w orth of payments to
Medlar, but it did not disclose Cisneros' inconsistent statements, the F.B.I.
interview summaries, nor Cisneros' admissions of payments. Arky arranged for
personal courtesy calls to other senators on the Banking Committee; none of the
other banking committee members received an F.B.I. report or information
about the inconsistencies. Arky stated that she was responsible to the vetting
team, and if they did not send the information about the payments, then she
did not feel a duty to tell the senators; it was up to Cisneros to answer any

12 In subsequent testimony to the OIC grand jury investigation, Hamilton
stated, "[Cisneros] was a Hispanic and the fact that he was so extremely attractive,
forceful, intelligent guy, when weighed in the balance outweighed these negatives, at
least as far as the people in Little Rock who made the decisions were concerned. . .
unless it had been discovered that [Cisneros] had committed some very heinous crime,
you know, something that spoke of moral turpitude or something that was really
totally dam ning. . . he was going to get appointed" (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-120).
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questions if asked. James Hamilton responded that the Senate w as entitled to an
answer if they asked the question, otherwise senators were not allowed to go
into every piece of information in som eone's past (Barrett, 1997).
A t the January 12,1993 confirmation hearing, the committee brought up
neither Linda Medlar, nor the payments. W hen Elizabeth Arky w as asked
during subsequent grand jury testimony w hy she had not brought up Cisneros'
inconsistent statement to the senators, whom Cisneros had paid courtesy calls
to, she responded that her obligation was to the transition team and that it was
u p to H enry to answer any questions that the senators might ask truthfully.
Likewise, Ham ilton's grand jury testimony revealed that the Senate "given their
official role, they had a right to an honest answer, if a question w ere asked"
(Barrett, 1997, p. IV-122).
The following extended quote speaks to the instability of M edlar and
Cisneros' relationship, the importance of the majority party's willingness to
approve nominees, ethics issues that the representatives of the people have and
how they impact a nominee. Additionally, the importance of privacy being
respected, and probably the m ost im portant is the fact that the F.B.I., according

to Cisneros, did in fact state that payments under the circumstances were
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warranted which may have eased the D.O.J.-P.S.P. decision. On January 15,
Medlar and Cisneros discussed the F.B.I. interviews:
LM:

A nd so, what, did they have any amounts?

HC:

I do n 't know. I don't know what they . . . But, it's just amazing to
me, they talked to 65 people, and m ost of 'em about this. So they
picked up bits and pieces and they, and, I mean, they had me
dead to rights on some things. They asked me, for example, in the
interview with m e . . . last week, latter part of last week, "When
(US) is the last time you talked to her?" A nd I said, "Well, we
talked, you know, through late 1992."

LM:

(Laughs) Why do you lie to them?

HC:

Well, I w udn't lying. It was true. I talked to you in late nin-, you
know, late 1992.1 mean, this was like the first week of January.
A nd - and he said, "Well, we have uh, we have uh, we learned
that she called your office on December 29 and said that if you
d id n 't call her back, she would take action."

LM:

Well, that m ust've been from Sylvia [Arce-Garcia].

HC:

No, it was from John [Rosales]. See John's a journalist. And he felt
that if they asked him direct questions he could not lie. So, being
the amateur that he is, I mean he just spilled his guts (laughs).

LM: Hum.
HC:

A nd they asked everybody. They went through Rene the
accountant. And w hen they couldn't get it from him, they went to
Luis the accountant. And they finally figured out the discrepancy
between what comes in and what goes to other expenditures.

LM: Mhm-hmm.
HC:

A nd they did have that figure.

LM: A nd w hat did they ask you?
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HC:

They, they did n 't ever talk to m e . . . well, they did, I guess, they
talked amounts, and I gave 'em the same fact situation that I had
given 'em before. So it was real delicate.

LM:

Is that basically why it didn't come up in the hearing?

HC:

No, let m e tell you something. It's in the report. It's in the FBI
report.

LM:

Uh-huh.

HC:

The FBI report i s . . . like 40 pages.

LM:

Yeah.

HC:

(Sighs) And, in the FBI report is . . . not, ah, a full discussion of our
situation and also the money. And it estimates . . . $60,000 Because
that's the discrepancy. See, they took, they had an interview, they
had FBI agents here in San Antonio, they had FBI agents in
Washington. W hen I talked to you last week and you were so
angry w ith me, I thought I was dead. I mean, I thought it was
over. And it w asn't what you w ould do, it's was alre-, it's what
the FBI was already getting . ..

Cisneros then described to Medlar the discussions he had in W ashington, D.C.
with the transition team regarding the contents of the FBI report:
HC:

. . . I went, I had a private meeting with the lawyers in
Washington, where they worked me over with every possible
follow-up, prosecutorial question.

LM:

And so w hat did you tell 'em?

HC:

I told 'em, you know, I told 'em, I, well, finally w hat it boils down
to is the truth. I mean, the fact of the matter is, I have helped you
all along, because I wanted you to have what you needed. Not
because, as I've told you many, many, many, m any times, because
I was afraid of what you w ould do.
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LM:

But how much do they think you've given?

HC:

What?

LM:

W hat do they think you've given?

HC:

Well they don't know, I mean, the FBI thinks, I mean, the FBI has
virtually the truth, because they just figured it out. So it's in the
report. Now, on M onday afternoon, my, my, m y thing is Tuesday,
on Monday evening, I get a call from the Clinton ethics people . . .

LM:

Mhm-hmm.

HC:

. . . to tell me that they just have been through the FBI report, and
that as far as they have read it, at that m oment they've read about
half of it, there's nothing in there that hasn't been known, or I
haven't been forthright about, that hasn't been public, or that can't
be faded.

LM:

(Sighs)

HC:

Now, the FBI report is supposed to go to the Senate on Thursday
afternoon. But they're still working on it on Monday.

LM:

Mhm-hmm.

In another January 15, 1993 telephone conversation taped by Medlar, Cisneros
and Medlar continued discussing the FBI background investigation and his
confirmation hearing:
HC:

. . . U h h h . . . anyway I was telling you, where was I?

LM:

The FBI report on Monday.

HC:

Yeah. So on Monday, now they worked all week, they dispatched
extra agents over the weekend on this.

LM:

Oh, is that why they came to see me?
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HC:

Uh-huh. I mean, see, what happened is this: The FBI was
complaining; there was a story in the Washington Post that the
FBI was complaining t h a t . . . they hadn't been given enough time
with the first round of people who w ent to hearings, like Ron
Brown last week. The FBI is complaining that they usually get, by
law th e /r e supposed to have tw o weeks notice, but they were 10
days and a weeks notice and less. A nd Ron Brown came up, and
Ron Brown ended up being very controversial; he's been in
trouble all the way. Okay?

LM:

Uhm-huh.

HC:

So. With me, they got more than two weeks because I was on the
transition, and I've been talked about as possible Cabinet for a
long time, and th e /v e had m y forms for, you know, since I went
on the transition thing. So they started on me pretty early. And
the FBI loves things that have to w i t h . . . sex and intimacy and so
forth. They're real bad at tracking dow n financial things 'cause
they're not accountants and so forth, but they just, they're, they're
just righteous guys who love to get into this stuff. I mean, they're
just gossipers and (takes breath) scandalizers like everybody else,
you know. So, by the way, the FBI is, I have found out, is heavily,
well, who knows, never mind. Anyway. I d on't w ant to talk on
this phone, if it's tapped, I don't w ant to say anything t h a t . . .
(laughs)

LM:

On your phone? Why w ould they tap your phone?

HC:

Uh. People tell me my phone's been tapped all along, so . . .

LM:

Oh, I don't believe that.

HC:

. . . So anyway, so then M onday afternoon rolls around, and I'm,
I'm, I'm cooked. I mean, I figure, first of all the Committee's
supposed to have it on Thursday. The Senate Committee is
supposed to have it on Thursday; it goes to the chairman. The
ranking m inority member has an opportunity to see it. But it
doesn't go to the chairman in m y case, 'til M onday night, like 11
o'clock at night. It could have stalled the hearing if he had w anted
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it, but he's a Democrat, and he's a pro, and got his own problems
and so forth. But he is pretty stringent about the FBI reports. So, I
go into the committee and, to my knowledge, he hasn't seen it, but
he scanned it, and D'Amato hasn't seen i t .. Okay. But D'Am ato's
got his own problems too. H e's up for an ethics investigation.. . .
So it doesn't come up in the hearing at a l l . . . at all. B u t . . . which
surprised me a little bit, except that the Republicans have all been
saying positive things in the pr es s. . . and D'Amato had been
saying "Bullshit, w e're not gonna get into the personal stuff," andand Phil Gramm's g o t . . . that investigation on him in M aryland,
so he's not anxious to get into ethics stuff .. .
LM:

Just wait though, that could come back to haunt you.

HC:

That they didn't bring it up?

LM:

Uhm-hmm.

HC:

Well, yes it could. And frankly I w ould have preferred a question,
so I could get it out on the record . . . and answer it.

LM:

B u t . . . w hat were you gonna say if they'd said something about
the amount?

HC:

Well, I was gonna do m y very best to-to-to answer the way we
had agreed, which is what, the position I've taken all along.

Cisneros then told Medlar about a conversation he had had with Riegle
regarding the paym ents two days after his confirmation hearing:
HC:

I - 1 forgot to tell you, I mean, I, uh, I - 1, we got off the subject. On,
two days after the hearing, I called Senator Riegle, because he's
the chairman of the committee and I'm gonna have to deal w ith
him a lot. I called to share with him some of m y thinking about
assistant secretaries, and I said, "I - 1 need to talk about something
sensitive with you," and it was a person that I'm thinking of
hiring w ho's coming off of their staff. . . for chief of staff. And, uh,
he said, "Well, I'm glad you're showing that kind of candor w ith
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me, because I w ant to talk about something sensitive w ith you,
too." And then we got into the payments question. . .
LM:

Uhm-hmm.

HC:

. . . from the FBI repor t . . .

LM:

Uhm-hmm . ..

HC:

. . . and he, uh said, "Look, I - 1 - 1 need your explanation, and I
need, uh, I need it," and he said, "I m ay send you some questions
in writing, because, uh, obviously if it comes up again in the
future, uh, someone may ask w hether or not the FBI knew it, and
they did, and then they may ask, 'Well, if the FBI knew it, why
didn't the Senate committee pursue it,' and I wanna be able to say
that I did."

LM:

And so w hat did you tell him?

HC:

I told him, uh, I didn't - he did n 't get into num bers or anything
like that. Now, the only question standing at this m om ent is
whether D'Am ato is going to, uh, w ant it. H e's the only person
who has access to i t . . .

LM:

I w ouldn't think he would.

HC:

Well, he has said he doesn't give a shit. I mean, he has said that to
me in those w ords, you know . . .

Cisneros and Medlar continued to discuss the contents of the FBI report and
what Cisneros had told Riegle about the payments:
HC:

I told him t h a t . . . why I did it.

LM:

And that's all that was said about it?

HC:

Uhm-hmm. The FBI report makes clear it was not hush money.
The FBI report itself in this, in the, in the paragraph that deals
w ith the issue, says it was not hush money.
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LM:

W hat did they say it was?

HC:

Assistance . . . understandable under the circumstances . .. your
move to Lubbock . . . and so forth.

LM:

But he doesn't know any dollar amount?

HC:

It's in the, it's in there, there are speculations in the report.

LM:

in assistance?

HC:

That's w hat it says? It says, you know, it doesn't actually assu-,
uh, you know, uh, estimate the 60, but it says that that's the, that's
the amounts . . . that it could be, judging from the way our
accounting is.

LM:

A nd so w hat did the Clinton people say w hen they . . . read that?

HC:

They, uh, that's, I mean, they, they said it w as not a problem,
because it's characterized as, as assistance.

LM: Did anybody remark that, uh, I didn't talk to the FBI?
HC:

I don't know.

LM: See, because they had w anted to get back in t o u c h . . .
HC:

Oh yes, yes, the FBI report says you were, uh, i ll . . . it does.

LM: Hmm.
Cisneros and Medlar then discussed threats that Medlar had m ade to Cisneros
and M edlar's decision not to provide information damaging to Cisneros to the
FBI or the press:
LM:

. . . And on top of everything, Henry, you have not been that con-,
you haven't been concerned about me. I d idn't get any flowers
from you; I didn't get a card; I didn't get a note.
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HC:

Yeah. You don't understand, I mean, every time I do something
like that, you end up, you threatening me with it.

LM:

Huh?

HC:

You do.

LM:

Henry.

HC:

You do.

LM:

Henry, if I w as gonna do anything to you, don't you think that
FBI report would have been the . ..

HC:

Look, ya know . . .

LM:

I m ea n . . .

HC:

If you're me, how could you separate 'em? I mean, how could you
separate w hen you're serious and w hen you're not serious, and
when you're threatening, and w hen you're just angry, ya know?

LM:

Well, in the first place if I'd ever done it before, I guess, ya know. I
mean, Honey, I'm sm-, as smart, as they come; I know exactly
w hat would do you in. I've always known that. I knew exactly
who I could have called and all this other stuff. I'm not dumb. I
w ouldn't have called the press, you know, but the FBI report
could have done you in. It could have done you in w ith Clinton
. . . I mean, and - and certain things like that, which I told you I
w ouldn't do. You know, and I've never done it before. I haven't
gone to the press, even when the press has called me. You and
Mary Alice have been the ones w ho have bad m outhed me.

HC:

No.

LM:

H on . . .

HC:

Okay, okay, okay, okay. I gotta go.
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As the conversation continued, Cisneros expressed his concern that the
"scandal" w ould be revealed:
HC:

I'll call you in the next couple of days.

LM:

No, you w on't either.

HC:

I promise you I will. The only reason I d i d n ' t . . . was - was the last
conversation you had, you busted me good, I mean, I was wiped.
I figured it was gonna be gone that day; (US in background) and I
w as gonna embarrass Clinton and the whole country, and have
lost everything.

LM:

You figured what?

HC:

That I had lost everything, I mean, company, boards, honoraria,
John Paul, all of it, because I was gonna self-destruct before the
whole country in a white flot- white hot flash of scandal - it's over.
I just, you know, I just, I mean, I was sick. (Barrett, 1997, pp.
IV-25-IV-133)

On January 15, Henry Cisneros begins liquidating his assets. The am ount
of support he had paid Medlar from November 9 until January 19 totaled
$25,845—using the average of three monthly payments in the preceding three
years, the totals w ould have ranged anywhere from $6,900 - $10,900. On the eve
of the January 21 confirmation vote, he had a conversation with Linda
explaining how he was going to cash in his annuities, noting Mary Alice had no
idea how m uch money he had saved, and work out paym ents to her. If the
F.B.I. came back about the subsequent payments, Cisneros thought it w ould be
regarded as blackmail since he had already disclosed the payments. In the post-
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confirmation period, he opened up accounts from which Linda could draw
funds and helped pay her medical bills. Cisneros and Medlar also agreed that
he w ould try to make the 1993 payments early in the year so that she w ould not
have to contact him at HUD, noting at one point that he could not send
"increments of—of larger than about that size" (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-141). In July
of 1993, Secretary Cisneros m ade a payment by signing over a $15,000 check
from Seagal Wheatley to Medlar, thereby concealing the paym ents from Mary
Alice (see Appendix B for the 1993 payments) (Barrett, 1997).
According to Barrett, Linda Medlar continued to be a threat to Cisneros
because of her possession of information about his misstatements before the
confirmation, and she attem pted to exploit the situation for gain.
Beginning in December, 1992 or January, 1993, Linda M edlar, Patsy
Wooten, and Michael Wooten hatched a plan to develop an H.U.D. property
managem ent company. According to grand jury testimony, M edlar w ould be
paid a commission for providing access to business opportunities.
According to Barrett, M edlar contacted Cisneros on January 15,1993 to
s e t u p M ic h a e l W o o te n 's (L in d a M ed lar's n e p h e w )

call. B efore bringing u p the

business venture, she discussed the substantial cost to Cisneros of her medical
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bills and described how Michael Wooten would be helping her with health
insurance in the future:
LM:

The hospital bill, well, I can send you a copy of it, the hospital bill
is 7,900. That's just the hospital. The doctor's a little over 3,000.
The ER is something, it seems like, 600 or something like that.

HC:

Uhm-hmm.

LM:

But it's not d o n e . . .

HC:

I understand.

LM:

. . . because the, of the . . . some, you know, other things going on.

HC:

Okay.

LM:

So, anyway, u h m . . . I think you're in for a rocky road.

HC:

Looks like it, dudn't it?

LM:

Yeah.

HC: I'm gonna be flat busted w hen this thing's done.
LM: . . . Oh, by the way, Michael has put me on his insurance plan.
HC:

T haf s good.

LM: So, hopefully this will never happen again.
HC: But you have to pay a premium.
LM:

Yeah, I have to pay it monthly, but at least it's a good plan.

HC:

Yeah, that's good.

Medlar then immediately raised the issue of the property managem ent
company:
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LM:

And, uh, he's starting a m anagem ent company, that, uh, Patsy is
gonna be . . .

HC:

Property management?

LM:

Yeah, he wants to do some management.

HC:

That's good.

LM:

And Patsy's gonna be the head of it, so it'll be a minority.

HC:

Woman-owned?

LM:

Yeah.

HC:

That's great!

HC:

What - what - w hat will it do?

LM:

. . . Truthfully? I'm - I'm not really sure. It's something to do, his
attorney has - has done this before, and it has, it does have
something to do w ith HUD.

HC:

Is that right?

LM:

Uh-huh. Has something to do w ith management o f . . .

HC:

Of - of - of properties.

LM:

. . . of the HUD properties, yeah.

LM:

. . . Uh, Michael wanted me to talk to you and ask you exactly,
you know, kind of what the ins and outs are of it.

HC:

I'll find out.

LM:

Y o u k n o w , a n d w h o h e h a s to talk to , a n d . . . B u t h e 's d o in g m e a

great favor just by doing the insurance a n d . . . said h e'd try to
work a deal where he can get my car insurance done through the
company or something.
HC:

That's great.
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LM:

. . . you know, because they've seen what I've gone through this
time. And then Patsy, naturally, is putting everything in her
name. So, I told them if they needed any questions ask-, answered
at least I could get the answers for them.

HC:

Sure.

LM:

Ya know.

HC:

Yep. (Barrett, 1997, pp. IV-147-IV-150)

Cisneros said that he w ould look into the "ins" and "outs" of Michael and
Patsy's company becoming an H.U.D. property m anagement company (Barrett,
1997, p. 149). Michael Wooten contacted Secretary Cisneros, who put him in
touch with Frank Wing (Barrett, 1997, pp. IV-150).
Frank Wing contacted Michael Wooten and told him that a new
company had a poor chance of getting an upcoming contract from the Dallas
H.U.D. office and that it would look too suspicious for a new company to get a
contract (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-150). At this time, Wooten dropped the contracting
firm idea and opened a brokering and consulting firm. W ith the assistance of
Michael Carper, an attorney, Wooten m et with John Condit, the president of
Domicile Property M anagement Company, the largest HUD m anagement
c o m p a n y in so u th e r n T exas. C o n d it p r o p o s e d a c o n su ltin g a r r a n g e m e n t

that

w ould result in a paym ent—a certain percentage of the value of contracts—to
Wooten for every introduction that Domicile received. Linda Medlar asked to
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see a w ritten agreement between Wooten and Condit, before discussing the
m atter—an upcoming HUD bid in Dallas—w ith Secretary Cisneros. W ooten
spoke to Secretary Cisneros, and Cisneros told Medlar that he w ould look at the
Domicile bid. Frank Wing (FW) called and the following taped conversation
ensued:
FW:

Need to just give you a real quick update on something that the
secretary has asked me to kind of uh look into.

LM:

The secretary, okay, (laughing). Okay.

(Call breaks)
FW:

Domicile. An excellent company.

LM:

M-huh.

FW:

Has done uh, uh, exceptional work in, uh, in San Antonio and
other areas, (call breaks) An excellent chance of the uh, w ith the
uh, the uh, proposal they have before the uh, regional office.

LM:

Oh for Fort Worth.

FW:

Mhuh.

LM:

Okay.

FW:

And, uh, as I uh, as I go through this a little bit m ore . . .

LM:

Mhuh.

FW:

. . . then I'll be able to uh, this is just uh, a prelim inary thing that
w e did uh, so th at w e could report back right aw ay then uh, w e're
going to follow u p on it, as it, as it goes up the process.

LM:

Okay, okay, well. I thank you for the information and uhm , then
Henry's gonna, or you're gonna follow up on it.
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FW:

Yes, I, I'll be doin' it. Yeah.

LM:

That's okay. Do, do you have any idea when a decision will be
m ade on this region, uhm , on the Fort W orth Regional Proposal.
(Barrett, 1997, pp. IV-154-IV-156)

As the bidding progressed, Domicile was eliminated, because their bid w as too
high, and then asked to submit additional details. While there was reason to
believe that Domicile m ay have been pu t back into the bidding process because
of pressure from the H.U.D. national office (perhaps by Wing or Cisneros),
Domicile did not win the bid. There was no evidence to suggest that Cisneros or
Wing did any thing to influence the evaluation of the bids or selection process,
and according to the OIC report, because there was "insufficient evidence to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the scheme had been implemented"
(Barrett, 1997, p. IV-161), there were no charges brought against any of the
individuals (Barrett, 1997).
Morris Jaffe, a financier in the oil, gas and aviation fields, among others,
w as a major contributor to politicians like Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter
(Hendricks, 1994). The financial relationship between Linda M edlar and Morris
Jaffe is based on her w ord and that of her nephew Michael Wooten. Wing told
Medlar that Jaffe was willing to give her $20,000 in order to assist Cisneros;
Jaffe did send $5,000 in November, 1993, in addition to subsequent paym ents
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(see Appendix B, Table 4). Medlar and Cisneros had a taped conversation in
early November in regard to a paym ent and Jaffe:
HC:

What do you need right this minute?

LM:

I d on't need anything quite frankly because Morris sent m e a
check.

HC:

Okay. A check?

LM:

Yeah.

HC:

A check?

LM:

A check.

HC:

Jesus (laughing).

HC:

H ow much was it?

LM:

Five. Which I do need this m onth because I've got some medical
bills.

HC:

Let me tell you something, can I, I mean, this guy . .. this guy's a
savior. (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-162)

According to Barrett, Michael W ooten and Linda Medlar discussed how
Secretary Cisneros had fallen behind in his payments, in later 1993 or early
1994. In January of 1994 Medlar w rote a letter, which Wooten subsequently
delivered to Morris Jaffe; the contents included a statement that she m ight go
public w ith Cisneros' payments. Jaffe stated that it would not be a good idea to
expose the secretary who Jaffe regarded as a good m an (Barrett, 1997). Jaffe and
Wooten talked about work for W ooten's company in order to channel m oney to
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Medlar. Jaffe's son, Doug, sent Wooten to a business that he owned a m inority
stake in, with the idea that W ooten might do an energy a u d it—the majority
stakeholder said that he had no such work for them, but W ooten received a
$12,000 check as paym ent for the lighting audit (Barrett, 1997). After turning
M edlar dow n for another loan (Hendricks, 1994), Jaffe attem pted to get a
num ber of jobs for her and even attem pted (silently) to go through a fellow
businessman, but she w ould never make the appointments (Barrett, 1997).
The behaviors of Frank Wing were of interest to the O.I.C. because of a
pattern of him being a representative of Cisneros. According to Jaffe, in March
or April 1993, Wing asked Jaffe to find Medlar a job (Barrett, 1997; Hendricks,
1994); according to Jaffe, Medlar was causing problems, calling and faxing
HUD. Frank was intercepting calls from her (Barrett, 1997). Barrett maintained
that Wing had answered calls from Medlar in which she h ad asked for money
from Cisneros, but he denied knowing about the regular support payments.
Wing denied seeing documents being sent to Cisneros from M edlar (Barrett,
1997). According to Barrett, Charlene Anderson, a staff assistant at H.U.D.
r e c a lle d

taking a fax a d d r e s s e d to Cisneros (from Medlar) to Wing. M edlar's

intent w as to inform Cisneros that if he did not send money, she would have no
choice (but to go to the press). Cisneros asked Anderson who had seen the
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facsimile, and Cisneros called Anderson to apologize for involving her (Barrett,
1997). Wing subsequently "directed her to transfer all of M edlar's calls to him
instead of Cisneros and instructed her not to log M edlar's calls into the official
HUD message booklet. According to Anderson, Wing wanted M edlar's
messages recorded on plain paper (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-172). During subsequent
questioning, Wing denied asking Anderson to not put the calls into the H.U.D.
call booklet, denied seeing documents from Medlar, and denied knowledge of
Cisneros' support payments to Medlar until 1994 when it became public
knowledge (Barrett, 1997). H e did, however, adm it to redirecting M edlar's calls
to himself (Barrett, 1997).
H enry Cisneros' sex scandal is now about to enter Phase 2, The
Unfolding. The case study thus far exhibits the public behavior of an unfaithful
husband and an unfaithful, abandoned, divorced mother of one, and private
financial considerations that are a result of the exposure of the sexual
indiscretion.

Phase 2: The Unfolding

According to the sex scandal phases posited in Chapter II, after
providing information of an alleged indiscretion to the various institutional
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representatives, a messenger(s) may continue to be an actor in the process.
Institutional representatives may choose to investigate the allegations and/or
transm it the allegations to other institutional actors. Such an investigation m ay
produce a record that m ay be "used" in the future. Oversight responsibilities
result in a presentation of the information to the secretary or under-secretary.
Investigatory reporting by the press m ay lead to release of the story, thereby
leading to pressures for a "full" investigation. In this case, the messenger, Linda
Medlar, is the only individual capable of providing the documentation
necessary to prove im proper behavior resultant of the sexual indiscretion. Due
to financial conditions and "proof," taped discussions w ith Cisneros and cashed
checks, Medlar moves to the courts for financial redress and verification of her
financial and factual claims. Further financial problems caused her to sell her
story and documents to a television tabloid. Due to the W atergate reforms, the
attorney general of the United States m ust consider the possibility of
malfeasance and, if a preliminary investigation finds a factual basis for concern,
an independent counsel m ust be appointed. Contrary to President Clinton's
in s is te n c e that th e s ta te m e n ts w e r e

not m aterial to Cisneros' job responsibilities,

David Barrett was appointed and proceeded with an investigation. With the
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assistance of Linda Medlar and her documents, Cisneros was indicted, but not
before he resigned at the end of President Clinton's first term.

The Messenger

The origins of the unfolding can be found in the early days of 1994 when
Linda Medlar received her last paym ent from Henry Cisneros (Barrett, 1997).
After six m onths without support from Cisneros, Medlar, according to her
attorney at the time the lawsuit w as filed, had run out of savings and begun
selling her belongings (Wood, 1994). In June of 1994, Medlar chose to consult an
attorney, and picked Bruce Magness out of the Yellow Pages (Barrett, 1997).
After providing Magness with information about Cisneros' promise, payments,
and her recordings of their conversations, Magness consulted w ith an associate,
Floyd Holder, and they listened to some of the Cisneros/Medlar taped
discussions (Barrett, 1997). Holder and Magness advised Medlar that she could
sue for breach of contract and sell the tapes to the media (Barrett, 1997).13 The
elements of the lawsuit against Cisneros included breach of contract, fraud,

13 Under Texas and federal law, the taping of the conversations was legal, but
the recordings are not necessarily admissible in court (Hendricks and Uhler, 1994).
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settlement payments amounting to $256,000 and unspecified punitive damages
(Wood & Martin, 1994).
On July, 29,1994, they filed suit in Lubbock County's 72nd District Court
against Henry Cisneros for breach of contract. Alleged in M edlar's suit is
Cisneros assumed responsibility for "making her name, photograph and life a
public spectacle," resulting in his agreement to support her for the damage
done, amounting to $4,000 a month (Wood & Martin, 1994, p. 6-A).
Cisneros responded with a press release through the H.U.D. public
relations office acknowledging his former romantic relationship, his past
financial assistance to her, denying any legal obligation to her and the claim
that he provided assistance to her since assuming office in January, 1993. A
Cisneros quote in the Dallas Morning News following the press release stated,
"There was never any m utual agreement for monthly paym ents of $4,000 or
any other amount. I couldn't afford something like that" (Barrett, 1997, p. IV175). After a release of documents by M edlar's attorneys, Cisneros stated that
formal payments had ended before he took office and then som e funds from his
s a v in g s

in 1983 (Wood & Martin, 1994).

For strategic reasons, Medlar and her legal team did not disclose the
existence of the tapes (Barrett, 1997), but the discussion of the $4,000 alleged

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

219
monthly paym ents and the $200,000 total in the papers m ust have raised
eyebrows amongst those who were aware of Cisneros' statements to the F.B.I.
While the extent of the legal and financial damage to the parties involved
could not have been imagined once the suit had been filed, Linda M edlar began
to increase her potential legal problems because of a series of steps impacting
the integrity of her tape recordings. Claiming that Magness and H older had
counseled her to destroy any tape segments that m ight contain defamatory
statements, threats to Cisneros, or evidence of extortion or blackmail, Medlar
destroyed or altered the evidence. Duplicates were produced on identical tapes
with a dual cassette recorder in order to give the illusion of uniformity, and
then edited. The originals were eliminated completely. Because of threats to
Cisneros, information about Jaffe, and other information on some recordings,
these tapes—four or five—were destroyed in their entirety (Barrett, 1997, p. IV177).
The White House declined comment on the lawsuit, referring all
inquiries back to the H.U.D. secretary, amid signs the story would not pose a
s e r io u s p r o b le m for th e a d m in istr a tio n (W o o d & M artin, 1994). A

H.U.D.

spokesman, Mike Siegel, asked that any additional questions be directed to
Cisneros' attorney, Seagal Wheatley of San Antonio (Wood & Martin, 1994).
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W heatley was on an extended weekend in the Hill Country, and when
contacted, said that he had not yet seen the case; he did say, "There was no
inkling of it, because there was nothing to it" (Wood & Martin, 1994, p. 6-A).
Various pundits discussed the im pact that a suit m ight have on the
Clinton administration. The longer it lasted, the more it m ight distract the
administration, the personal nature of the situation may result in the scandal
not having great strength, and the legal actions could have an impact,
depending upon Cisneros' performance in office.
While noting that television and new sprint carried the suit widely,
W ood and Martin (1994) suggested that the m ost damage in the future to
Cisneros might be the impact of tabloid television, which m ight be inclined to
feature interviews with Linda Medlar.
In Lubbock, Linda Medlar refused to talk to the press (Anderson, 1994),
and in San Antonio, Elvira refused to talk to the press until after speaking w ith
her son (Pisano & Thomas, 1994). But other members of the family protested the
invasion of Cisneros's privacy, as well as the legally frivolous nature of the case
(Pisano & Thomas, 1994).
In the pre-trial period, both sides expressed confidence, the possibility of
an out-of-court settlement, and an interest in bringing the case to a resolution
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quickly, thereby limiting additional damage to the parties (Anderson, 1994). In
a response to the suit filed by Medlar, Cisneros' attorney, Seagal Wheatley,
declared that the claims were w ithout merit and should be dismissed (Wood,
"Cisneros sees no obligation," 1994). Wheatley asked that the deposition of
Medlar be taken in San Antonio (Wood, 1994). H e also requested a list of people
from M edlar w ith whom she had discussions about the affair and of employers
who said she w as unemployable because of the bad publicity related to the
sexual indiscretions (Wood, 1994). Two other items of note, according to the
W ood's report, are Cisneros' July 1993 claim that he had told her he could no
longer respond to her financial dem ands and that she had also been talking
with the press during the affair, thus immunizing him against claims that he
had destroyed her reputation (Wood, 1994).
Twenty-first century technology and tabloid television offer avenues for
"messengers" like Mrs. Calhoun and her like that they could only dream of
when attem pting to smear M argaret Eaton almost 180 years ago. W ith such a
splashy story in hand, Inside Edition could not help but handsom ely rew ard
Linda M edlar w ith a $15,000 paycheck (Jakle, O ctober 27, 1994) and pre-airtime

hype for their interview, which prom ised to bring dow n a member of the
president's Cabinet. From the tape recorder and the m outh of Linda Medlar, the
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story of adultery, lying to the F.B.I. and cash pay-offs went straight into the ears
of millions of Americans, congressmen, executive departm ents and the
president (Jakle, October 2 7 ,1994).14 The interview, which aired on September
12,1994, included details about the destruction of M edlar's professional life,
proof of large check remittances to Medlar from Cisneros as a result of their
$4,000 a m onth support paym ent agreement, and accusations of lies by the
secretary to the F.B.I. during the pre-confirmation background investigation (B.
Davidson, September 13,1994; Jakle, October 27,1994). While professions of
love were made between the Linda and Flenry as late as December of 1993, no
m utual affection still existed, and Henry expressed renewed affection for his
wife and children (Jakle, October 27,1994).
Appearing on the same show with Medlar was Cisneros' attorney,
Seagal Wheatley, who was asked about the relationship betw een Medlar and
Cisneros, the support payments, and the end of their relationship (Jakle,
September 10,1994). While noting that the relationship betw een Mary Alice and

14 Newspapers such as the New York Times and San Antonio Express News
received manuscripts of tape recordings on the day of the Inside Edition broadcast,
aiding the nature of the reporting on the transcripts and the interview (Hendricks;
DeParle, 1994).
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Henry had been strengthened by the controversy, the possibilities for a
settlement between Cisneros and M edlar had been diminished by this public
embarrassment (Jakle, September 10,1994). Cisneros did not appear on the
same show because he felt that the charges were old news, and the tapes would
contain "soap opera" issues (Jakle, September 20,1994, p. 20-G).
Reactions to M edlar's revelations varied at the national and local level.
David Hill, consultant to Republican Party clients nationwide, expected that the
revelations w ould impair Cisneros' political career for 10 years. Political
consultant George Shipley, a friend of Cisneros, predicted little damage from
the press coverage. "There are no new facts here," he said. "This has long been
a closed chapter in H enry's life. H e has successfully reconciled w ith his wife,
and his m arriage will stand through this incident" (Hendricks, September 13,
1994, p. 5-A). Local responses included superficial advice to Medlar about
avoiding close-up camera shots or the more sage suggestion to move on with
her life rather than wallowing in her loss (Jakle, September 13,1994b).
W hen notified of the interview and its contents, Cisneros agreed to be
interviewed insisting that he had been "forthright" with the F.B.I., and that
Medlar was motivated by money and an interest in destroying him and his
career, noting that taped conversations m ust be taken w ith a "grain of salt"
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(Jakle, September 13,1994a, p. 4-A). In subsequent statements to the press,
Cisneros apologized for w hat he referred to as "foolish talk" (regarding the
president and others) (DeParle, 1994), and stated that "I generally try to be
respectful and generous in m y comments" ("Cisneros Apologizes for Taped
Comments," 1994, p. 1-A). Cisneros stated that he had been
forthright w ith all persons at every step of the process. If there are any
discrepancies on specific numbers, it is a result of several things. One, I
w as operating from memory; I kept no records; and I assisted her when
she asked for it, and that was an irregular pattern over the years.
("Cisneros Apologizes, " 1994, p. 4-A)
In regard to payments m ade to Linda Medlar in 1993, Cisneros identified those
am ounts as part of a final settlement (DeParle, 1994).
Communications between the White House and Cisneros and
deliberations within the White House assured Cisneros' standing. Cisneros'
lawyer, Seagal Wheatley, apprised a White House deputy counsel of the facts of
the case on the day after the airing of the Inside Edition story (Martin,
September 14,1994). In an October 7 press conference, President Clinton
voiced strong support for embattled Housing and U rban Development
Secretary H enry Cisneros, saying the former San Antonio mayor has
b e e n " p a in fu lly forthright" in h is d is c lo s u r e o f p a y m e n ts to a former
mistress. Clinton said the controversy had not underm ined his
effectiveness . . . and would not disqualify him to serve in the Cabinet.
"He is doing the job that I hired him to do for the American people," he
said. "As long as he is doing that job at a high level, he should be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

225
allowed to continue to do i t . . . . We knew w hat the facts were at the
t im e /'. . . and White House personnel reviewed the situation "and
decided there was nothing illegal or inappropriate about w hat w as done
by Secretary Cisneros—something that was fully known by his family."
(Martin, October 8,1994, p. 1-A)
Later in the press conference, President Clinton expressed further support for
Cisneros: "(Cisneros is) an extraordinary H.U.D. secretary. He has proposed
initiatives heretofore unseen to house the homeless, to empower people stuck in
these public housing projects, to sweep the projects of weapons and drugs"
(Martin, October 8,1994, p. 7-A).
A September 22,1994 New York Times article reported Senator Alfonse
D'Amato, R-N.Y., ranking Republican on the Banking Committee, stating "This
is a personal matter. I do not believe that this in any way reflects upon the
secretary's performance" (DeParle, 1994, p. 18-A).
In September of 1994 Attorney General Reno "began an inquiry to decide
whether to commence a preliminary inquiry into Linda M edlar's accusations
that Cisneros had m ade false statements to the F.B.I." (Barrett, 1997, p. III-l). At
a weekly news conference held on September 22, Reno, when asked if the
Cisneros case w as being examined, could n o t comm ent. Later that day, a press

release stated, "The Justice Departm ent has received information relating to a
material that was broadcast on the television show Inside Edition about
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Secretary Cisneros and is proceeding as the law provides" (Johnston, 1994, p.
22-A).

According to the Independent Counsel Act of 1988, which has its roots in
the 1978 Ethics in Government Act, the attorney general w ould have to follow
certain steps after the Linda Medlar accusations on Inside Edition were aired if
the alleged infraction "violated any federal criminal law other than a violation
classified as a class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction" (Barrett, 1997, p. III-l).
Under the law, an attorney general has 30 days to determine w hether the
information is specifically credible to warrant a preliminary investigation
(Barrett, 1997; Johnston, 1994). The preliminary investigation m ay last for 90
days and if, by the end of that period, there is a determination m ade that
grounds exist to continue the investigation a request to appoint an independent
counsel m ay be m ade (Barrett, 1997, p. III-l).
"People who have followed the review, which is just getting under way,
said Federal authorities had obtained m ost or all of the tapes from Ms. Medlar's
lawyers and would interview Ms. Medlar as part of their inquiry" (Johnston,
1994, p. 22-A).

In examining w hether Mr. Cisneros broke any laws, investigators are
likely to compare Mr. Cisneros's comments on the tapes w ith other
statements m ade at time of his appointm ent about the paym ents to Ms.
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Medlar, which totaled m ore than $40,000 a y e a r.. . . It can be a crime to
willfully lie to federal agents. (Johnston, 1994, p. 22-A)
On October 14, a preliminary investigation was opened into Medlar's
accusations.
As m ight be expected, the m ore "famous" documents might m ake their
way into the press, particularly if there is a civil suit being fought. In October,
news of Cisneros' establishment of a bank account in Washington after his
confirmation by the Senate for the express use of Linda Medlar to w ithdraw
funds was publicized, thus raising new issues (Hendricks, October 7,1994).
While the attorney general's office was conducting an inquiry and then
preliminary investigation, Cisneros' and Medlar's attorneys were skirmishing
in public, during depositions and in the Lubbock court. Portions of the
depositions reported by Hendricks (April 2,1995) have dem onstrated the
necessary elements to proving a contract, or a breach thereof. In a September 27,
1994 session with Medlar being deposed, Wheatley asked:
"My question is very specific, I want to know if you ever told Mr.
Cisneros you were going to file a lawsuit or make a claim against him for
m onetary as a result of the (newspaper) article (that m ade the affair
public) and you n e v e r did do that, did you?"
Medlar responded, "I remember speaking to him about it. I don't recall."
W heatley responded, "Could you answer the question?"
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Medlar attorney Bruce Magness interrupted, "Just let her explain."
Wheatley, "It ain't hard."
Medlar, "No."
Magness, "Let her talk."
Meldar, "I don't recall if I said I'm going to sue you, Henry, or if I told
him I was seeking out legal counsel as to what best to do about it."
(Hendricks, April 2,1995, p. 26-A)

M edlar claimed in her current suit that Cisneros promised to pay her $4,000 per
m onth and she agreed to not file suit against him, which Cisneros and
W heatley "branded as patently false." (Hendricks, April 2,1995, p. 26-A). In an
October 14th deposition, Cisneros was asked about his recollection regarding
M edlar's visit to Attorney Maloney's office, to which he replied she stopped
that legal action "on her own" (Hendricks, April 2, 1995, p. 26-A).
In w hat seemed to be contradictory transcripts released in December of
that year, "Cisneros is quoted in the deposition: 'I can tell you categorically that
I did not agree to pay $4000 a month at that time or any other tim e,"'
(Hendricks, 1995, p. 4-A) In a transcript released later that m onth,
Cisneros seems to acknowledge a regular paym ent schedule of $4000,
"Do you understand that I've got make about $70,000 a year just to give
you w hat I give you per month? . .. Linda, four times 12 is 48. With
taxes, what do you have to make after taxes to clear 48, which I give you?
You know, about 70, maybe 80 to make 48." ("Cisneros Seeks to Block
Medlar Tapes," 1994, p. 23-A)
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In an effort to rebut claims by Cisneros that Linda had told people about their
affair thereby ruining her career, Attorney Magness asked Secretary Cisneros
who were the individuals that Ms. Medlar had told; Cisneros responded with
two individuals—Paul Thompson, a columnist for the San Antonio ExpressNews, and Arturo Sanchez, a part-time worker in the Cisneros campaign and a
member of the city planning commission.
In public, Cisneros' attorney called into question the authenticity of the
Medlar transcripts—stating that Medlar was being asked to interpret w hat was
being said on the tapes four years after a conversation m ight have happed.
("Accuracy of Medlar Transcript Attacked," 1994). As to the merits of the
lawsuit, Wheatley's argument focused around the fact that Texas law required
that a multi-year contract needed to be in writing, and M edlar did not possess
such a document; whereas M edlar's attorney Bruce Magness insisted that the
legal system is always based on the memories of the individuals involved, and
seemed intent on making it plain at trial the promises m ade by Cisneros and the
damage inflicted by Cisneros' misbehavior toward Ms. M edlar (Hendricks,
October 18,1994).
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Malkowski (1994) reported a variety of opinions from the Texas legal
community, including the fact that (a) there is little case law on the topic—most
are resolved out of court; (b) Cisneros had "entered into performance on this
alleged contract. . . but it all depends on w hat the facts turn out to be," i.e., how
long Cisneros prom ised to make the payments; and (c) regarding Cisneros'
responsibility for the destruction of Linda M edlar's reputation, a person who
chooses to have an affair w ith a public figure takes a chance (p. 6-A).
During the discovery phase in October, Medlar's attorneys asked for
documents such as phone records, flight records, credit card statements,
government documents, etc., most of which the opposing counsel said were
unreasonable ("Cisneros Attorneys Battle Medlar Request for Records," 1994).
Pre-trial motions and hearings included probably the m ost significant
motion by Cisneros' attorneys to remove the conversations as evidence
(Cisneros Seeks to Block Medlar Tapes," 1994). On December 17,1994 Wheatley
and Magness argued the case before District Judge Blair Cherry w ho would
determine whether the case went before a jury. Medlar's attorney, Floyd
H older, argued that Linda d id not waive her right to privacy because of their

affair—the destruction of her reputation came at the hands of Cisneros, and
both counsels argued over the existence of a contract, Holder arguing that the
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telephone conversations were the same as a written contract (Hendricks,
December 17,1994).
On October 11,1994 Lauch Faircloth (R-GA) requested, in-light of the
allegations, a copy of the F.B.I. report because he was concerned about
statements by Cisneros (Barrett, 1997).
In December 1994 Senator Alphonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.), in response to a
request from Cisneros' attorney, w rote a letter stating that the am ount of
Cisneros' paym ents would not have changed the senator's vote for
confirmation (Barrett, 1997). Later, D'Amato stated that a vote to confirm
Cisneros w ould have been endangered if members of the committee had been
aware of the calculated efforts to hide the December 1992 payments to M edlar
(Barrett, 1997).
On February 3, Judge Cherry declined to dismiss the case, ruling that a
jury should decide it. He m ade the decision again on April 18 when he ruled:
the court is not perm itted to act as a fact-finder.. . . A case can be
dismissed only when m aterial facts are not in d isp u te.. . . There are
genuine issues of material facts at stake in M edlar's lawsuit. ("Judge
W on't Dismiss Suit Against Cisneros," 1995, p. 9-B)
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By the time the judge had ruled on whether the case could go before a jury,15
Attorney General Janet Reno had already proceeded with a request for an
Independent Counsel on March 13.
H enry Cisneros had been optimistic about the chances of not having a
counsel appointed. In m id February, 1995, the secretary appeared before the
National Press Club to discuss the investigation of his statements to the F.B.I.
regarding paym ents to Linda Medlar, and the Republican congressional attacks
on H.U.D. and its programming. Reiterating m any of his previous statements,
Cisneros said:
I'm confident that a special prosecutor will not be necessary in this case.
W e've been completely forthcoming w ith the investigation, and I fully
expect that they will conclude that there was no wrong doing. But no

15 Advising his client to make a bargain with Cisneros because her chances
were not very good with a jury, Floyd Holder explained that he "feared female jurors
w ouldn't look favorably on Medlar's claims. 'The double standard still exists___
Women can forgive any man, except for their own husband'" (Hendricks, March 29,
1995, p. 7-A). As a result of the settlement, both parties agreed to not speak to reporters
about the details of their relationship, not profit in the marketplace as a result of their
affair, and "not make 'disparing remarks' about each other without being prevented
from answering questions 'compelled or required by an appropriate agency"'
(Hendricks, May 20,1995). Henry Cisneros agreed to pay Medlar and her lawyers
$49,000 with the stipulation that he was not obligated legally to do so. Linda Medlar
agreed to dismiss her $256,000 legal claim, "concede claims in the lawsuit were
'doubtful' and in serious dispute," (Hendricks, May 20,1995, p.l-A), and talk with
Secretary Cisneros' Washington D.C. attorney, Cono Namorato. (Hendricks, May 20,
1995).
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m atter w hat the outcome of that decision of the Justice Department, it is
my intent to continue to serve as secretary. (Martin, February 15,1995,
p. 7-A)
Cisneros, who had been attempting to reform H.U.D. program m ing and
streamline its administration, argued that the Republican Congress w ould be
abandoning the country's commitment to its cities if H.U.D. were abolished
(Martin, February 15,1995; Tumiel, 1995).
In spite of efforts by President Clinton, Senator D'Amato (R-N.Y.), and
another senator (Jones, 1998), Janet Reno did not concur, and Judge Sentelle's
panel appointed David Barrett in May of 1995 (Clinton, 2004). The inner
workings of the executive branch are a bit m urky prior to the attorney general's
decision. According to Martin (1995),
Sources confirmed that the Justice Departm ent w as prepared in January
to recommend the case against Cisneros be dismissed because the false
statements would not have derailed his confirmation from a Democratcontrolled Senate. The Justice Department, however, sought a 60-day
extension after the F.B.I. objected, arguing that lying during the vetting
process circumvented the process to determine w hether a nominee is fit
to serve in public office, sources close to the case said. Justice lawyers
and the F.B.I. also were concerned about tape-recorded statements
Cisneros (sic) that suggest he "coached" Medlar about what to tell
agents, (p. 4-A)
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The independent counsel's report corroborates the positions of the Department
of Justice's Public Integrity Section advice, as well as other senior Department
of Justice staff who had opposed the request for an independent counsel.
Was it director Louis Freeh or a subordinate within the bureau that
refused to "sign-off" on the final disposition of the case—is there a bureaucratic
or legal requirement? Was it a possible embarrassment for the D epartm ent of
Justice if the F.B.I. disagreed w ith the final disposition, thereby causing the
Justice Department to change its position? Besides the legal argum ent that a
person should not lie to an agent, what else motivated the bureau? Was the 60day extension necessary to continue negotiations with the F.B.I. to reduce the
scope of the investigation of Cisneros? Interestingly, the justification for not
seeking an independent counsel was not that the lies did not indicate an issue
of trustworthiness, but rather that a Democratic Congress w ould have argued
that it was a personal issue and people tell partial truths about personal things,
therefore they w ould have confirmed Cisneros.
According to Thomas and Gugliotta (1995), a vigorous debate occurred
w ith in th e C lin to n A d m in istr a tio n :

members of the FBI wanted Cisneros to be prosecuted for any
deception which broke federal law,
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•

members of the D.O.J. argued that the lies were not criminal because
they were not relevant to Clinton's decision to include him in the
Cabinet or the upper house's vote to confirm him, and

•

others asked whether "such a narrow issue warranted an
independent counsel."

Attorney General Reno was uncertain about her decision and reportedly
deliberated w ith departm ent officials up until the deadline (Thomas &
Gugliotta, 1995).
On March 13,1995 Attorney General Reno applied to United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Division for the Purpose
of Appointing Independent Counsels, for the appointm ent of a special
prosecutor. Reno based her decision to proceed with the request on the
preliminary investigation findings that Cisneros made false statements to the
F.B.I. regarding payments to Medlar. While the false statements may not have
been im portant to confirmation in the Senate, the question to the attorney
general was whether these false statements were material to Cisneros' work,
and whether he and Medlar had conspired to lie to the F.B.I. The attorney
general concluded that there were no findings to support income tax or gift tax
violations, and that there were no findings to support a charge that the acts of a
businessman were connected to an "official" act of Cisneros.
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The court of appeals panel of justices appointed David M. Barrett as
Independent Counsel and gave him
[Fjull power, independent authority and jurisdiction to investigate to the
m aximum extent authorized by the Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1994, whether H enry G. Cisneros, secretary of
housing and urban development, comm itted a violation of any federal
criminal law . . . by making false statements with respect to his past
paym ents to Linda Medlar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation during
the course of his background check conspiring with others to do so.
[[jurisdiction and authority to investigate other related allegations or
evidence of violations of federal criminal law . . . by any organization or
individuals as necessary to resolve the m atter described above.
[Jjurisdiction and authority to investigate violation of 28 U.S.C.1826, or
any obstruction of the due administration of justice, or any material false
statement or testimony in violation of federal criminal law, in connection
w ith or arising out of the investigation of the matters described above.
[Jjurisdiction and authority to seek indictments and to prosecute any
persons or entitities involved in any of the matters described above, who
are reasonably believed to have committed a violation of any federal
criminal law, arising out of such matters, including person or entities
who have engaged in unlawful conspiracy or who have aided or abetted
any federal offense. (Barrett, 1997, pp. III-3, III-4).

Phase 3: Explanation and Investigation

After a secretary or under-secretary's explanation of events, an acquittal,
resignation, or cover-up m ay occur with the approval of the senior executive
involved. News of the decision m ay be transm itted to any of the other
institutional actors, and result in inaction, an investigation, or transmission to
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others or the press. Competing actors m ay force another investigation and/or
plead their case w ith the president for the resignation of the offender. Choosing
to cover-up or deny the results, the president may face a resulting release of the
story to the press and public. In the next phase, the president deals with the
impact of the denial or cover-up.
On March 14,1995, after offering his resignation to President Clinton,
Henry Cisneros stepped before reporters with his wife M ary Alice at his side,
and stated, "My decision is to stay and fight for the departm ent" (Martin,
March 15,1995, p. 1-A). Expressing disappointm ent over the decision to
appoint an independent counsel, Cisneros noted that the appointm ent was not
synonymous w ith a "finding of wrongdoing" (Martin, March 15,1995, p. 4-A).
"I am hopeful that the investigation will be completed expeditiously, and I am
confident the independent counsel16 will conclude that I did not engage in
criminal wrongdoing . .." (Martin, M arch 15,1995, p. 4-A).
In a statement, Clinton said, "Secretary Cisneros is a good m an and an
effective public servant. He says he regrets any mistakes he has made. So
do I. But that does not outweigh the excellent work he has been doing,

16 A Washington lobbyist and Republican fundraiser, David Barrett, was aided
by approximately five attorneys, support staff and a contingent of six full-time agents
dedicated to the case by the F.B.I. (Jones, 1998).
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and will do as secretary of housing and urban development. I look
forw ard to his continued valuable service." (Martin, March 15,1995,
p. 4-A)
After the appointm ent of an independent counsel, Cisneros considered
quitting, but rejected the idea after consulting w ith his staff. Gisneros reported
that his continued efforts were bolstered by the president's example of always
rededicating oneself to a cause, even after setbacks, and belief that God helps us
to use our gifts in times of trouble (Cisneros, 2004). Cisneros' situation was not
aided by M edlar's handing over of the redacted tapes to the F.B.I. and I.R.S. on
May 31,1995.
On October 31,1995, a federal grand jury was empanelled to determine
whether Henry Cisneros "committed violations of federal law by making, or
conspiring with others to make, false statements to the F.B.I. during the course
of its background investigation of him" (U.S. v. Cisneros, 26 F. Supp.2d 24, slip
op. 7 (D.D.C. 1998).
Lubbock lawyer, Floyd Holder, complained that the inclusion of his
client, Linda Medlar, as a co-conspirator in the Cisneros case w as an effort by
th e C lin to n a d m in istra tio n to b la m e th e v ic tim (M artin, M arch 15, 1995).

Independent Counsel Barrett identified Linda Medlar as the key w itness against
Cisneros, and in November of 1995, she was notified of her "target" status in
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the ongoing investigation and offered full immunity in exchange for full
cooperation (Jones, 1998). Medlar quickly agreed and signed a document that
m ade it "clear that she was required to answer all questions concerning the
subject matter of the investigation truthfully, fully and completely, could not
w ithhold any information . . . " (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-181).
According to Jones (1998), the F.B.I. placed a call tracer on M edlar's
phone "shortly after she was given immunity, to see if there were people
'reaching out' to her and to test her honesty" (p. 16). Linda M edlar's
truthfulness came into question over a num ber of issues, such as how long and
w hen she had spoken with Shirl Thomas, an aid to Cisneros, or large issues like
the representation to the I.R.S. that the tapes of her conversations with Cisneros
were the originals (Jones, 1998). Efforts at gaining the necessary information for
the investigation were ham pered by Linda's unwillingness to make
appointm ents with agents or by her breaking off relations w ith the counsel's
office for an extended period of time (Barrett, 1997). While providing im portant
information like Cisneros' provision of a $16,000 down paym ent on her home,
in April of 1996 Linda Medlar
•

stated that the tapes, which were given to the I.R.S. in 1995, w ere the
originals. (F.B.I. experts were able to prove that this was not true);
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denied having knowledge of what "could affect the validity of the
tapes of her conversations with Cisneros";
•

explained that the recorders used to m ake the tapes had been
misplaced in-transit during a move; a subsequent questioning of
moving staff proved that she had tried to persuade them to tell the
same story and a search of her property turned up the missing
recorders (the O.I.C. needed the original recorders in order to prove
the validity of the tapes; and
maintained that "all relevant records" were in the custody of the
O.I.C., which the independent counsel subsequently disproved
during the execution of a search of M edlar's property. (Barrett, 1997,
pp. IV-182,183)

These statem ents to the F.B.I. and preceding representations to the I.R.S.
regarding the authenticity of tapes that she had given them were lies about
essential elements of the investigation.
Subpoenaed in September of 1996 to appear before a W ashington grand
jury, M edlar, with counsel present, was questioned once again about her
previous statements at the offices of the W ashington O.I.C. on September 17
(Barrett, 1997; "F.B.I. Agents Take a Load of Cartons from Medlar Home,"
1996). She restated her assertion that the copies were the originals and was then
asked to allow the F.B.I., to search her home to which she consented (Barrett,
1997). The following is a description of w hat happened next, according to the
OIC:
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However, just before the search began, the press arrived at the home,
tipped off by a neighbor who had identified the F.B.I. agents waiting to
conduct the search. Medlar learned from a phone call w ith her mother
about the presence of the press. The OIC had not contacted the press,
and had no advance knowledge of their presence; however, Medlar
accused the FBI of leaking information about the search, and Medlar and
her attorney left the meeting. The agents proceeded w ith the search by
executing a search warrant that they had previously obtained in case she
did not consent to the search. After that, Medlar ceased cooperating w ith
the OIC. (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-184)
Neighbors identified cars that had been parked on the street for several
days as vehicles that carried some of the individuals that had removed cartons
from the home and shed ("FBI Agents," 1996). Found in the search was the
audio equipment used to record conversations with Cisneros, financial
documents such as bank statements, deposit slips, etc., and transcripts and
notes of their audio conversations (Barrett, 1997).
After attem pting—with no success—to reestablish communications w ith
Linda Medlar through her counsel, the O.I.C. in November 1996 notified Ms.
Medlar that she no longer enjoyed her grant of imm unity and it could use her
statements for prosecutorial purposes. Marshalling evidence related to the
Cisneros investigation and the material discovered about her acquisition of a
hom e w ith the assistance of Mr. and Mrs. Wooten, the O.I.C. brought an
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indictment against Linda Medlar, and Patsy and Allen Wooten on September
12, 1997 in Lubbock Federal District Court.
On November 21,1996, H enry Cisneros' announced his resignation; his
last day w ould be on January 19,1997. According to the O.I.C.'s final report,
Cisneros' resignation letter to the newly re-elected President Clinton contained
the following passage: "Though I would like to help build on the progress we
have m ade . . . , I have concluded that I cannot ask to be considered for service
in the next four years" (Barrett, 1997, p. IV-180). In a 2003 article in the Texas
Monthly magazine authored by Cisneros, he expanded on his explanation by

stating that legal issues needed to be addressed (Cisneros, 2004).
On September 12,1997, Linda Medlar and the Wootens were indicted by
the O.I.C. for obstruction of justice, money laundering, bank fraud, among
other charges. Pleading guilty to money laundering, concealment of facts and
several other charges, Medlar started a 42-month prison term on April 15,1998.
While the Wootens had agreed to cooperate with the O.I.C., M edlar refused. In
March 1999, Medlar decided to cooperate with Barrett's office in exchange for a
reduced sentence and the dismissal of charges in W ashington where she had
been indicted w ith Secretary H enry Cisneros, Sylvia Arce-Garcia, and John
Rosales on December 11,1997 for conspiracy, false statements, etc., in a
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W ashington, D.C. district court. With the inclusion of the tapes as evidence, the
proof of Medlar's m ental stability and a willingness of the independent counsel
to proceed with the case, the opposing counsels struck a plea-bargain resulting
in Cisneros' admission of guilt that resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for
lying to the F.B.I.
Before Judge Sporkin, Cisneros adm itted that he had understated his
support payments to his ex-lover because he did not want to embarrass the
parties involved and because the exact num bers were not available when filling
out the federal background paperwork. In comments to Burka (1999), Cisneros
thought he w ould have been exonerated in court, either by jury or in an
appeal. . . . But the decision to plead guilty to a m isdem eanor was a nobrainer. It allowed him to avoid the prohibitive cost of a trial. . . and also
to spare his family the anguish of seeing his affair w ith Medlar . ..
dragged through the media yet again, (p. 115)
After the two and one-half years, May 1995 until December 1997,
investigation resulting in the guilty plea, Special Prosecutor David Barrett
sought to expand the scope of his Cisneros investigation based on the suspicion
of multi-year tax code violations. Attorney General Reno agreed to expand the
in v e s tig a tio n to o n ly o n e m o re tax y ea r r e su ltin g in n o a d d itio n a l ch a rg es

against Cisneros. Suspecting efforts by members of Clinton administration to
thw art the multi-year tax evasion investigation, Barrett's office unsuccessfully
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sought to expand its investigation to alleged administrative malfeasance.
Barrett's final report was released to the public in early 2006, eight years after
Cisneros guilty plea.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS
Does the Cisneros/Medlar affair "fit" the phases of sex scandal? Henry

Cisneros and Linda M edlar's sexual indiscretion and subsequent problems of
■f

lying to the F.B.I. conform to the broad outlines of the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet
level sex scandal posited in Chapter II.
Phase 1: Mayor Henry Cisneros and fundraiser Mrs. Linda Medlar
engaged in sexually indiscrete behavior that was eventually exposed in the
press. The adulterers adm itted to their inappropriate behavior. After Medlar
was divorced, Cisneros returned to his wife, but agreed to financially support
Linda. When Cisneros was considered and nominated for the federal Cabinet
position of Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, he lied to the F.B.I.,
and the Clinton-Gore transition team about the level of support that he had
given to Medlar and w hat he would give to her in the future. H ad the behaviors
of Frank Wing, Morris Jaffe, or Linda M edlar and her cohort been discovered
the scandal could have been hurried along. Henry failed to meet his financial
obligation to Linda in February 1994 and subsequent months.

245
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Phase 2 began to unfold w hen Ms. Medlar sued Cisneros for breach of
contract in July 1994. She alleged that Henry was not making his $4,000 a m onth
support payments. On September 12,1994, Linda Medlar appeared on Inside
Edition w ith copies of checks and tape recordings. The $4,000 remittances were

from Henry Cisneros to her and the voices on the tapes were of the principals
discussing the terms of their financial agreement. Under the Ethics in
Government Act and Independent Counsel Act of 1988, Attorney General Janet
Reno was required to begin an inquiry into the allegations and, if necessary,
conduct an investigation to determine whether an independent counsel should
be appointed. Secretary Cisneros' attorney briefed the White House's counsel.
President Clinton praised the work of his H.U.D. secretary as well as his
forthrightness on the issue of paym ents to Medlar. Cisneros refused to step
down, stating that his "num bers" m ay have been a little inaccurate. After the
F.B.I. and staff within the Justice Department differed over the need to ask for
an independent counsel, Attorney General Reno asked that a panel of judges of
the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia appoint a counsel. In
M arch 1995 A tto r n e y G en eral fo u n d th at H e n r y C isn e r o s h a d lie d to th e F.B.I.,

and determ ined that an independent counsel was needed to determine whether
these false statements were "material" to his work.
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Phase 3: Secretary Cisneros insisted that he would be vindicated,
President Clinton insisted that he stay at his post, and David Barrett, the
independent counsel, began his work. After granting Linda Medlar full
im m unity from prosecution in November 1995 and failing to gain Linda
M edlar's complete cooperation during the construction of his case against
Secretary Cisneros, David Barrett revoked her grant of im m unity from
prosecution, indicting her for lying to the F.B.I. and the I.R.S., and a num ber of
other infractions in November 1997. Ten months earlier Secretary Cisneros left
office—he had subm itted his letter of resignation a few days after campaigning
for President Clinton's successful re-election.
While the Cisneros/Medlar affair and the subsequent related
investigation and prosecution for related behavior conforms to essential
elements of the scandal literature, i.e., Lowi, Sherman, Williams, et al., certain
aspects of the scandal support a modification of the author's phases and
introduce variations to some of the existing variables.
Adm itting to accusation o f sexual indiscretion? Five years before Mayor
H e n r y C isn e r o s

adm itted his extra-marital affair to a national audience, he had

begun cultivating a relationship with Governor William Jefferson Clinton of
Arkansas. He introduced Governor Clinton at a number of conventions in San
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Antonio, and the two politicians m ost likely "kept an eye" on the progress of
each other, each working for his ow n political base and reaching out to the
federal governm ent when the need be. While controlling the San Antonio press
so that he could still be an effective mayor, H enry Cisneros used a nationally
televised program to "immunize" himself before he even was appointed HUD
secretary. Attentive to the confession, Clinton, among other less than sexually
discrete executives, m ust have adm ired the politically savvy move of Cisneros,
as well as his attem pts to rebuild a city.
In a self-described miserable marriage, Cisneros had multiple
extramarital affairs until finally meeting his muse. Inspired to consider divorce,
Cisneros w ould not have been unusual except for the fact that he was a
politician w ho then held off-the-record conversations about his marriage.
Eventually, the media turned on Mayor Cisneros who had allowed the press
into his home, and he confessed in public, on-the-record. Henry considered
"giving up" John Paul, the son he always wanted, but his Catholic conscience,
an accessible girlfriend, and the political price of divorce m ade him reconsider.
H o w e v e r , th e h id d e n p rice

of d e str o y in g L in d a M e d la r 's fundraising business

because of his public admission of love would haunt him. Cisneros w as a
gifted, ambitious, retired mayor no longer in the public eye, planning to make
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enough money to pay for his son's surgeries, support his lover and ex-wife with
the dream of national service one day.
What was the role of historical precedent that resulted in the development of
executive order (10450) and a zealous investigatory agency to prevent sex scandals?

The variable not specifically discussed in the social mores, but somewhat
related are the events that shape public policy, particularly in this case is the
influence of the Cold War on the executive, which resulted in the screening
procedures of incoming executives by the incumbent adm inistration—President
Eisenhower's Executive Order 10450. Background checks (by J. Edgar Hoover's
agents) to ensure high moral character and to avoid problems w ith communists
or homosexuals infiltrating the State Department, etc., set a questionable
administrative precedent. An unwillingness to modify or reverse this executive
order has resulted in a distortion of the decision-making of a president-elect
and reasonable transition team leaders, and provide perhaps a too heavy
penalty. Allison and Halperin (1972), Williams (1998), and Clifford's (1990)
characterization of institutional competition—exemplified by the F.B.I., the
D e p a r tm e n t

of Justice, and political appointees' debate over Cisneros'

m isstatements—was set in motion by Eisenhower's Executive O rder 10450.
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How does the Cisneros/Medlar affair impact the thinking of Neustadt and
anyone else concerned about its practical implications? Once an attorney general

receives credible evidence, the m om entum that speeds along the scandal
process has truly begun. Perhaps a more practical avenue for such cases m ay be
an alternative, reform route. At the more practical level, the Cisneros case
appears to raise questions about the vetting process and background checks:
1. Can a well-designed process for checking perspective nominees be
ham pered by the F.B.I., the D.O.J.P.S.O., the transition team or the
nominee? Any of these entities may fail to carryout their jobs correctly
or bow to undue political pressures. Why should a president-elect be
prevented from making his/her own choice, barring a serious breach
of the public trust or felony conviction, of a nominee?
2. What is a proportionate response to sexual scandal related
infractions? If there are issues in a Cabinet officer's past or present—
as long as the event is not of a heinous n ature—should not we allow
public opinion, the Congress through its oversight, censure or
im p e a c h m e n t p o w e r s , or th e civ il co u r ts to fu n c tio n

thereby sorting

out the issues, rather than entrusting discretion to an independent
counsel.
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What determines the role of an independent counsel? M entioned in the

literature by Garment (1991) and Fisher (1999) is the role of the independent
counsel over the last 30 years that slips into the third phase investigation path,
but w ith the Cisneros case, among m any other independent counsel cases, there
appears to be the need for adding variables to the overall model. The specific
variables to be added w ould be "court" and "characteristics" that choose the
"independent counsel," and the variables to describe this individual w ould be
"characteristics" and "scope/time of investigation." If a court is necessary to
choose and oversee the independent counsel, w hat is its judicial temperament,
dom inated by liberals or conservatives? Likewise, what are the background
characteristics of the attorney chosen? Is he/she a federal prosecutor and w hat
president chose them, etc.? What is the scope of their
investigative/prosecutorial mission?
Since debate is common over the prosecution, or lack thereof, of sexual
im propriety and attendant factors in pre-existing law enforcement, and
prosecutorial agencies like the D.O.J., perhaps the least examined dynamic may
be that of the decision m aking and consensus (or not) building w ithin an
independent counsel's organization. W hat latitude does an independent
counsel have? For example, the independent counsel focused on the way in
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which Cisneros' misstatements impacted the functioning of the F.B.I., the
Departm ent of Justice and the U.S. Senate in the confirmation process, rather
than the overall impact of the misrepresentations. Each of these characteristics
m ay make a difference regarding the speed and outcome of the scandal process.
How does the Cisneros-Medlar affair impact the basic proposition by Lowi o f a
scandal model within the realm of government? The establishment of the

independent counsel act has "fixed" the marketplace, at least in a scandal's
early stage of exposure. If the allegations are credible to television or to the
media marketplace in general, then the political m arketplace is forced to
respond to the issue. Since tapes of lovers and copies of support checks will be
for sale, sex scandals will be Federal Expressed into the scandal marketplace
regardless of the demand. The act removed the discretionary powers of the
attorney general, as well as the ability of the ruling party or sitting president to
"drag his (her) feet" (for good or for bad) on the investigation.
What was the public effort by the president to protect his appointee? Unlike his

handling of the Monica Lewinsky scandal, President Clinton (and A ndrew
Jackson) u s e d th e crisis m a n a g e m e n t a p p ro a ch to th e

Cisneros case. H e quickly

stated the facts as he knew them, endorsed the good work of Henry and asked
the Secretary to go back to work at H.U.D. Likewise, Cisneros, other than his
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statement that he had not been paying Linda after he assum ed office, was
forthright about his affair and the financial support (give or take a lot of money
in this case) and w anted to go back to work.
What was the basis for Clinton's support for Cisneros? Besides knowledge

about polling data, w ith regard to the American public's attitude about sexual
indiscretion and the private lives of their officials, President Clinton stated that
an affair was unrelated to the work of his secretary, and his legal opinion was
that the lies about Cisneros' under-paym ents were not "material" to the
Secretary's job.
What types of conclusions can be drawn from the Henry Cisneros case study?

Conducting an analysis and/or comparison of the various sex scandals requires
an attem pt at comparing hum an relations from different settings in the
evolution of governm ent—executive discretion, congressional oversight,
security concerns, etc., the press, and societal attitudes about public officials,
their privacy as it relates to infidelity and attendant ramifications of sexual
indiscretion. To simplify w ould mean the loss of nuance. However, some broad
g e n e r a liz a tio n s a n d a n a tte m p t

at p r io ritiz a tio n can be m ade w it h regard to

some of the variables discussed:
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1. Changes in presidential and/or secretarial relationships are crucial in
the prolonging or shortening of the scandal process until the
resignation finally occurs—President Clinton's support did not wane
until the end of the first term, but Attorney General Reno (and her
staff) were forced to confront the illegalities of specific activities.
2. The stability of the lover (or participant in the sex act) with regard to
remaining silent about an affair is key to the eruption of the scandal
or its progression and is one variable that is beyond the control of a
president, secretary or under-secretary.
3. Like the unstable lover, a spouse or family can provide the spark
through comments to the press or divorce—the duration of the
impact on the scandal process of the family, like the intimate, is an
unpredictable variable because a long, messy draw n-out divorced
proceeding is unforeseeable. Mary Alice chose the family and her
husband's career over divorce and skewering him in the press.
4. The public's moral tem perature or mood trum ps all executive
d isc r e tio n in c a se s o f s e x u a l in d isc r e tio n —th e c itize n r y 's

response to

the case of Henry Cisneros, a forerunner to President Clinton's sexual
indiscretion, exhibited the understanding and tolerance of the moral
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frailties of its officials. Likewise, as public conceptions of extra marital
relationships change, "payments" between couples that are
publicized m ay be understood as a form of alimony or palimony. The
public dialogue over moral issues as identified by D unn play a role in
whether an executive and the press, and their judgm ents, vary in
pow er regarding the progression of a scandal.
5. A not so insignificant player in the scandal process is the advisor or
administrative assistant whose role is implied by the m ention of Wing
and Anderson at H.U.D. in the O.I.C. report, because their decisions
regarding silence about issues are all important in speeding or
retarding the development of the scandal progress.
6. Positive personal, professional or political relationships w ith members
of Congress are of little benefit during the progression of a scandal if
the following variables are in place (while it is difficult to rule out any
variant to a sexual scandal at the Cabinet level, these variables hold
true):
•

if th e a lle g e d se x u a l in d isc r e tio n or a tte n d in g a c tiv ity is r e la ted in

any way to work,
•

if there is the likelihood that a house of Congress will be lost to
the opposition,
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•

if there is the likelihood that a major policy proposal/program will
be lost, and

•

if senators—particularly chairpersons of oversight comm ittees—
of either party, are insistent on high ethical/moral standards and
action, as compared with those who are personally dealing with
the subject of sexual/ethical scandal or attending problems.

In keeping with Jimenez's (2004) statements about the opposition party's
policy and political objectives being served by an attack on the executive, it
could be concluded that a majority opposition party will be inclined to speed
the resignation of secretary or under-secretary by the means of a careful
examination of a scandalized nominee during a confirmation process, closer
oversight of a scandalized secretary, and/or impeachment as a last weapon. In
the case of Henry Cisneros, members of the congressional majority called for his
resignation and were probably pleased when an independent counsel was
requested.
What was the role of the press? It served as a conduit of information to the

public and its reaction to scandal is symptomatic of the values of the time.
When the actual information regarding the affair became public, an analyst
c o m m e n tin g o n th e situ a tio n w a s c o n c e rn ed that ta b lo id te le v is io n m ig h t

buy

Linda M edlar's story about the affair, thereby keeping it before the public. Five
years later, a $15,000 check from a tabloid television program provided the
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incentive for Linda M edlar to go forward w ith the story of H enry Cisneros'
misstatements to the F.B.I. W ould she have "told all" if the m oney had not been
offered?
After the post-Medlar tabloid appearance, the subsequent support of
Secretary Cisneros by President Clinton of and the silence of the independent
counsel, minimized the role of the press—little was known that could have
sped along the scandal process until indictments were handed dow n and by
that time, Cisneros had resigned his post. The changes in the attitude of the
press as discussed in Summers is also key in understanding the development of
the Cisneros scandal, although the advent of tabloid television w as not
discussed. In the post-W ater gate press's environment, Henry Cisneros felt the
brunt of skepticism about executive administration and claims of privacy.
While candidate Clinton and then-mayor Cisneros had inoculated themselves
against the actual scandal, unfortunately for Cisneros—in accordance with
Williams' assertion about attacks by institutions with their ow n agenda—the
media attacked the story told by the secretary. The press' coverage of Linda
M e d la r 's tell-a ll sto r y o n th e p u b lic a ttitu d e is u n k n o w n to th is a u th or, b u t

because of President Clinton's reading of the polls and/or his determination to
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retain an effective administrator, he showed resolve to retain his Cabinet
secretary.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Anticipated by the Founding Fathers and provided for in the
Constitution, a sex scandal at the Cabinet or sub-Cabinet level is a fascinating,
multi-faceted, democratic phenomenon. The aim of this research was to provide
answers to the following questions:
•

What is the general sequence of events that makes u p a scandal?

•

What factors impact the development of a sex scandal at the Cabinet
and sub-Cabinet level?

Borne out by the scandals of Alexander Hamilton, John Eaton, Sumner Welles,
and H enry Cisneros, plus the literature, is the following general sequence of
events or phases and factors that impact the development of a sexual scandal at
the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet levels. Significant to the first phase, as well as
subsequent phases of the scandal, are the alternate paths by which actors are
im pacted by other actors, events and context.
What is the general sequence of events that composes the first phase—the alleged
hehavior—o f a sex scandal? A Cabinet or sub-Cabinet executive behaves in ways

that are subject to allegations of sexual impropriety, or arising from the past
259
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m ay be allegations of a similar nature, and any attendant factors. With or
without the knowledge of a third party's discovery of the alleged impropriety,
the secretary or under-secretary proceeds w ith their job responsibilities.
What are the factors that impact the development of the first phase? Behaviors

m ust qualify as scandalous. There is no scandal unless the public believes it to
have been scandalized by a violation of societal norm s of behavior. A distinct
factor of this phase is the state of relationships between family members, lovers
and executives prior to the scandal. The quality of these relationships m ay be
crucial to the release of the scandalous information, the offer of employment in
the Cabinet and subsequent support during the scandal. Traits of individuals
involved in the alleged affair such as their marital status or gender, a sexual
indiscretion track record by the indiscrete individual, a legal record of the
behavior, and/or attem pts to conceal the affair and/or attendant facts of the
affair may have varying impacts either solo or in concert on the phase resulting
in the unfolding during Phase 2.
What is the general sequence o f events in Phase — the unfolding? After
p r o v id in g in fo r m a tio n o f a lle g e d in d isc r e tio n

to th e various institutional

representatives, a messenger(s) m ay continue to be an actor in the process.
Institutional representatives may choose to investigate the allegations and/or
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transmit the allegation to other institutional actors. Such an investigation may
produce a record that may be "used" in the future. Oversight responsibilities
may result in a presentation of the information to the secretary or under
secretary. Investigatory reporting by the press may lead to the release of the
story, thereby leading to decreased poll num bers for the administration,
pressures for a "full" investigation and possible electoral consequences.
What factors impact the unfolding of the sexual scandal? The messengers may

be either public and/or private individuals who, if armed w ith documentation
of sexual indiscretion, wield great power because of their ability to release the
information to the press, public, Congress, and/or executives. M ultiple releases
of the documents may increase the likelihood of the scandal being investigated
and/or released rather than being "lost" in the government.
What is the general sequence of events in Phase 3 —The Explanation and
Investigation? After a secretary or under-secretary's explanation of events, an

exoneration, resignation or cover-up m ay occur w ith the approval of the senior
executive involved. News of the decision m ay be transm itted to any of the other
in stitu tio n a l actors a n d r e su lt in in action , an in v e stig a tio n ,

or transmission to

others or the press. Competing actors m ay force another investigation and/or
plead their case with the president for the resignation of the offender. Choosing
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to cover-up or deny the results, the president may face the release of the story
to the press and public.
What is the general sequence o f events in Phase 4 —Inter-Executive and
Congressional Competition? With the statutory power to continue a Cabinet

executive's tenure, a president decides to retain an executive. The repercussions
m ay be reduced morale, pressure from competing elites, expenditures of
political capital, and/or reduced public support, possibly leading to electoral
losses. The length of the secretary or under-secretary's tenure is usually
determined by any num ber of factors, including a president's skills, policy and
political disputes, etc., but its conclusion is usually determ ined by a
precipitating event.
What factors impact the development of the Inter-Executive and Congressional
Competition Phase? In order to preserve his/her position, a secretary or under

secretary m ay m ake an increased effort to be on good term s with the president,
engage critics to reduce their political strength, and reduce the likelihood of
dismissal by taking on new job responsibilities.
W h e n e x e c u tiv e s ' r e la tio n sh ip s c h a n g e , th e se p e r so n a lity ,

political,

and/or administrative conflicts m ay reduce the tenure of the accused.
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Effective presidential tactics are im portant tools to preserve an
executive's tenure. The m otivations for retaining the accused m ay eminate from
the president's personal history support, but an executive's tenure m ay
eventually succumb to the chief executive's legacy concerns.
In a competitive political environment, access to the press in order to get
out the details of the scandal m ay m ean the difference between steady and
dropping poll numbers or electoral defeat.
A sexual scandal which results in the loss of political capital in the form
of lost policy opportunities m ay result in a truncated tenure. Congressional
oversight in the form of calls for an investigation and/or the extreme of calling
for hearings might hasten the resignation of the accused.
Public polling and elections that reflects the public's m ood about a
sexual indiscretion m ay result in a reduction of the Congressional contingent
affiliated w ith the president.
The aforementioned phases and factors have been supplem ented by the
data provided by the H enry Cisneros scandal which showed the importance of
community and press' standards that "imm unized" a potential executive and
governmental mechanisms for controlling indiscrete executives have increased
over the last fifty years w ith the advent of the vetting process, the office of the
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independent counsel, and various statutory hurdles or penalties. Congressional
oversight has been extended by counsels and courts.
A sum m ary of the scandal information delivery and reception bares
repeating because of its impact on the scandal process. Linda Medlar was
interviewed for a national news program and discussed statements by Cisneros
that were false; the statements were then passed along to Attorney General
Janet Reno who was required to investigate the allegations, eventually resulting
in a request for an independent counsel. Under the law, an investigation is
required if substantial evidence is presented. The continued investigation of
charges or an admission by the accused to breaking the law - in this case lying
to the F.B.I. results in reduced length of tenure.
The framers of the Constitution and the early practitioners of the
government of the United States, w hom vested accountability with the
president alone in the m atter of Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials, would not be
surprised by 200 years of checks and balances needed in the relationship
between the executive branch - president and his Cabinet and sub-Cabinet
a p p o in te e s - a n d th e C o n g r e ss in re g a rd

to scandal. R e m e d ie s for inappropriate

behavior are essentially the same, requiring diligent legislative and executive
oversight as well as administrative mechanisms - an auditor or independent
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council - to insure that nothing illegal had transpired. In the realm of sexual
indiscretion by Cabinet or sub-Cabinet officials, presidents have not been
released from concerns over congressional discovery, or public disapproval of
errant husbands/wives or its impacts on effective administration. Nor are
executives safe from investigations revealing indiscretions, like the rather
quaint investigation of Alexander Hamilton by three members of Congress.
Each of the variables added is an expression of the democratic culture in
search of a means to protect itself from undesirable executive behavior. H ow
well our democracy is expressing itself is also of interest in concluding this
chapter about Henry Cisneros' foibles. As was noted earlier in the m anuscript,
the historical record is very thin w ith regard to scandals of this nature. The
Cisneros scandal record has not been exempted from efforts to reduce w hat is
available to researchers, i.e. the sealing of court documents, agreements
between parties in lawsuits, and most recently the decision by the Office of the
Independent Counsel to bar the public from internet access to the final report
that w as posted on the internet in January, 2006. This research has been limited
by w hat is m ade available to the public and it is the hope of this researcher that
governmental institutions will increase transparency with regard to documents
so as to strengthen our democracy.
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Review of Sumner Welles Dismissal Literature
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Historians have proposed many different reasons for the resignation of
Sumner Welles. Lingeman (1970) briefly mentions that Welles attem pted to
circumvent Hull until the former was forced out on account of the scandal.
Perrett (1973) and Hoehling (1970) framed the dispute between Welles and Hull
as an ongoing dispute between the "realists" and "idealists" w ithin the State
Department, but do not explain how the under-secretary was removed. Burg
(1996) identifies personal animosity as the motivating factor forcing Welles'
resignation. Burns (1970) identifies Welles' independently dealing w ith the
White House and foreign envoys as reasons for his removal. W ithout
mentioning the sexual scandal surrounding Welles, Michelson (1944) identifies
issues of Roosevelt's unwillingness to allow Hull to choose his ow n m en in the
State Department. Hull's insecurity with possibly being replaced by Welles, the
under-secretary's willingness to carry out assignments that should have been
handled by Hull or through his office, leaked stories that an embarrassed Hull
attributed to Welles, a poor personal relationship between the two men,
differing opinions on Soviet-U.S. relations at a crucial point in time, and
F.D.R.'s u n w illin g n e s s to b reak u p h is C a b in et a s im p o rta n t fa cto rs in a c c ep tin g
Welles' resignation.
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Beschloss (2002) identifies accusations of Welles' homosexual liaisons as
a security risk, which precluded Roosevelt from assigning him to the Moscow
Conference, but the author does not elaborate. Herzstein (1989) adds a threeyear cover up to the scandal, focuses on Hull's dislike of his under-secretary
because he feared that F.D.R. was grooming him to be secretary of state, and
Roosevelt's desire to control the State Department, but does not identify the
accusations of sexual indiscretion. In a summary of the diplomatic career of
Welles—using secondary sources such as Hull's memoirs prim arily—Graff
(1988) identifies personality conflict, policy differences such as the development
of an international organization, administrative friction, etc., over 10 years of
service together that caused the final rift; Hull then used the possibility of
scandal as a means to have Welles removed. Daniels (1975) identifies the
essential elements of the behavior on the Southern Railway train returning from
Alabama, Christian Bullitt's part in spreading details of the indiscretion, and
Welles' bypassing of Hull to communicate with the president, probably
encouraged by F.D.R., but the author does not link the resignation to the
in d isc r e tio n . Ig n o r in g H u ll's ro le

in the situation, Black (2003) claims that

Bullitt's gossip about the incident on the train eventually caused Welles to
become demoralized and resign. Dallek (1979) identifies issues of trust,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

269
authority, departmental morale, congressional support and adm inistrative style
as the main reasons for the A ugust 1943 ultim atum from Hull to F.D.R. Dallek
contends that the under-secretary had usurped the secretary's authority and
remarks by Welles to the press were embarrassing, thereby destroying the
relationship between the secretary and his underling. Dallek reports H ulls'
insistence that Welles' homosexual activities w ould have consequences for the
department, and particularly for the administration's relationship w ith the
Senate. For Dallek, the resignation was a product of F.D.R.'s administrative
strategy—divide the State Department through rivalry between H ull and
Welles so that F.D.R. would be the ultimate arbiter.
Besides Welles' indiscretion, Fleming (2001) identifies the controversy
over Loy Henderson as a reason for Hull and Bullitt's attack on Welles'
administration of the State Department. Henderson, a Soviet specialist, was
caught up in a controversy resulting from Soviet and U.S. relations. W hen the
British and Americans were unable to invade France in 1943, Foreign Minister
Litvinov used the opportunity to ask for the resignation or reassignm ent of
H e n d e r s o n a n d R ay A th e r to n , w h o o p p o s e d th e S o v ie t state. F le m in g

m aintained that either Welles was being blackmailed over his bisexual behavior
by the Soviets or hoping that the purging of anti-Soviet officials w ould
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strengthen his position vis-a-vis Hull, resulting in his prom otion to Hull's
position. Hull was enraged over the request. Fleming continues that it was
Welles' abandonment of Henderson that resulted in the loss of his staff support
from within the State Department and the opportunity for Bullitt and H ull to
attack his administrative behavior in the press. The W ashington Times-Herald,
the New York Times and Chicago Tribune attacked FDR's poor
administering—his preference for Welles over H ull—of the State Department
for the Welles and Hull feud that led to the paralysis of the department.
Fleming concludes that F.D.R. m ade one m ore attem pt to keep Welles on by
offering him a mission to Moscow, but exposure of Welles' indiscretions during
future negotiations would be explosive if F.D.R. chose Hull over him. A bitter,
burned out Welles had become a liability and agreed to the departure (Fleming,
2001).
One principal articulated specific reasons for the dismissal of Sumner
Welles. Cordell Hull in his memoirs (1948) discussed that he had a num ber of
discussions with President Roosevelt regarding the resignation of Welles, prior
to h is r e m o v a l a s w e ll a s th e r e a ss ig n m e n t

of Welles to special situations

outside of the country. According to Hull, the major reasons for Welles removal
were his "readiness to make major decisions from time to time without
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consulting" (the secretary) (p. 1227), insistence upon going to the president
without the secretary's knowledge, efforts to have the president m ake a
decision without informing the secretary, deficiencies in knowledge regarding
certain policy areas, failures in following protocol regarding foreign emissaries
access to the secretary, communications outside of proper channels, making
policy speeches without the secretary's approval, distraction from the efficient
supervision of the administrative apparatus and unwillingness to do teamwork.
While Morgan (1985) offers a good, short, general synopsis of the
historical factors m entioned by the previous authors and the major
contributors, complete treatm ents of the scandal, as it relates to length of
tenure, is provided by Irwin Gellman (1995) and Benjamin Welles (1997). Curt
Gentry (1991) augments these authors with a lim ited and precise description of
the scandal from J. Edgar H oover's perspective. Using prim ary docum ents from
the papers of F.D.R., Hull, Welles, and other members of the administration,
Benjamin Welles and Irwin Gellman provide som e of the factors that
determ ined the length of tenure.
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Table 1: Cisneros 1990 Paym ents to M edlar
Paym ent Date
January 2,1990
February 1,1990
March 5,1990
April 10,1990
May 3,1990
May 31,1990
June 29,1990
September 13,1990
October 5,1990
October 12,1990
November 1,1990
December 4,1990
December 8,1990
Total

Paym ent Am ount
$2,500
$3,000
$2,500
$2,500
$2,500
$4,500
$3,000
$3,900
$4,000
$5,100
$3,000
$4,000
$4,000
$44,500
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Table 2: Cisneros 1991 Payments to M edlar
Paym ent Date
January 9,1991
February 2,1991
February 7,1991
February 26,1991
April 17,1991
April 18,1991
May 1,1991
May 31,1991
July 3,1991
July 18,1991
A ugust 2,1991
A ugust 29,1991
September 5,1991
October 2,1991
November 5,1991
November 20,1991
December 2,1991
December 7,1991
December 13,1991
December 31,1991
Total

Paym ent Am ount
$6,000.00
$4,000.00
$1,000.00
$12,000.00
$4,000.00
$4,000.00
$4,000.00
$4,000.00
$4,582.00
$2,500.00
$4,000.00
$2,000.00
$2,017.21
$4,500.00
$3,925.00
$2,000.00
$4,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$2,500.00
$73,024.21
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Table 3: Cisneros' January 1992 - Novem ber 3,1992
Paym ents to M edlar
Paym ent D ate
January 9,1992
January 21,1992
February 5,1992
February 5,1992
February 11,1992
March 2,1992
March 10,1992
April 3,1992
April 10,1992
April 15,1992
May 5,1992
June 1,1992
June 2,1992
July 6,1992
July 14,1992
August 3,1992
August 24,1992
September 2,1992
October 2,1992
October 7,1992
October 15,1992
October 19,1992
November 3,1992
November 9,1992
November 9,1992
November 13,1992
D e c e m b er 16, 1992

December 18,1992
Total

Paym ent Am ount
$1,200
$1,000
$1,700
$ 700
$1,600
$3,000
$1,000
$2,500
$1,500
$ 500
$4,000
$1,900
$2,500
$2,500
$2,000
$4,000
$2,000
$2,500
$2,000
$1,900
$ 650
$ 500
$2,000
$1,000
$1,000
$2,000
$8,000
$8,000
$63,150
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Table 4: Cisneros' January 4, 1993 - December 3,1993
Payments to M edlar
Paym ent Date
January 4,1993
January 19,1993
January 19,1993
January 28,1993
February 10,1993
February 16,1993
February 24,1993
March 15,1993
July 16,1993
October 12,1993
December 3,1993
Total

Payment A m ount
$4,000
$ 845
$1,000
$5,000
$7,500
$15,000
$15,000
$10,873
$15,000
$ 4,000
$ 1,300
$79,518

Table 5: Jaffe's Paym ents to M edlar
Payment Date
Summer 1993
November 3,1993
December 13,1993
January 25,1994
Total

Payment A m ount
$1,500
$5,000
$2,000
$10,648*
$19,148

’‘This total was arrived at as a result of subtracting the am ount of the $12,000
check rem itted to Michael Wooten and his subsequent subtraction of traveling
expenses.
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